{"id":79381,"date":"2025-12-24T12:12:24","date_gmt":"2025-12-24T06:42:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/?p=79381"},"modified":"2025-12-24T12:12:24","modified_gmt":"2025-12-24T06:42:24","slug":"daily-editorial-analysis-24-december-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/daily-editorial-analysis-24-december-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"Daily Editorial Analysis 24 December 2025"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><strong>The VB-G RAM G Act 2025 Fixes Structural Gaps<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Viksit Bharat\u2013Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 marks a significant reform in India\u2019s rural employment and livelihood framework.<\/li>\n<li>By expanding the statutory <strong>employment guarantee from 100 to 125 days and restructuring implementation <\/strong>around planning, convergence, and accountability, the Act seeks to strengthen rural livelihoods while enhancing long-term productivity.<\/li>\n<li>Criticism that the <strong>reform weakens employment rights<\/strong>, undermines decentralisation, or signals fiscal withdrawal rests on a flawed assumption that welfare and development are competing objectives.<\/li>\n<li>The Act is grounded in the principle that<strong> welfare and development are mutually reinforcing<\/strong>, and embeds this understanding within its statutory and institutional design.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Key Features of the VB- G RAM G Act<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Strengthening the Statutory Right to Employment<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>A key feature of the Act is the <strong>expansion of the guaranteed employment <\/strong>entitlement from 100 to 125 days, reinforcing the legal right to work.<\/li>\n<li>The Act also <strong>strengthens enforceability <\/strong>by removing procedural dis-entitlement clauses that previously rendered unemployment allowances ineffective.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Time-bound grievance redress <\/strong>mechanisms have been reinforced, addressing the gap between statutory promise and lived reality.<\/li>\n<li>The employment guarantee remains <strong>statutory, justiciable, and substantively stronger<\/strong> than before.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Demand-Based Employment and Participatory Planning<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>The Act retains the <strong>demand-driven nature of employment<\/strong>, with workers continuing to initiate requests for work.<\/li>\n<li>The reform lies in <strong>anticipatory, participatory village-level planning<\/strong>, ensuring that employment is available when demanded rather than being denied due to administrative unpreparedness.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Planning operationalises demand instead of replacing it<\/strong>, shifting the framework from reactive distress response to proactive livelihood assurance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Decentralisation and Institutional Architecture<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Decentralisation remains central to the Act\u2019s architecture. Gram panchayats continue as the primary planning and implementing authorities, while <strong>gram sabhas retain approval powers over local plans<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The introduction of <strong>Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans <\/strong>institutionalises decentralised planning rather than diluting it.<\/li>\n<li>Aggregation of plans at higher administrative levels enables <strong>coordination, convergence, and visibility<\/strong>, while <strong>decision-making authority remains local<\/strong>. Centralisation is limited to coherence, not control.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Consultation and Cooperative Federalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>The Act reflects the principles of <strong>cooperative federalism<\/strong>, having been shaped through <strong>extensive consultations with State governments, <\/strong>technical workshops, and multi-stakeholder discussions.<\/li>\n<li>Key design elements, such as structured village planning, convergence mechanisms, and digital governance, are informed by <strong>State-level feedback and implementation experience<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>States are positioned as <strong>development partners<\/strong>, not merely implementing agencies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Fiscal Commitment and Addressing Structural Weakness<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Fiscal Commitment and Equity in Allocation<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Claims of fiscal withdrawal are inconsistent with budgetary trends. <strong>Central allocations have increased to nearly \u20b995,000 crore<\/strong>, demonstrating sustained fiscal commitment.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>60:40 funding model<\/strong>, with a <strong>90:10 ratio for northeastern and Himalayan States and Jammu and Kashmir<\/strong>, follows established norms.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Rule-based, normative allocation ensures equity<\/strong>, while flexibility provisions allow States to seek relaxations during <strong>natural disasters <\/strong>or extraordinary circumstances, balancing accountability with responsiveness.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Addressing Structural Weaknesses of Earlier Frameworks<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Implementation experience under earlier frameworks revealed <strong>episodic employment, weak enforceability of unemployment allowances, <\/strong>fragmented asset creation, and vulnerability to corruption and duplication.