{"id":127236,"date":"2026-10-03T09:21:17","date_gmt":"2026-10-03T03:51:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/?p=127236"},"modified":"2026-10-03T11:32:15","modified_gmt":"2026-10-03T06:02:15","slug":"daily-editorial-analysis-3-october-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/daily-editorial-analysis-3-october-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Daily Editorial Analysis 3 October 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><strong>A Court Divided by Its Own Architecture <\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Supreme Court of India is the <strong>guardian of the Constitution<\/strong> and is expected to provide authoritative answers to fundamental legal questions.<\/li>\n<li>However, its expanding workload, fragmented Bench system and delays in constituting Constitution Benches have created significant institutional challenges.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>September 23 split verdict<\/strong> concerning the Chief Election Commissioner and other <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/chief-election-commissioner-and-other-election-commissioners-act-2023\/\" target=\"_blank\">Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023<\/a><\/strong> illustrates these difficulties.<\/li>\n<li>The disagreement was not initially about the validity of the law but about whether a <strong>two-judge Bench was competent<\/strong> to decide the challenge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><strong>The Election Commissioners\u2019 Appointment Framework<\/strong><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The 2023 Appointment Law<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The 2023 Act provides that the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners shall be appointed on the <strong>recommendation of a committee<\/strong> consisting of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.<\/li>\n<li>The law replaced the interim arrangement established by the Constitution Bench in <strong>Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (2023)<\/strong>, under which the Chief Justice of India served as the third member of the selection committee.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>The Article 145(3) Dispute<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>During the proceedings, the Union government argued that the challenge raised a substantial question concerning constitutional interpretation and therefore required a <strong>minimum five-judge Bench under Article 145(3)<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Justice Dipankar Datta rejected this argument, while Justice Satish Chandra Sharma accepted it.<\/li>\n<li>The matter was consequently placed before the Chief Justice for consideration of a Constitution Bench.<\/li>\n<li>Article 145(3) does not require every important or new case to be heard by five judges. It applies when there is a <strong>substantial question <\/strong>of constitutional interpretation.<\/li>\n<li>Earlier decisions have distinguished constitutional interpretation from merely applying an already established constitutional principle.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><strong>The Constitutional Significance of Anoop Baranwal<\/strong><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The Interim Nature of the CJI\u2019s Role<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Both judges agreed that the CJI\u2019s membership of the appointment committee in Anoop Baranwal was an <strong>interim arrangement<\/strong>, intended to operate until Parliament enacted legislation.<\/li>\n<li>However, the judgment went beyond merely creating that temporary mechanism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Protection from Executive Dominance<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The Constitution Bench had held that <strong>Article <\/strong>324 requires safeguards against exclusive executive control over appointments to the Election Commission.<\/li>\n<li>This constitutional principle is binding under <a href=\"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/article-141-of-indian-constitution\/\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Article 141<\/strong><\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Justice Datta therefore viewed the central issue as whether the new statutory arrangement complied with an already established constitutional requirement.<\/li>\n<li>Justice Sharma adopted a different approach, reasoning that since the <strong>constitutional validity of the 2023 Act<\/strong> had not previously been authoritatively decided, the matter required a Constitution Bench.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><strong>The Broader Institutional Problem<\/strong><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Transformation of the Supreme Court<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The Supreme Court has changed considerably since 1950. It now has a <strong>sanctioned strength of 38 judges<\/strong> and functions largely through <strong>two-judge Benches<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>A large part of its workload consists of special leave petitions and ordinary appeals, while Constitution Benches are constituted only when judges can be spared from this daily workload.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Fragmentation and Judicial Consistency<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>This structure can result in different Benches developing different interpretations of legal principles. Such fragmentation creates challenges for <strong>precedent, consistency and constitutional certainty<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The problem becomes particularly serious when constitutional questions remain unresolved for years.<\/li>\n<li>Anoop Baranwal, for instance, was instituted in 2015, referred to a Constitution Bench in 2018 and decided only in 2023.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><strong>The Consequences of Judicial Delay<\/strong><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>By the time the present challenge is finally decided, Election Commissioners appointed under the disputed law may have already overseen <strong>multiple State and general elections<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Thus, delay can create a <strong>fait accompli<\/strong>, making a later judicial ruling less capable of reversing the consequences of an earlier decision.<\/li>\n<li>Constitutional courts must resolve fundamental questions in a reasonable time so that legal uncertainty does not persist indefinitely.