{"id":113404,"date":"2026-07-16T10:35:59","date_gmt":"2026-07-16T05:05:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/?p=113404"},"modified":"2026-07-16T10:51:51","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T05:21:51","slug":"daily-editorial-analysis-16-july-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/daily-editorial-analysis-16-july-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Daily Editorial Analysis 16 July 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><strong>Iran\u2019s Disruptive Strategy, Its Global Consequences<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran&#8217;s recent actions in the <strong>Strait of Hormuz<\/strong> have intensified concerns over regional stability, global energy security, and the future of <strong>West Asian geopolitics<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>While these actions may have delivered short-term <strong>tactical<\/strong> gains, they risk becoming long-term <strong>strategic failures<\/strong> by deepening Iran&#8217;s international isolation, weakening its economy, and straining relations with neighbouring Gulf states.<\/li>\n<li>In contrast, India&#8217;s emphasis on multilateralism and diplomacy demonstrates a more sustainable approach to achieving influence in international affairs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>A Strategy of Disruption<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Since the <strong>Iran-Iraq War<\/strong>, Iran has projected itself as a champion of <strong>Islamic resistance<\/strong> against Western influence and Israel.<\/li>\n<li>This ideological position evolved into support for proxy organisations such as <strong>Hezbollah<\/strong>, <strong>Hamas<\/strong>, and the <strong>Houthis<\/strong>, collectively known as the <strong>Axis of Resistance<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Through these groups, Iran expanded its regional influence without engaging directly in large-scale military confrontations.<\/li>\n<li>Although this strategy created significant <strong>operational success<\/strong> by challenging adversaries and maintaining pressure on the United States and Israel, it also widened Iran&#8217;s diplomatic isolation.<\/li>\n<li>Today, its closest strategic partners remain Russia, China, and North Korea , reflecting a foreign policy centred on confrontation rather than cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>Tactical victories have therefore come at the cost of reduced international legitimacy, weaker economic integration, and limited opportunities for long-term development.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>India&#8217;s Approach<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India has maintained a pragmatic relationship with Iran based on <strong>energy security<\/strong>, trade, and the <strong>Chabahar Port<\/strong> while carefully balancing its broader foreign policy interests.<\/li>\n<li>Even during periods of Western sanctions, India protected its national interests by maintaining limited energy imports before gradually diversifying its oil sources.<\/li>\n<li>During the recent regional crisis, India adopted a policy of <strong>strategic restraint<\/strong>, avoiding direct mediation while encouraging dialogue through quiet diplomacy.<\/li>\n<li>Its support for <strong>UN Security Council Resolution 2817<\/strong>, which condemned attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council (<strong>GCC<\/strong>) countries and international shipping, reflected its commitment to international law and maritime security.<\/li>\n<li>This balanced approach aligns with India&#8217;s vision of a <strong>multipolar world<\/strong>, where disputes are addressed through cooperation and consensus rather than military confrontation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Regional Consequences<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran&#8217;s attacks on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and its proposal to impose preferential transit rates for selected countries represent a policy of <strong>coercive brinkmanship<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Such actions threaten one of the world&#8217;s most important maritime trade routes, creating uncertainty for oil-importing nations and disrupting global commerce.<\/li>\n<li>Countries such as India, whose economic growth depends heavily on uninterrupted energy supplies and secure trade corridors, are particularly vulnerable to prolonged instability in the region.<\/li>\n<li>Domestically, Iran has emerged from recent conflicts politically hardened. The growing influence of the <strong>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)<\/strong> and conservative clerics suggests that future policies may continue to favour limited confrontation below the threshold of full-scale war.<\/li>\n<li>This environment reduces prospects for moderation while increasing the risk of recurring regional tensions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Choice Before Iran<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran possesses significant economic potential as an <strong>upper-middle-income economy<\/strong> with vast energy resources.<\/li>\n<li>Opportunities such as the <strong>de-freezing of assets<\/strong>, expanding <strong>oil exports<\/strong>, and greater participation in global markets could generate sustained economic growth and improve the welfare of its citizens.<\/li>\n<li>Achieving these goals, however, requires replacing confrontation with <strong>diplomatic engagement<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Continued reliance on proxy warfare, coercive tactics, and threats to international navigation will likely prolong economic isolation and discourage foreign investment.<\/li>\n<li>Greater cooperation with the international community would strengthen regional stability while enabling Iran to benefit from expanded trade and energy partnerships.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Iran stands at a critical crossroads between continued confrontation and constructive engagement.<\/li>\n<li>While its recent military actions have demonstrated tactical capability, they have also increased diplomatic isolation, economic uncertainty, and regional instability.<\/li>\n<li>Lasting national progress depends not on coercion but on <strong>economic integration<\/strong>, <strong>international cooperation<\/strong>, and responsible diplomacy.<\/li>\n<li>Compared with Iran&#8217;s disruptive strategy, India&#8217;s commitment to <strong>dialogue<\/strong>, <strong>consensus<\/strong>, and <strong>strategic autonomy<\/strong> offers a more effective model for navigating an increasingly interconnected and multipolar world.