<\/li>\n<li>These weaknesses became evident during <strong>droughts, migration surges, and the COVID-19 pandemic<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The Act responds by <strong>integrating livelihood security <\/strong>with durable asset creation, agricultural stability, and productivity enhancement, treating income support and development outcomes as a continuum.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Comparative Perspective: Lessons from the UPA Era<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Wage freezes ignored inflation<\/strong>, budgetary allocations declined despite rising demand, and <strong>worker participation fell<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Delayed fund releases and administrative apathy<\/strong> weakened the employment guarantee.<\/li>\n<li>The <strong>Comptroller and Auditor General\u2019s 2013 report documented widespread corruption<\/strong>, including fake job cards, financial irregularities, delayed wages, and poor record-keeping, particularly in States with high rural poverty.<\/li>\n<li>These failures underscored the necessity of <strong>structural correction rather than policy stagnation<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Viksit Bharat\u2013Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 represents <strong>renewal, not retreat<\/strong>, in India\u2019s rural welfare framework.<\/li>\n<li>By expanding entitlements, strengthening enforceability, institutionalising decentralised planning, and enhancing fiscal and administrative coherence, the <strong>Act integrates welfare and development<\/strong> into a unified statutory model.<\/li>\n<li>Income support and productivity enhancement are treated as interdependent goals<strong>, laying the foundation for a resilient, self-reliant rural economy<\/strong> grounded in enforceable rights, cooperative federalism, and sustainable development.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The VB-G RAM G Act 2025 Fixes Structural Gaps FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><strong>Q1. <\/strong>What is the main objective of the Viksit Bharat\u2013Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The Act aims to strengthen rural livelihoods by expanding the statutory employment guarantee and integrating welfare with long-term development.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2. <\/strong>How does the Act strengthen the legal right to employment?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The Act increases guaranteed employment from 100 to 125 days and improves enforceability through stronger grievance redress mechanisms.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3. <\/strong>Does the Act replace demand-based employment with top-down planning?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>No, the Act retains worker-initiated demand while using advance participatory planning to ensure timely availability of work.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4. <\/strong>How does the Act address concerns about centralisation?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The Act preserves decentralised decision-making by keeping gram panchayats and gram sabhas as primary planning authorities while centralising coordination.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5. <\/strong>Why is the Act described as integrating welfare and development?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The Act links income support with durable asset creation and productivity enhancement, treating welfare and development as mutually reinforcing.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/the-vb-g-ram-g-act-2025-fixes-structural-gaps\/article70430686.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>Putin\u2019s Visit to India and the Aftermath<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s visit to India in early December for the <strong>23rd India-Russia Annual Summit<\/strong> drew intense international attention.<\/li>\n<li>While India viewed the visit as part of a long-standing bilateral process, the West saw it through the prism of the <strong>Russia-Ukraine war and the diplomatic boycott <\/strong>imposed on Moscow since 2022.<\/li>\n<li>The visit ultimately reaffirmed India\u2019s commitment to <strong>strategic autonomy<\/strong>, while revealing both continuity and subtle recalibration in India\u2013Russia ties.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Historical Foundations of a Strategic Partnership<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2013Russia relations are anchored in<strong> deep historical trust and shared strategic interests.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Meetings between leaders of the two countries have often reshaped regional geopolitics, most notably the <strong>1971 India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, <\/strong>Friendship and Cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>That agreement decisively altered South Asia\u2019s strategic balance, enabling India\u2019s victory over Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh.<\/li>\n<li>Beyond landmark treaties, <strong>symbolic and substantive gestures <\/strong>have sustained mutual confidence, such as President Putin\u2019s 2009 decision to waive penalties to facilitate India\u2019s acquisition of its second aircraft carrier.<\/li>\n<li>Over decades, Russia\u2019s consistent support, especially during periods when the West aligned with Pakistan, cemented a relationship based on <strong>mutual accommodation and reliability<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Since the Gorbachev era and under President Putin\u2019s long tenure, successive Indian Prime Ministers have <strong>strengthened this partnership.