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Way Forward: Institutional Reform<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>One possible reform is the creation of a <strong>permanent Constitution Bench<\/strong> dedicated primarily to constitutional questions.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>Law Commission\u2019s 229th Report (2009)<\/strong> had already proposed a similar structural arrangement.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>Master of the Roster<\/strong> system gives the Chief Justice substantial authority over Bench composition.<\/li>\n<li>In a Court with 38 judges, this is more than a routine administrative function.<\/li>\n<li>Bench composition should therefore be governed by <strong>transparent, predetermined and objective rules<\/strong> to strengthen institutional confidence and reduce uncertainty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The dispute over the Election Commissioners\u2019 appointment law reveals a deeper structural challenge facing the Supreme Court.<\/li>\n<li>Delayed Constitution Benches, fragmented adjudication, uncertainty over precedent and <strong>concentrated roster powers<\/strong> can weaken the Court\u2019s ability to perform its constitutional role effectively.<\/li>\n<li>Reforms should provide <strong>clearer standards under <a href=\"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/article-145-of-indian-constitution\/\" target=\"_blank\">Article 145(3)<\/a>, <\/strong>faster constitution of larger Benches, transparent Bench allocation and stronger adherence to precedent.<\/li>\n<li>The Supreme Court was conceived not merely as an appellate institution but as the <strong>guardian of constitutional governance<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Its institutional structure must therefore ensure that the most important constitutional questions are answered <strong>before delay makes those answers practically ineffective<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>A Court Divided by Its Own Architecture FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1.<\/strong> What was the main issue in the Supreme Court\u2019s split verdict?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The main issue was whether a two-judge Bench could hear the challenge to the 2023 Election Commissioners\u2019 appointment law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> What does Article 145(3) provide?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Article 145(3) requires at least five judges when a case involves a substantial question of constitutional interpretation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3.<\/strong> What did Anoop Baranwal establish?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Anoop Baranwal held that Election Commission appointments should be protected from exclusive executive control.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> Why are delays in forming Constitution Benches problematic?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Delays can allow disputed laws to operate for years before their constitutional validity is determined.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> What institutional reforms are suggested?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The reforms include permanent Constitution Benches, transparent Bench allocation, faster hearings and stronger adherence to precedent.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/a-court-divided-by-its-own-architecture\/article71537992.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>India\u2019s Model BIT \u2014 A Decade Later, Amid Changes <\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s decision to revise its <strong>Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)<\/strong> nearly a decade after the 2015 framework comes at an important stage in the evolution of international investment law.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>Union Budget 2025-26<\/strong> announced the revamp to make the framework more investor-friendly.<\/li>\n<li>However, the objective is not simply to increase investor protection but to incorporate India\u2019s experience since 2015 while responding to changes in the global investment regime.<\/li>\n<li>A revised Model BIT should promote <strong>investment, legal certainty, sustainable development <\/strong>and regulatory autonomy while limiting unnecessary litigation risks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>A Cautious Framework<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s 2015 Model BIT emerged amid concerns over investor-state arbitration, particularly after the <strong>White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India<\/strong> award in 2011.<\/li>\n<li>It adopted a cautious framework with a narrower definition of investment, carefully defined substantive protections, regulatory exceptions and a requirement to pursue domestic judicial and administrative remedies for <strong>five years<\/strong> before treaty arbitration.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s subsequent treaty practice has become more flexible. The<a href=\"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/india-uae-bilateral-investment-treaty-2024\/\" target=\"_blank\"> <strong>India-UAE BIT<\/strong><\/a> reduced the local-remedies period to <strong>three years<\/strong>, while the <strong>India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement<\/strong>, effective from July 2026, also provides a three-year period.<\/li>\n<li>These agreements demonstrate a gradual shift from the rigidity of the 2015 framework.<\/li>\n<li>A Model BIT should function as a <strong>starting point for negotiations<\/strong>, rather than an inflexible template.<\/li>\n<li>Individual agreements should retain flexibility to reflect the economic and legal circumstances of treaty partners.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>What a New Model Must Factor In<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Most Favoured Nation Provision<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The inclusion of a <strong>Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause<\/strong> requires careful consideration.<\/li>\n<li>Most Indian investment treaties have excluded MFN provisions, limiting investors\u2019 ability to invoke protections contained in other treaties.<\/li>\n<li>If included, the clause must clearly define its scope. <strong>Maffezini v. Spain<\/strong> demonstrated how an MFN provision could potentially be used to access more favourable dispute-settlement arrangements from another treaty.