{"id":96289,"date":"2026-04-03T11:53:32","date_gmt":"2026-04-03T06:23:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/?p=96289"},"modified":"2026-04-03T11:53:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-03T06:23:32","slug":"daily-editorial-analysis-3-april-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/daily-editorial-analysis-3-april-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Daily Editorial Analysis 3 April 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><strong>ECI Transfer Controversy, Top Court\u2019s Clarifications<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The conduct of <strong>free and fair elections<\/strong> is a cornerstone of any democratic system, and in India, this responsibility is entrusted to the Election Commission of India.<\/li>\n<li>However, recent actions by the ECI, specifically the <strong>transfer of senior officials<\/strong> in election-bound States such as West Bengal, Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and the Union Territory of Puducherry, have sparked a <strong>serious constitutional debate.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>The abrupt removal of top bureaucrats, including the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police in West Bengal, raises critical questions about the scope, legality, and <strong>limits of the ECI\u2019s powers under the Constitution.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Constitutional Basis and Scope of ECI\u2019s Powers<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The ECI derives its authority primarily from <strong>Article 324<\/strong> of the Constitution of India, which vests in it the superintendence, direction and control of elections.<\/li>\n<li>This provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India as conferring broad, plenary powers upon the Commission to ensure the integrity of elections.<\/li>\n<li>In the landmark case Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Commissioner, the Court described Article 324 as a reservoir of powers, enabling the ECI to act decisively in situations where existing laws are silent.<\/li>\n<li>However, this interpretation is not without limits. The Court clearly emphasised that such plenary powers can only be exercised in areas where no statutory provisions exist.<\/li>\n<li>Where laws enacted by Parliament or State legislatures govern a particular field, the ECI is bound to act in conformity with those laws.<\/li>\n<li>Additionally, the exercise of these powers must adhere to principles of fairness, reasonableness, and natural justice.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conflict with Statutory Framework<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The controversy surrounding the transfer of senior officials lies in its apparent conflict with established statutory provisions.<\/li>\n<li>Officers belonging to the <strong>All India Services<\/strong> are governed by the <strong>All India Services Act,<\/strong> which places their appointment, posting, and transfer under the jurisdiction of the respective government, primarily the State governments when officers are serving in State cadres.<\/li>\n<li>Moreover, under the constitutional scheme, <strong>particularly the Seventh Schedule,<\/strong> public services fall within the domain of the Union and State governments.<\/li>\n<li>The ECI\u2019s authority to requisition staff for election purposes is explicitly provided <strong>under Article 324(6),<\/strong> but this does not extend to unilateral transfers of top administrative or police officials without the knowledge or consent of the State government.<\/li>\n<li>Importantly, neither the Representation of the People Act, 1950 nor the Representation of the People Act, 1951 grants the ECI the power to transfer senior officers.<\/li>\n<li>This absence of statutory backing raises serious concerns about the legality of such actions.<\/li>\n<li>While it may be argued that these laws do not directly deal with administrative transfers, bypassing them altogether risks undermining the <strong>constitutional balance of power.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Implications for Federalism and Governance<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The sudden transfer of top officials, particularly without prior consultation, <strong>disrupts administrative continuity<\/strong> and may even paralyse governance in States.<\/li>\n<li>This raises a fundamental question: can the objective of ensuring free and fair elections justify such sweeping interventions in State administration?<\/li>\n<li>Furthermore, the underlying assumption behind these transfers, that certain officials may compromise electoral integrity, remains <strong>largely unexplained.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>The absence of a transparent procedure to determine bias or misconduct <strong>weakens the legitimacy of these decisions<\/strong> and risks creating a perception of arbitrariness.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Problem of Unchecked Power<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A deeper concern emerging from this issue is the <strong>potential normalisation of unchecked institutional power. <\/strong><\/li>\n<li>The ECI has historically relied on the cooperation of State officials to conduct elections, given that it lacks its own administrative machinery.<\/li>\n<li>Casting doubt on the integrity of these officials and removing them abruptly may demoralise the civil services and erode trust between institutions.<\/li>\n<li>The Supreme Court, even while affirming the breadth of Article 324, has cautioned against such overreach.<\/li>\n<li>In the same judgment, it asserted that no authority in India operates above the law and that all actions must conform to principles of fairness and accountability.<\/li>\n<li>The idea that <strong>unchecked power is alien to our system<\/strong> serves as a vital reminder that constitutional bodies, however important, are not beyond scrutiny.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The recent actions of the Election Commission highlight <strong>a delicate constitutional tension <\/strong>between the need to ensure electoral integrity and the imperative to respect legal and institutional boundaries.<\/li>\n<li>While Article 324 provides the ECI with significant authority, this power is <strong>neither absolute nor unregulated.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Ultimately, the legitimacy of elections depends not only on their fairness but also on the fairness of the processes employed to ensure them.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Upholding the rule of law,<\/strong> respecting institutional boundaries, and ensuring transparency in decision-making are essential to preserving both democratic integrity and constitutional order.