Beware the tempting apple of Ukraine mediation

Why in news?

• The article underpins perils(dangers) of going beyond persuasion and exercising caution for India while playing a role in seeking to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table for brokering peace.

 

Background

• Media report: In a recent report, New York Times focussed on India's possible role in pressing for peace between Russia and Ukraine amidst the visit of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s to Moscow (November 7-8).
  • It also reported that India is trying to refashion India's tradition of non-alignment into a more commanding strategy of "all alignment"
  • The daily also highlighted that if the peacemaking efforts succeed, it can bring a more prominent place for India in the global order and bring it closer to the long-sought prize, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
• India’s perception: It led to comment in the Indian media, on how Indian diplomacy since the Russian invasion of Ukraine had deftly put India in a position to promote peace between the warring parties.
  • Few favouring the ruling system argued that a mediatory Indian role in the Ukraine war would naturally serve as a great vindication of Indian PM Modi’s personal position as a world leader and his government’s successful handling of India’s external interests.

 

India spotlight in G20 presidency

• Advancing India’s global status: Indian PM drawing public attention to his efforts to boosting India’s reputation is clear from the enormous emphasis he is giving to India assuming the G20 presidency on December 1, 2022.
• Demonstration: For instance, in a speech to mark the release of the logo, theme and website of the Indian presidency, he emphasized that this summit is just not a diplomatic meeting.
  • Also that India sees this as a new responsibility and as the world’s faith in itself.
• New challenges: The new question put forward is that whether India would consider the G20 presidency as a “new” responsibility to contribute to a resolution of the Ukraine conflict, more so when she may be actively encouraged to do so by the West.

 

Pitfalls in assuming responsibility

• Flipping status quo: The idea to act as intermediate in Ukraine conflict, though seductive, is full of hazards. It would mark a departure from the cautious, and largely successful, approach that India has pursued till now on the Ukraine war.

 

India’s standing on Ukraine conflict

• Expressed displeasure: India has made its disapproval of Russia’s action clear even if it has refrained from voting against it on substantive resolutions in United Nations forums, including the Security Council.
• Limited outcry: The maximum extent that India has gone to is of Indian PM openly telling Russian President Vladimir Putin in Samarkand (September 2022) that the present age was not one of war.
• Peaceful resolution: India has advocated a return to diplomacy and dialogue and has intervened in specific cases with Russia.
  • For example, to prevent it from endangering the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant (in Ukraine) or to allow the export of Ukraine foodgrains.
• Minimal outcomes: But all the above steps are far from attempts to mediate or bring the parties to the negotiating table.

 

Drawing lessons from earlier regime

• Practicing restraint: India can go back to her past in order to prevent itself from being tempted to accept western encouragement to go in the direction of mediation.
  • For instance, it can reflect on the lessons learnt by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in intervening with the Soviet leadership, at the prodding of the United States, to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
• Exposing western hypocrisy: As highlighted in The book named “The Great Game in Afghanistan: Rajiv Gandhi, General Zia and The Unending War, India-U.S. diplomacy on Afghanistan, the story of India’s diplomatic defeat and American duplicity gets spotlight.
• The story: India itself wanted a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan from the time it took place and conveyed its assessments privately to the Soviets.
  • During Rajiv Gandhi’s time Indian policymakers felt that Indian interests would be best served by the establishment of a broad-based neutral government in Kabul, and the U.S. too gave New Delhi the illusion that it wanted the same.
  • However, it is one matter to do so suo motu and quite another to undertake an initiative on some other country’s behalf.
• Implicit barter and false illusion: Another implicit aspect of the bargain for Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan was that the U.S. would put the brakes on Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme.
  • However, it became clear though that the U.S. was committed to it and also did not want India to play an active diplomatic role in ending the Afghanistan crisis.
  • It merely desired Indian influence to be brought to bear on the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan.
• India’s reaction: When the U.S.’s positions became clear to Rajiv Gandhi, India-U.S. ties, which were witnessing some warmth, suffered.
• Present relevance: The current era with its compulsions for India is far removed from that of the 1980s. But the basic principles which govern the game of nations do not change.
  • As in the 1980s, so now, the S. and the West in general wish India to use her leverage with Mr. Putin to abandon the war and negotiate with Ukraine while being aware that Indian interests with Ukraine are practically non-existent.
• Malicious intentions: Despite whatever they may say to India about its growing role in the world and how its global prestige would rise, all they really want is India’s intervention with Mr. Putin to change course.

 

Perils of going beyond this persuasion

• Commendable role: It is certainly appropriate for India to point to the great and growing global difficulties because of the Russian action.
  • India’s external affairs minister, Mr. Jaishankar while on his recent Russia tour pointed that the global economy is simply too inter-dependent for a significant conflict anywhere, not to have major consequences elsewhere.
  • For instance, world is seeing growing concerns on energy and food security from the conflict that are coming on top of severe stresses created by two years of COVID. The Global South, especially, is feeling the pain acutely.”
• Righteous course for India: It would also be correct for India to keep emphasizing that the way out is through dialogue and diplomacy. It would, however, be counterproductive to go beyond such appeals.
  • This is not only because mediation efforts, if undertaken, may fail but also because they would expose the true extent of India’s global influence and the limitations of personal chemistry between leaders in influencing events.