Putin’s Nuclear Bluff Has Worked, It Has Lessons for India

Why in news?

• India’s foreign minister S Jaishankar’s recent bilateral visit to Moscow is taking place amidst a heightened global perception of Russia’s nuclear threat.
• The article discusses the possible learnings for India with respect to hostile neighbor Pakistan amidst Putin’s nuclear bluff in ongoing Ukraine war.

 

Background

• The status of Russian nuclear forces on the ground has remained unaltered since President Putin ordered defence minister Sergei Shoigu to put the country’s deterrence forces on high combat alert in February.
• However, there have been no signs of a higher state of nuclear readiness and Russia has since denied possible nuclear weapons use.

 

Deploying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)

• Even the speculations have not been about the possible use of Russian strategic arsenal but remained restricted to tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).
  • Strategic nuclear weapons are larger (up to 1,000 kilotons) and are launched from longer range(over 5500 km). 
• About tactical nuclear weapon:These are small nuclear warheads and delivery systems meant to carry out a limited strike in a smaller area and are designed for use in battle, as part of an attack with conventional weapon forces.
  • These are designed to engage objects in the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission.
  • These can be “one kiloton or less (producing the equivalent to a thousand tonnes of the explosive TNT).
  • The largest can be as big as 100 kilotons. For instance, the atomic bomb the US dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was 15 kilotons and thus a TNW.
• Shifting war outcomes:Limited use of TNWs is unlikely to change conventional battle outcomes unless these are used in large numbers, which is impractical as it would adversely affect the user’s forces too and contaminate the battlefield.

 

What has Putin’s early posturing delivered?

• Thwarted west moves: Putin’s warning of unpredictable consequences of outside intervention in Ukraine did keep the US and NATO at bay.
  • For instance, US and NATO did not put their forces on the ground in Ukraine or respond positively to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s appeal to enforce a no-fly-zone over Ukraine.
• Remodeling weapons:Each nuclear-weapon state is now engaged in upgrading its nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
• New procurements: New non-nuclear weapon states have been motivated to acquire nuclear weapons.

 

Respecting sovereignty

• 1994 Budapest Memorandum: Under this, Russia had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and borders in return for Ukraine giving up the 4,400 nuclear weapons stationed on its soil.
• Paltry promises: Non-nuclear weapon states from recent happenings understand that the negative security assurances offered by nuclear-weapon states are worthless when the conflict is with a nuclear-weapon state.
  • This undermines the prevailing international consensus on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is based.
• Fermenting apprehensions:South Koreans and Japanese are asking questions about the reliability of the US
  • Even before the war in Ukraine, public opinion in Japan and South Korea was swinging in favour of the two countries acquiring nuclear weapons.
  • This was owing to the general sense that the US might not endanger the security of its mainland to defend its allies and friends.
• About Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT): It is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament.
  • The treaty was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Presently, it has 191 member states. India is not a member.
  • It requires countries to give up any present or future plans to build nuclear weapons in return for access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
  • It represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.

 

Pakistan kicking against the global trend on TNWs

• Dwindling weaponry: According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, TNWs declined worldwide post-Cold War, from between 20,000-30,000 in the 1980s to 2,500 in 2019. In the US inventory, TNWs declined from 9,000 in 1989 to230 in 2019.
• Outlier: The sole exception to this global trend was Pakistan, which departed from its declared nuclear posture of minimum credible deterrence to adopt the ‘flexible response’ doctrine and then ‘full-spectrum deterrence’.
• Pakistan excuse: For Pakistani officials, increasing and diversifying Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is not seen as a policy choice, but rather a compulsion to maintain an effective deterrent vis-à-vis India.
  • Any advances in India’s conventional military capability, nuclear arsenal, or strategic position amplify the perception of an incessant and unremitting threat for which Pakistan has no recourse other than nuclear weapons.
  • In this view, deterrence is more relative and elastic than fixed; “full-spectrum” capabilities provide a way to keep up and ensure that Pakistan’s deterrence remains credible, rather than a new strategy as such.
• Seeming objectives: Pakistan’s TNWs’ objectives appear to be conflict management, early termination of military hostilities and prevention of war.
• Contrary effects: TNWs’ use, however, would have the opposite effect.Escalation control will be difficult to manage and wholesale destruction might become a possibility.

 

Options for India

• Transnational cooperation: In conjunction with the intelligence agencies of friendly countries, precisely assess the disposition and deployment of Pakistani TNWs.
• Arsenal deployment: Accelerate the deployment of multilateral-layered missile defence batteries.
• Strengthen domestic capabilities: Buttress the Indian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities.
• Point-to-point communication: Establish a hotline between the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the Indian Strategic Forces Command
• Technological upgradation: Continue to improve nuclear weapons and delivery systems proportionate to the emerging threats and continued reliance on credible minimum deterrence.