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>ECI Transfer Controversy, Top Court\u2019s Clarifications FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1. <\/strong>What is the main role of the Election Commission of India?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The Election Commission of India is responsible for conducting free and fair elections.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> Which constitutional provision gives powers to the ECI?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> Article 324 of the Constitution of India grants powers to the ECI.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3.<\/strong> What did the Supreme Court of India say about Article 324?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The Supreme Court stated that Article 324 provides plenary powers but with limitations.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> Which law governs the transfer of All India Service officers?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The All India Services Act governs the transfer of such officers.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> Why are the ECI\u2019s recent transfers controversial?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The transfers are controversial because they may lack statutory backing and could undermine federal principles.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/lead\/eci-transfer-controversy-top-courts-clarifications\/article70816573.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>A Path to Peace in West Asia Beyond Pakistan Talks<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The recent diplomatic engagements hosted by Pakistan, involving Saudi Arabia, T\u00fcrkiye, and Egypt, signal <strong>a cautious attempt to address the escalating conflict<\/strong> in West Asia.<\/li>\n<li>Parallel outreach to Iran and China reflects growing diplomatic activity.<\/li>\n<li>However, these efforts remain limited, revealing the complexity, fragility, and constraints of modern conflict resolution where political intent, military realities, and mutual distrust intersect.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Centrality and Challenge of a Ceasefire and Exhaustion Without Resolution<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The Centrality and Challenge of a Ceasefire<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>A ceasefire remains the most critical yet elusive first step.<\/li>\n<li>The opposing sides, United States\/Israel and Iran, lack both clarity of objectives and strategic alignment.<\/li>\n<li>Under Donald Trump, shifting goals, from denuclearisation to regime change to surrender, weaken negotiation prospects.<\/li>\n<li>Israel\u2019s expectations of an internal uprising following actions against Ali Khamenei appear unrealistic.<\/li>\n<li>Such uprisings require timing, leadership, and coordination, none of which are present.<\/li>\n<li>Instead, Israel\u2019s likely goal is the complete degradation of Iran\u2019s strike capability, a target not yet achieved.<\/li>\n<li>With neither victory nor stalemate in sight, the path to ceasefire remains blocked.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Exhaustion Without Resolution<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Signs of military fatigue and domestic pressure are visible but insufficient to force compromise.<\/li>\n<li>Protests in the United States indicate public discontent, while reports of logistical strain suggest operational limits.<\/li>\n<li>Israel continues to face attacks despite advanced defence systems, and Iran is experiencing significant attrition.<\/li>\n<li>Yet, both sides maintain rigid positions. The absence of trust, especially after military actions during negotiations, undermines diplomacy.<\/li>\n<li>Even if a ceasefire emerges, ensuring compliance without credible guarantees remains a serious challenge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>The Problem of Enforcement and the Role of the United Nations<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A sustainable ceasefire requires <strong>enforcement mechanisms<\/strong>, typically through peacekeeping forces authorised by the United Nations Security Council.<\/li>\n<li>However, geopolitical divisions and declining faith in multilateralism make this unlikely. The reluctance of the United States to rely on the UN further complicates the situation.<\/li>\n<li>Historical precedent offers an alternative.<\/li>\n<li>During the Suez Crisis, the UN General Assembly bypassed the UNSC through the Uniting for Peace resolution.<\/li>\n<li>This succeeded largely due to the decisive role of Dwight D. Eisenhower, highlighting that institutional success depends on <strong>great power backing<\/strong> and <strong>political will<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Regional Dynamics and the Limits of Mediation<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Potential mediators such as Egypt, T\u00fcrkiye, and Pakistan face <strong>credibility issues<\/strong> due to their strategic alignments.<\/li>\n<li>Egypt\u2019s ties with Israel, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s NATO membership, and Pakistan\u2019s defence commitments to Saudi Arabia introduce <strong>bias<\/strong> and limit neutrality.<\/li>\n<li>Regional distrust further complicates efforts. Iran remains wary of United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both perceived as aligned with U.S. objectives.<\/li>\n<li>Past tensions involving Pakistan and T\u00fcrkiye deepen suspicion. China\u2019s role, while significant, lacks <strong>security guarantees<\/strong> or <strong>direct commitments<\/strong>, reducing its effectiveness as a mediator.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>India and the Global South: An Alternative Approach<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India can adopt a cautious yet proactive strategy. Rather than direct mediation, <strong>it can mobilise the Global South<\/strong> to build a collective diplomatic front.<\/li>\n<li>Collaboration with Southeast Asian nations and others affected by the conflict can amplify calls for de-escalation and peace at the United Nations.<\/li>\n<li>This approach reflects evolving global dynamics where middle powers play a growing role.<\/li>\n<li>A unified stance can generate the <strong>political momentum<\/strong> needed to revive multilateral diplomacy and push for a durable ceasefire.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Islamabad initiative underscores both the importance and limitations of diplomacy in a deeply polarised environment.<\/li>\n<li>The absence of <strong>clear objectives<\/strong>, <strong>mutual trust<\/strong>, and <strong>enforcement capacity<\/strong> continues to hinder progress.