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Iran\u2019s Disruptive Strategy, Its Global Consequences FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1.<\/strong> Why is Iran&#8217;s strategy considered a strategic failure?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Iran&#8217;s strategy is considered a strategic failure because it has increased international isolation despite achieving short-term military gains.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> What is the Axis of Resistance?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The Axis of Resistance is a network of Iran-backed groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3. <\/strong>How has India responded to the Iran crisis?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>India has responded through strategic restraint, quiet diplomacy, and support for international law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> Why is the Strait of Hormuz important?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The Strait of Hormuz is important because it is a vital route for global oil trade and international shipping.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> What should Iran do for long-term progress?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Iran should prioritise diplomatic engagement, economic integration, and peaceful cooperation with the international community.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/op-ed\/irans-disruptive-strategy-its-global-consequences\/article71226748.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>One Nation, One Election &#8211; Constitutional Reform or Misplaced Priority?<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill seeks to implement One Nation, One Election (ONOE) by synchronising elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies.<\/li>\n<li>This will be done through the insertion of <strong>Article 82A <\/strong>and amendments to Articles 83 and 172.<\/li>\n<li>The proposal, based on the recommendations of the High-Level Committee (HLC) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, requires a <strong>two-thirds majority<\/strong> in Parliament and <strong>ratification <\/strong>by at least half of the States.<\/li>\n<li>Hence, there is the need to <strong>critically evaluate<\/strong> the government&#8217;s rationale and highlight constitutional, political, and economic concerns.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Government&#8217;s Rationale for ONOE<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>The HLC justifies simultaneous elections on four major grounds &#8211;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reduction in election expenditure.<\/li>\n<li>Minimising policy paralysis caused by the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).<\/li>\n<li>Lower administrative and security burden.<\/li>\n<li>Higher <strong>economic growth<\/strong>, citing research claiming that GDP growth is around 1.5 percentage points higher during simultaneous election cycles.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Questioning the Economic Growth Argument<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Historical evidence contradicts the claim:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>India&#8217;s period of simultaneous elections (1952\u20131967) coincided with the &#8220;Hindu Rate of Growth&#8221; (~3.5% annually), characterised by licence raj, import substitution, and closed economy.<\/li>\n<li>India&#8217;s highest growth phase (2003\u20132011) occurred during staggered elections, with GDP growth of 8\u20139%.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Methodological concerns:<\/strong><\/li>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>The cited research may not adequately account for major growth drivers such as 1991 economic reforms, trade liberalisation, IT revolution, global capital inflows, and financial sector development.<\/li>\n<li>Further, the reported growth appears partly driven by higher fiscal deficits, and increased government expenditure.<\/li>\n<li>This raises the possibility of a <strong>political business cycle<\/strong> rather than sustainable structural growth.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Election Expenditure &#8211; Does ONOE Reduce Costs?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Limited government spending: <\/strong>Election expenditure by the government constitutes less than <strong>1%<\/strong> of the Union Budget, according to Election Commission of India (ECI) accounts.<\/li>\n<li><strong>The real issue &#8211; Black money:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Candidates officially report spending only about 50% of the permissible expenditure limit. This suggests substantial unaccounted election financing.<\/li>\n<li>The Centre for Media Studies (CMS) estimates that the 2024 Lok Sabha election involved over \u20b91 lakh crore in expenditure, much of it believed to be unaccounted.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Hence, ONOE merely concentrates election expenditure rather than reducing the role of black money or campaign financing.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>MCC &#8211; Problem Shifted, Not Solved<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Currently, different states remain under MCC for nearly four months annually due to staggered elections.<\/li>\n<li>Under ONOE, the MCC would apply simultaneously across the country, and developmental announcements would be suspended nationwide during one large election period.<\/li>\n<li>Thus, governance disruption is concentrated rather than eliminated, making the claim of ending &#8220;policy paralysis&#8221; questionable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Constitutional and Democratic Concerns<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Impact on parliamentary democracy:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The Kesavananda Bharati judgment recognised parliamentary democracy and free and fair elections as part of the <strong>Basic Structure<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Challenge: <\/strong>If a government loses its majority before the common election cycle, it cannot continue without democratic legitimacy, and frequent President&#8217;s Rule would undermine federalism.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Constructive no-confidence motion: <\/strong>The HLC proposes adopting <strong>Germany&#8217;s <\/strong>model, where a no-confidence motion must simultaneously elect an alternative government.