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Ukraine, the West, and India\u2019s Strategic Autonomy<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The <strong>Russia-Ukraine conflict posed a critical test<\/strong> for India-Russia relations.<\/li>\n<li>India maintained neutrality and refused to align with Western efforts to isolate Russia, a stance that has caused persistent friction with the U.S. and the European Union.<\/li>\n<li>Against this backdrop, President Putin\u2019s visit acquired heightened symbolic significance.<\/li>\n<li>Western expectations that <strong>global political shifts, U.S. <\/strong>tariffs on Indian purchases of Russian oil, and diplomatic pressure might weaken India-Russia ties were not borne out.<\/li>\n<li>The warmth displayed between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Putin, coupled with extensive media coverage, underscored <strong>continuity rather than divergence<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Joint Statement: Continuity with Subtle Nuances<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Joint Statement issued after the summit reaffirmed the<strong> Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership<\/strong>, marking 25 years of formal strategic cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>It reiterated <strong>mutual trust, respect for core national interests<\/strong>, and the intention to strengthen traditional areas while exploring new avenues.<\/li>\n<li>Particular emphasis was placed on <strong>connectivity initiatives<\/strong>, including the <strong>Northern Sea Route through the Arctic<\/strong> and the <strong>Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor<\/strong>, alongside enhanced <strong>technological and industrial cooperation<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>The optics of the visit-public warmth, coordinated messaging, and expanded cooperation-were widely viewed as successful.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Defence Ties: An Enduring but Questioned Pillar<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Despite these affirmations, <strong>the conspicuous absence of defence cooperation from the Joint Statement was striking<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Defence has historically been the <strong>bedrock of India-Russia relations<\/strong>, especially during the Putin era.<\/li>\n<li>Whether this silence reflects deliberate diplomatic caution or a gradual shift in priorities remains open to interpretation.<\/li>\n<li>Nevertheless, <strong>defence cooperation remains central to India\u2019s security architecture<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Russia has been India\u2019s <strong>most consistent and reliable supplier of advanced military systems<\/strong>, spanning land, sea, and air domains.<\/li>\n<li>Critical platforms include the <strong>S-400 air and missile defence system<\/strong>, the <strong>jointly developed BrahMos missile<\/strong>, <strong>Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft<\/strong>, <strong>T-90 tanks<\/strong>, and transport helicopters.<\/li>\n<li>These systems continue to form the <strong>core of India\u2019s defence capabilities<\/strong> and have significantly enhanced operational effectiveness in recent conflicts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Western Contradictions and Strategic Realities<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A shift away from Russia towards Western defence sources carries <strong>significant strategic risks<\/strong>. Western partners have historically proven inconsistent, particularly in South Asia.<\/li>\n<li>This concern is reinforced by recent U.S. decisions to approve <strong>major upgrade and sustainment packages for Pakistan\u2019s F-16 fighter fleet<\/strong>, even as Washington publicly characterises U.S.-India ties as the defining relationship of the century.<\/li>\n<li>Such contradictions reinforce India\u2019s <strong>strategic scepticism<\/strong> and highlight why Russia continues to be viewed as a <strong>trusted long-term partner<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>President Putin\u2019s visit demonstrated the <strong>resilience and adaptability of India-Russia relations<\/strong> amid global turbulence.<\/li>\n<li>While the partnership remains robust and symbolically strong, the muted emphasis on defence suggests <strong>nuanced recalibration rather than rupture<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s foreign policy continues to prioritise <strong>strategic autonomy, reliable partnerships, and long-term national interest<\/strong>, resisting pressure to conform to transient geopolitical alignments.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Putin\u2019s Visit to India and the Aftermath FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1. <\/strong>Why did President Putin\u2019s visit to India attract global attention?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>The visit drew global attention because it occurred amid Western efforts to diplomatically isolate Russia after the Ukraine conflict.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2. <\/strong>What historical event significantly strengthened India\u2013Russia relations in 1971?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The 1971 India\u2013Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation significantly strengthened India\u2013Russia relations.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3.<\/strong> How did India position itself during the Russia\u2013Ukraine war?