<\/li>\n<li>Historical lessons show that peace efforts require not just institutions but also <strong>decisive leadership<\/strong> and <strong>strategic consensus<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<li>In this context, broader coalitions led by emerging powers may offer a more viable path toward lasting stability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>A Path to Peace in West Asia Beyond Pakistan Talks FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1.<\/strong> Why is a ceasefire difficult to achieve?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> A ceasefire is difficult because there is a lack of trust and no clear agreement on objectives among the conflicting sides.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2.<\/strong> What weakens the negotiation process for the United States?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The negotiation process is weakened by shifting and unclear goals under Donald Trump.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3.<\/strong> Why are regional mediators seen as ineffective?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> Regional mediators are seen as ineffective due to their strategic biases and lack of neutrality.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4.<\/strong> What role does the United Nations struggle to perform?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> The United Nations Security Council struggles to enforce peace due to geopolitical divisions.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5.<\/strong> What alternative role can India play?<br \/>\n<strong>Ans.<\/strong> India can lead the Global South to collectively push for de-escalation and a ceasefire.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source:<a href=\"https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/opinion\/op-ed\/a-path-to-peace-in-west-asia-beyond-pakistan-talks\/article70816617.ece\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Hindu<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>India\u2019s Smartphone PLI Success &#8211; A Blueprint for Manufacturing Transformation<\/strong><\/h2>\n<h3><strong>Context<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s emergence as a global manufacturing hub\u2014particularly in <strong>electronics<\/strong>\u2014marks a significant shift from its earlier dominance in IT services.<\/li>\n<li>The Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for smartphones (2020) has delivered remarkable outcomes, positioning India as a key player in global value chains (<strong>GVCs<\/strong>).<\/li>\n<li>However, the uneven success of PLIs across sectors raises important policy questions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Key Achievements of Smartphone PLI<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Surge in production and investment: <\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>For example, an investment of about $1.2 billion under the scheme has driven $64 billion in production by FY 2025 \u2014 more than double the $30 billion in 2020.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Employment generation<\/strong>:\n<ul>\n<li>With total investment in the broader smartphone ecosystem (including non-PLI participants) is estimated at ~$8 billion, it created about 1.5-2 lakh jobs.<\/li>\n<li>This has also resulted in<strong> expansion of supply chains<\/strong> (e.g., Apple ecosystem, with 40 firms, creating 1.2 lakh additional jobs).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Export growth and global integration: <\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Exports have soared from $3.1 billion to $24 billion, lifting India\u2019s share of global smartphone exports from 1 to <strong>8<\/strong>%.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Forward linkages &#8211; component ecosystem:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Building on the success of the PLI, the government has launched the <strong>Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme<\/strong> to nurture a domestic component ecosystem.<\/li>\n<li>Against an expected investment of Rs 59,350 crore, applications worth twice that amount have poured in, with 1.4 lakh jobs committed versus 91,600 originally envisaged.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Why did Smartphone PLI Succeed?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Export-oriented strategy (plugging into GVCs):<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>A clear export focus, targeting two segments &#8211; phones with an invoice value of over Rs 15,000 (critical for exports), and cheaper phones better suited to the domestic market.<\/li>\n<li>The sales and investment thresholds were different for each segment, ensuring that (unlike many industrial policies that focus on import substitution) the smartphone PLI aimed to plug India into GVCs.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Insight<\/strong>: Export orientation is critical for scaling manufacturing and job creation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Downstream focus (assembly-led growth model):<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Target<\/strong>: Global assemblers like Foxconn, Pegatron, Wistron.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Strategy<\/strong>: \u201cAssembly first, ecosystem later\u201d (China\/Vietnam model).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Impact<\/strong>: Rapid scaling of manufacturing capacity, creation of MSME supplier networks, and large-scale employment (labour-intensive assembly).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Leveraging India\u2019s labour advantage:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>High employment intensity, for example, Foxconn (Chennai unit providing over 40,000 jobs). Its new facility in Bengaluru adds another 25,000.<\/li>\n<li>Tata Electronics employs more than 80,000 people \u2014 80% of them <strong>women <\/strong>\u2014 at its three manufacturing plants.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Insight<\/strong>: Aligning policy with factor endowments (labour abundance) enhances success.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Rational tariff policy (input cost competitiveness):<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Reduction of import duties on PCB assemblies, camera modules, connectors, microphones, USB cables.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Outcome: <\/strong>Lower input costs and improved global competitiveness. Avoided \u201ctariff inversion\u201d seen in other sectors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Administrative responsiveness and Ease of Doing Business (EoDB):<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>For instance, infrastructure upgrades (e.g., Chennai airport cargo expansion), state facilitation during labour issues, and quick resolution of export bottlenecks.