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Critics argue this: <\/strong>Alters India&#8217;s parliamentary tradition. Enables weak minority governments to remain in office.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Fixed synchronisation requires altering assembly tenures:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Achieving the first synchronised cycle would require extending some Assemblies, while curtailing others.<\/li>\n<li>However, Articles 83 and 172 limit legislative tenure to five years. Extension without elections violates the electorate&#8217;s mandate. Premature dissolution shortens the tenure voters approved.<\/li>\n<li>Hence, both options compromise democratic legitimacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Threat to federalism and regional parties:<\/strong><\/li>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>Research indicates a &#8220;<strong>wave effect<\/strong>&#8221; &#8211; Simultaneous elections encourage voters to support the same party at both national and state levels.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Potential consequences:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Electoral advantage for large national parties.<\/li>\n<li>Weakening of regional parties.<\/li>\n<li>Reduced attention to state-specific issues such as agrarian distress, coastal livelihoods, flood management, and regional development priorities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>This may dilute India&#8217;s cooperative federal structure.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Ignoring Local Government Elections<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The proposal excludes elections to the Panchayats, and the Urban Local Bodies.<\/li>\n<li>These are constitutionally protected under the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Key concerns:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Local body elections remain under State Election Commissions, not the ECI.<\/li>\n<li>Municipal corporations such as Mumbai, Pune, and Bengaluru manage budgets exceeding those of several states.<\/li>\n<li>Separate local elections would continue to involve administrative deployment, security arrangements, and governance disruptions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Therefore, many projected efficiency gains remain unrealised.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Reforms Needed Instead of ONOE<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India&#8217;s electoral challenges lie elsewhere and can be addressed without major constitutional amendments.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Reforms needed:<\/strong><\/li>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>Transparent disclosure of political donations.<\/li>\n<li>Strict enforcement of expenditure limits.<\/li>\n<li>Disqualification of criminally tainted candidates.<\/li>\n<li>Strengthening the independence and autonomy of the Election Commission of India.<\/li>\n<li>Measures to curb black money, vote-buying, and misuse of state machinery.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The proposed One Nation, One Election framework primarily reorganises India&#8217;s electoral calendar without addressing the structural weaknesses of the electoral system.<\/li>\n<li>The anticipated gains remain uncertain, while the proposal raises significant concerns.<\/li>\n<li>Hence, strengthening electoral integrity through <strong>targeted reforms<\/strong> would be a more effective and constitutionally sound approach than undertaking a far-reaching constitutional restructuring.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>One Nation, One Election FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1<\/strong>. What are the constitutional concerns associated with the ONOE proposal?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Basic Structure doctrine, parliamentary democracy, legislative tenure, federalism, and free and fair elections.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2<\/strong>. Why is the claim that ONOE will boost India&#8217;s economic growth contested?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Historical evidence shows India&#8217;s highest growth occurred during staggered elections.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3<\/strong>. Why may ONOE fail to substantially reduce election expenditure in India?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Because the major source of election spending is unaccounted political finance and black money.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4<\/strong>. How could simultaneous elections affect India&#8217;s federal structure and regional political representation?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. It may create a national wave effect, strengthening national parties while weakening regional parties.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5<\/strong>. What are the key electoral reforms that could improve India&#8217;s democratic process without adopting ONOE?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Strengthening political funding transparency, enforcing expenditure limits, disqualifying criminal candidates, etc.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/opinion\/columns\/one-nation-one-election-will-not-fix-what-is-broken-10788422\/?ref=opinion_pg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><strong>IE<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>The Crisis at the Heart of Non-Proliferation<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Iran nuclear standoff has reopened a long-standing debate on the <strong>fairness<\/strong> of the global non-proliferation order.<\/li>\n<li>As talks in Doha struggle over frozen assets and verification issues, Iran is being asked to fully dismantle its enriched uranium stockpile, even though President Pezeshkian maintains that enrichment is Iran&#8217;s sovereign right.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>five recognised nuclear powers<\/strong>, and Israel too, face no similar demand to disarm.<\/li>\n<li>In this context, this article argues that the non-proliferation regime punishes compliance while rewarding defiance.<\/li>\n<li>It examines the unequal application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), and the broader debate over fairness, disarmament and the credibility of the existing international nuclear order.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Core Question<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Why must Iran give up a capability that nine nuclear states already hold?<\/li>\n<li>Analysts say the claim that Iran is &#8220;uniquely dangerous&#8221; is not backed by evidence.