<\/li>\n<li>Conversely, <strong>Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria<\/strong> adopted a restrictive interpretation where such an extension was not clearly authorised.<\/li>\n<li>India should therefore specify whether MFN provisions apply to <strong>dispute settlement<\/strong>, reducing interpretive uncertainty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Investor Obligations and Counterclaims<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>The revised model should also establish clearer <strong>investor obligations<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The India-Uzbekistan BIT permits a state to bring counterclaims against investors or investments in specified circumstances.<\/li>\n<li>The new model could incorporate clearly defined responsibilities relating to <strong>compliance with domestic law and responsible investment<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Such provisions would create greater symmetry between investor rights and obligations while establishing a legal basis for legitimate state counterclaims.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Dispute Settlement Reform<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The five-year domestic-remedies requirement under the 2015 Model should be reassessed.<\/li>\n<li>The three-year periods in the India-UAE and India-Israel agreements indicate greater flexibility in India\u2019s approach.<\/li>\n<li>The revised model could strengthen <strong>consultation, mediation and dispute-prevention mechanisms<\/strong> before arbitration.<\/li>\n<li>Early resolution could reduce litigation, costs and uncertainty while improving investor-state relations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Need for Precision and Clarity<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The revised model should provide greater precision regarding expropriation and <strong>Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Ambiguous provisions can encourage conflicting interpretations and increase disputes.<\/li>\n<li>At the same time, investor protection should not undermine the <strong>state\u2019s right to regulate in the public interest<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The treaty should clearly distinguish legitimate regulation from compensable expropriation.<\/li>\n<li>Similarly, sustainable development and responsible investment should be supported by enforceable legal provisions wherever India intends to impose investor obligations rather than remaining merely aspirational principles.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s Model BIT revision provides an opportunity to create a clearer, balanced and adaptable investment framework.<\/li>\n<li>The experience of the past decade suggests that excessive rigidity can restrict treaty flexibility, while vague protections can generate uncertainty.<\/li>\n<li>The revised model should incorporate India\u2019s evolving treaty practice, clarify <a href=\"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/qualified-mfn-investment-treaty\/\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>MFN provisions<\/strong><\/a>, reform <strong>dispute settlement<\/strong>, recognise <strong>investor responsibilities<\/strong>, strengthen dispute prevention and preserve <strong>regulatory policy space<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>A carefully designed Model BIT can strengthen India\u2019s position in the changing global investment regime and enable it to play a greater role in <strong>shaping international investment rules<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>India\u2019s Model BIT \u2014 A Decade Later, Amid Changes FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1.<\/strong> What is a Model BIT?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans. <\/strong>A Model BIT provides a framework for India\u2019s negotiations with foreign countries on investment protection.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> Why is India revising its Model BIT?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans. <\/strong>India is revising it to incorporate lessons from the past decade and adapt to changes in international investment law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3. <\/strong>What change has India made regarding local remedies?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans. <\/strong>India has reduced the local-remedies period from five years to three years in agreements with the UAE and Israel.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> Why is the MFN provision important?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans. <\/strong>The MFN provision is important because its scope can determine whether investors access protections available under other treaties.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> What should the revised Model BIT achieve?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans. <\/strong>The revised Model BIT should balance investor protection with India\u2019s regulatory autonomy and promote predictable investment rules.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/op-ed\/indias-model-bit-a-decade-later-amid-changes\/article71538034.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Daily Editorial Analysis 1 October by Vajiram &#038; Ravi covers key editorials from The Hindu &#038; Indian Express with UPSC-focused insights and relevance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":86373,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[138],"tags":[141,882,909],"class_list":["post-127236","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-daily-editorial-analysis","tag-daily-editorial-analysis","tag-the-hindu-editorial-analysis","tag-the-indian-express-analysis","no-featured-image-padding"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127236","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/34"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=127236"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127236\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":127249,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127236\/revisions\/127249"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/86373"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=127236"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=127236"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=127236"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}