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Insight<\/strong>: Policy success depends on implementation efficiency, not just design.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><strong>Industry-government collaboration:<\/strong>\n<ul>\n<li>Extensive consultations during policy design, and continued engagement in ECMS rollout.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Takeaway<\/strong>: A partnership model fosters investor confidence and adaptability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Challenges and Limitations<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Uneven PLI performance: <\/strong>Though the total PLI outlay was \u20b91.97 lakh crore, only 10% is disbursed across sectors.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Weakness in other sectors: <\/strong>Lack of export focus, tariff barriers raising input costs, poor integration with global value chains.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Limited upstream capabilities<\/strong>: Dependence on imports for high-value components, need to deepen domestic value addition.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Global headwinds<\/strong>: Rising protectionism, supply chain realignments, competition from countries like Vietnam.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Way Forward:<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Replicate export-led strategy<\/strong>: Prioritise global markets over domestic substitution. Integrate sectors into global value chains.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Adopt assembly-first approach<\/strong>: Build scale in downstream manufacturing. Gradually move to upstream component production.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Focus on labour-intensive sectors:<\/strong> Target industries like textiles &amp; garments, footwear, toys, etc.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Rationalise tariff structures: <\/strong>Remove input bottlenecks, ensure competitive cost structures.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Strengthen ecosystem via ECMS<\/strong>: Promote domestic component manufacturing, encourage MSME participation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Institutionalise industry consultation<\/strong>: Continuous feedback loops, flexible and adaptive policy design.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Sustained industrial policy support<\/strong>: Learn from China\u2019s long-term support (China has spent an estimated 1.7-2% of its GDP annually over three decades supporting industry). Ensure policy stability and consistency.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s smartphone PLI success offers <strong>a clear policy template<\/strong>: focus on exports, leverage labour advantages, build scale through assembly, and ensure a business-friendly ecosystem.<\/li>\n<li>It demonstrates that strategic industrial policy, when aligned with global markets and domestic strengths, can deliver transformative outcomes.<\/li>\n<li>The real test now lies in <strong>scaling <\/strong>this model across sectors, converting early gains into broad-based manufacturing competitiveness and employment generation.<\/li>\n<li>This will be a critical step toward achieving India\u2019s ambition of becoming a global manufacturing powerhouse.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><strong>India\u2019s Smartphone PLI Success FAQs<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Q1<\/strong>. What are the key factors behind the success of India\u2019s smartphone PLI scheme?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. The scheme succeeded due to its export orientation, focus on downstream assembly, competitive tariff structure, etc.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q2<\/strong>. How has the smartphone PLI scheme contributed to India\u2019s integration into GVCs?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. By prioritising exports and attracting global assemblers, the scheme enabled India to scale production and increase exports.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q3<\/strong>. Why is an assembly-first strategy considered effective in building a manufacturing ecosystem?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Assembly-led growth generates scale, employment, and demand for components, which gradually fosters a domestic supplier ecosystem.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q4<\/strong>. What is the role of tariff rationalisation in enhancing the competitiveness of India\u2019s manufacturing sector?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Lowering import duties on key inputs reduces production costs, avoids tariff inversion, and improves export competitiveness.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Q5<\/strong>. What lessons from the smartphone PLI can be applied to other labour-intensive sectors in India?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ans<\/strong>. Policies should emphasise export-led growth, leverage labour advantages, ensure ease of doing business, etc.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Source: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/opinion\/columns\/some-smartphone-lessons-for-industrial-police-10616286\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><strong>IE<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Daily Editorial Analysis 3 April 2026 by Vajiram &#038; Ravi covers key editorials from The Hindu &#038; Indian Express with UPSC-focused insights and relevance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":20,"featured_media":86373,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[138],"tags":[141,882,909],"class_list":{"0":"post-96289","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-daily-editorial-analysis","8":"tag-daily-editorial-analysis","9":"tag-the-hindu-editorial-analysis","10":"tag-the-indian-express-analysis","11":"no-featured-image-padding"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96289","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/20"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=96289"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96289\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":96304,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96289\/revisions\/96304"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/86373"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=96289"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=96289"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vajiramandravi.com\/current-affairs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=96289"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}