<\/li>\n<li>It is a <strong>conclusion states reach first and justify later<\/strong>, especially states whose own record on international law is inconsistent.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Unequal Rules Under the NPT<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Treaty on the <strong>Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<\/strong> was meant to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Instead, it froze an unequal hierarchy in place.<\/li>\n<li>It split the <strong>world into nuclear &#8220;haves&#8221; and &#8220;have-nots<\/strong>.&#8221; Have-nots must show restraint. Haves keep modernising their arsenals.<\/li>\n<li>This double standard plays out clearly in practice:\n<ul>\n<li>India and Pakistan stay outside the NPT, hold real nuclear arsenals, and are still treated as strategic partners by major powers.<\/li>\n<li>Israel has never allowed inspections of its widely known nuclear programme and is rarely named as a proliferation risk.<\/li>\n<li>Iran, by contrast, enriched uranium within a legal framework, accepted the most intrusive inspections in arms control history under the JCPOA, and was still hit with sanctions after U.S. withdrawal from the deal.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Hiroshima and the Question of Moral Authority<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>As per the experts, the origin of today&#8217;s nuclear order lies in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the only wartime use of nuclear weapons in history.<\/li>\n<li>That act set two precedents: it showed the devastating power of these weapons, and it showed that their use could be absorbed into the language of &#8220;strategic necessity.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>The state that used them became the very state that now polices nuclear order elsewhere. This complicates any moral claim to regulate others&#8217; nuclear ambitions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The JCPOA&#8217;s Collapse and Its Lesson<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated under the Obama administration, was a genuine diplomatic achievement.<\/li>\n<li>Its abandonment by the Trump administration in 2018 sent a clear signal to every state watching: agreements with the U.S. carry no guarantee of lasting compliance.<\/li>\n<li>This collapse is responsible for deepening the current crisis.<\/li>\n<li>The real issue is not whether Iran should enrich uranium. It is whether the framework judging that question is fair to begin with.<\/li>\n<li>The call for total nuclear abolition dates back to the 1955 Einstein-Russell declaration, which warned that deterrence logic will eventually produce the catastrophe it claims to prevent.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The non-proliferation order rewards power, not principle. Iran&#8217;s compliance was punished; others&#8217; defiance was tolerated.<\/li>\n<li>Until disarmament obligations bind all states equally, the choice before the world remains stark: confront nuclear hierarchy through honest policy reform, or wait for catastrophe to force the reckoning.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Crisis at the Heart of Non-Proliferation FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1.<\/strong> Why does the article describe the global non-proliferation regime as facing a legitimacy crisis?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans:<\/strong> It argues that unequal treatment of states, selective enforcement and inconsistent disarmament obligations have weakened the credibility and fairness of the existing nuclear order.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> How does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) differentiate between states?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans:<\/strong> The NPT recognises a limited group of nuclear-weapon states while requiring non-nuclear states to forgo nuclear weapons and accept international safeguards and inspections.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3.<\/strong> Why is the collapse of the JCPOA considered significant?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans:<\/strong> The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA undermined confidence in diplomatic agreements, raising concerns about the durability of negotiated nuclear non-proliferation arrangements.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> How does the article compare Iran&#8217;s nuclear programme with those of other states?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans:<\/strong> The article argues that different standards are often applied to various nuclear-capable states, fuelling debates over consistency, equity and the legitimacy of global non-proliferation policies.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> What reform does the article suggest for strengthening the non-proliferation regime?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans:<\/strong> It advocates universal application of disarmament obligations, equal treatment of all states and renewed commitment to global nuclear arms reduction and international cooperation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/op-ed\/the-crisis-at-the-heart-of-non-proliferation\/article71225474.ece#:~:text=Unequal%20rules,to%20modernise%20their%20nuclear%20arsenals.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">TH<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Daily Editorial Analysis 16 July 2026 by Vajiram &#038; Ravi covers key editorials from The Hindu &#038; Indian Express with UPSC-focused insights and relevance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":86373,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[138],"tags":[141,882,909],"class_list":["post-113404","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-daily-editorial-analysis","tag-daily-editorial-analysis","tag-the-hindu-editorial-analysis","tag-the-indian-express-analysis","no-featured-image-padding"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113404","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/34"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=113404"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113404\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":113411,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113404\/revisions\/113411"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/86373"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=113404"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=113404"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=113404"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}