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> India maintained strategic neutrality and refused to join Western sanctions against Russia.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> What notable omission appeared in the Joint Statement of the summit?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans. <\/strong>Defence cooperation was notably absent from the Joint Statement despite its traditional importance.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5. <\/strong>Why does Russia remain a critical defence partner for India?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> Russia remains critical because it has consistently supplied advanced and reliable military systems essential to India\u2019s defence capabilities.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/putins-visit-to-india-and-the-aftermath\/article70425676.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>SHANTI Bill &#8211; India\u2019s Second Shot at Nuclear Energy Leadership<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s nuclear power programme has long suffered from <strong>policy uncertainty<\/strong>, liability bottlenecks, and investor hesitation, especially after the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage <strong>Act, 2010<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>In this backdrop, Parliament has passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India <strong>(SHANTI) Bill<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>It aims to <strong>reset India\u2019s nuclear governance framework<\/strong> and align it with global nuclear commerce norms while strengthening energy security and decarbonisation goals.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Why the SHANTI Bill Matters<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Nuclear power is a <strong>clean, reliable<\/strong> baseload energy source, crucial for India\u2019s <strong>net-zero ambitions.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>India targets <strong>100 GW <\/strong>of nuclear power by <strong>2047<\/strong>, requiring large-scale investment, global collaboration, and regulatory credibility.<\/li>\n<li>The SHANTI Bill represents India\u2019s \u201c<strong>second chance<\/strong>\u201d to emerge as a credible nuclear energy leader.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Key Features of the SHANTI Bill<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Legislative reset<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 with a single, integrated legal framework.<\/li>\n<li>Seeks to harmonise Indian law with global nuclear liability regimes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Balanced public\u2013private participation (PPP)<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Allows involvement of both public and private sectors, but maintains a state-led system. Foreign-incorporated companies excluded as licensees.<\/li>\n<li>Sensitive stages such as fuel cycle, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel management remain exclusively with the central government.<\/li>\n<li>This balanced PPP is termed as a <strong>cautious expansion strategy.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Regulatory architecture and safety<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Licensing<\/strong>: Retained by the government.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Safety authorization<\/strong>: Assigned to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) with enhanced statutory powers, stronger radiation safety norms, mandatory public outreach, and improved emergency preparedness.<\/li>\n<li>It ensures independent regulators, nuclear safety, institutional capacity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Nuclear liability framework \u2013 The core reform<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Operator-centric liability: <\/strong>Aligns with global practice where primary liability rests with the operator. Limits operator liability to 300 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Curtailment of supplier liability: <\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Operator\u2019s right of recourse limited to contractual terms, intentional wrongdoing, etc.<\/li>\n<li>It shifts a share of responsibility beyond the operator\u2019s cap to the central government through a <strong>Nuclear Liability Fund.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>It points to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (<strong>CSC<\/strong>) for supplementary funds if claims exceed that level.<\/li>\n<li>This indicates a shift from the expansive supplier liability introduced in 2010.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>State as insurer of last resort:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Terrorism recognised as a sovereign risk.<\/li>\n<li>The state assumes liability in extreme cases.<\/li>\n<li>Ensures victims are not left uncompensated after catastrophic events, assuring last-resort liability of the state.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Graded liability and transparency:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Liability graded according to the nature of installation, risk profile.<\/li>\n<li>No category allowed below a minimum threshold without regulator-certified rationale.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Annual public disclosure<\/strong> on liability and compensation financing.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Victim-centric compensation:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Expanded definition<\/strong> of nuclear damage: long-term health impacts, environmental degradation, loss of livelihood and income, and preventive measures.<\/li>\n<li>Claims pathway with timelines, faster disbursement via dedicated funds &#8211; establishing the principle of<strong> speed of compensation equals justice.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Intellectual property (IP) reforms:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Creation of a<strong> special nuclear inventions regime<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>Amendments to patent laws to encourage nuclear energy\u2013related innovations, safety software, radiation applications, robotics and specialised manufacturing.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Impact<\/strong>: Strengthens domestic nuclear supply chains and skilled employment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Challenges and Concerns<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Political and moral insensitivities: <\/strong>Dilution of supplier liability may be criticised as pro-corporate, diluting victim justice and a strong emotional legacy of the Bhopal disaster.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Weak institutional capacity: <\/strong>AERB needs more specialised inspectors, faster rule-making ability, and strong enforcement credibility.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Public trust deficit<\/strong>: Nuclear safety concerns, limited public understanding of liability mechanisms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Way Forward<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Capacity building and public engagement<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Strengthen AERB autonomy and staffing.<\/li>\n<li>Build insurance and reinsurance capacity.<\/li>\n<li>Enhance public communication and transparency.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<h4><strong>Use SHANTI<\/strong> <strong>To<\/strong><\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Deepen India\u2013US civil nuclear cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>Diversify nuclear partnerships beyond single suppliers.<\/li>\n<li>Integrate nuclear energy firmly into India\u2019s climate strategy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The SHANTI Bill does not claim perfection, but it offers <strong>credibility, clarity, and convergence <\/strong>with global norms\u2014three essentials for scaling nuclear energy.<\/li>\n<li>By balancing safety, liability, innovation, and investment, SHANTI provides India with an opportunity to move from prolonged debate to delivery, <strong>transforming <\/strong>India from a cautious nuclear outlier into a <strong>reliable global nuclear builder<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>SHANTI Bill FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1<\/strong>. How does the SHANTI Bill attempt to revive India\u2019s stalled nuclear power expansion?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. By aligning India\u2019s nuclear liability regime with global norms, strengthening regulation, and enabling cautious PPP.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2<\/strong>. Why was the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 considered a bottleneck for nuclear energy growth?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Its expansive supplier liability, shaped by the Bhopal gas tragedy, discouraged private and foreign participation in nuclear projects.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3<\/strong>. What is the significance of operator-centric liability under the SHANTI Bill?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. It places primary responsibility on the nuclear operator, caps liability at 300 million SDR, and restores predictability.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4<\/strong>. How does the SHANTI Bill balance victim justice with investment certainty?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. By expanding the definition of nuclear damage and ensuring faster compensation while limiting supplier liability.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5<\/strong>. In what ways can the SHANTI Bill strengthen India\u2019s energy security and climate commitments?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. By enabling scalable, safe nuclear power as a clean baseload source critical for decarbonisation and long-term energy security.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/opinion\/columns\/shanti-bill-is-indias-second-shot-at-nuclear-energy-leadership-10435688\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><strong>IE<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Daily Editorial Analysis 24 December 2025 by Vajiram &#038; Ravi covers key editorials from The Hindu &#038; Indian Express with UPSC-focused insights and relevance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":20,"featured_media":50653,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[138],"tags":[141,882,909],"class_list":{"0":"post-79381","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-daily-editorial-analysis","8":"tag-daily-editorial-analysis","9":"tag-the-hindu-editorial-analysis","10":"tag-the-indian-express-analysis","11":"no-featured-image-padding"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79381","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/20"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79381"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79381\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/50653"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79381"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79381"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79381"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}