UPSC Mains Current Affairs for 2 September 2026

India’s Sugar Price Hike: Causes, Government Response and the Ethanol Debate

September 2, 2026

India's Sugar Price Surge Latest News

Retail sugar prices in India rose sharply from Rs 48.18/kg on July 20 to Rs 55.70/kg on August 20, 2026 — with the all-India modal price reportedly touching Rs 65/kg by late August.
The government has rejected claims linking the surge to ethanol diversion, attributing it instead to a combination of production, demand, and market factors.

The Scale of the Price Surge

Retail sugar prices rose by roughly Rs 20/kg in just a month — from Rs 45/kg on July 21 to Rs 65/kg by late August.
Ex-factory prices (what mills realise after taxes) also jumped sharply: from Rs 44.95–46.7/kg (UP), Rs 46.2–46.9/kg (Maharashtra), and Rs 46.25–47/kg (Karnataka) on August 1, to Rs 57–64/kg across these states by August 20.

Government's Five Reasons for the Price Rise

The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution cited five factors, explicitly rejecting the ethanol-diversion theory:
- Lower domestic production: Sugar output for the current season is estimated at ~30.6 million tonnes, below the initial estimate of 34.3 million tonnes, due to Red Rot and Top Borer diseases and waterlogging from excess rainfall.
- Festive-season demand: Rising demand ahead of Dussehra (October 20) and Diwali (November 8) has added pressure on prices.
- Weather-related crop damage: Excess rainfall and waterlogging hit sugarcane output directly.
- Tighter global supplies: International sugar prices rose over 16% (from $474/tonne on June 30 to $552/tonne on August 20), with a projected global sugar deficit of 3.3 million tonnes in 2026-27.
- Speculation and hoarding: Certain industry sections were flagged for contributing to artificial price pressure.

Why the Government Says Ethanol Is Not to Blame

The share of sugar diverted for ethanol has actually declined — from about 12% in 2022-23 to around 9% in 2025-26.
Nearly three-fourths of India's ethanol now comes from grains (mainly maize), not sugarcane.
The ethanol programme has helped address India's structural sugar surplus — production typically runs at 32-34 million tonnes against consumption of 28-29 million tonnes — preventing excess inventory from locking up mill working capital.
It has also improved mill finances: 97% of sugarcane dues for 2025-26 had been paid as of August 20, and no sugar subsidy has been needed since 2021-22 (compared to Rs 14,600 crore given between 2014-2021).

The Real Story: Production Shortfall and Nine-Year-Low Stocks

Industry estimates show gross sugar production for 2025-26 at just 309 lakh tonnes, against an initial projection of 343.5 lakh tonnes — a shortfall of over 30 lakh tonnes, independent of ethanol diversion.
After diversion (~30 lt) and adjusting for consumption (280 lt) and exports (8 lt), closing stocks are projected at around 41 lakh tonnes — the lowest since 2016-17 (some estimates suggest it could be the lowest since 2008-09).
Root cause: Excess rainfall and delayed monsoon withdrawal in Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Gujarat during September-October 2025 waterlogged fields, reducing cane growth and sucrose accumulation.
- Uttar Pradesh's dominant Co-0238 cane variety was also hit by red rot disease and top shoot borer pests.
Market triggers: Liquidity-strapped mills had oversold beyond quotas, leaving little real stock despite paper declarations. Poor June 2026 monsoon in cane-growing states also fuelled speculative buying and mill-level stock-holding ahead of the festive season.

Government Measures to Control Prices

Stock limits: A cap of 400 tonnes on sugar dealers nationwide until November 30; bulk consumers barred from holding more than 15 days' consumption stock from September 1.
Duty-free imports: Approval for import of up to 10 lakh tonnes (with the news report separately citing 1 million tonnes) of raw sugar at zero duty till October 31, against the standard 100% tariff.
Export ban: All sugar exports banned till September 30, 2026 as a precautionary measure.
Stock verification: Joint central-state teams ordered to physically verify mill stocks to check hoarding and artificial scarcity.
Bulk consumer tracking: Mills directed to furnish details of large buyers (soft drink/confectionery makers, sweetmeat sellers) who purchased 500+ tonnes annually.
Boosting supply: States and mills advised to begin crushing from October 15, with October output expected to exceed 1 million tonnes (against the usual 3-4 lakh tonnes).
Industry sources suggest the government may also direct mills to halt ethanol production from direct cane juice and B-molasses in 2026-27 to prioritise domestic sugar supply.

Conclusion

While the government attributes the sugar price surge to production shortfalls, weather damage, festive demand, and hoarding rather than ethanol diversion, data shows gross production itself fell sharply due to climatic and pest-related factors — with ethanol's share actually declining.
The episode highlights the delicate balance India must maintain between its ethanol-blending goals for energy security and ensuring stable, affordable sugar supplies for consumers.

Source: IE | LM

India's Sugar Price Surge FAQs

Q1: What caused India's Sugar Price Surge in 2026?

Ans: India's Sugar Price Surge was driven by lower production, excess rainfall, crop diseases, pest attacks, festive-season demand, tighter global supplies, speculation, and hoarding.

Q2: Why does the government reject ethanol diversion as the cause of India's Sugar Price Surge?

Ans: The government says India's Sugar Price Surge cannot primarily be blamed on ethanol because sugar diversion declined and most ethanol now comes from grains.

Q3: How did lower sugar production contribute to India's Sugar Price Surge?

Ans: India's Sugar Price Surge intensified after gross production fell sharply below initial estimates, leaving closing stocks at their lowest levels in several years.

Q4: What measures has the government taken to control India's Sugar Price Surge?

Ans: To address India's Sugar Price Surge, the government imposed stock limits, approved duty-free imports, banned exports, ordered stock verification, and accelerated crushing.

Q5: What does India's Sugar Price Surge reveal about the ethanol policy debate?

Ans: India's Sugar Price Surge highlights the need to balance ethanol-blending goals and energy security with adequate domestic sugar availability and stable consumer prices.

Article 124(3) and the Unused Route to the Supreme Court

September 2, 2026

Latest News

More than 76 years after the Constitution came into force, the provision (Article 124(3)) allowing a “distinguished jurist” to be appointed directly as a Supreme Court judge has never been used.
Speaking at the 13th convocation of National Law University Delhi on August 30, 2026, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan described this as an “unused mandate” that requires serious consideration.
He argued that bringing distinguished jurists from legal academia and scholarship could diversify the Supreme Court Bench.
It could strengthen the SC’s ability to address public law and constitutional questions, and reduce excessive dependence on narrow technicalities.

Constitutional Provision - Article 124(3)

Three routes to the Supreme Court:
- Article 124(3) provides that a person can become a Supreme Court judge if they are an Indian citizen and -
  - Have been a High Court judge for at least five years;
  - Have been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years; or
  - Are, in the opinion of the President, a “distinguished jurist.”
- The first two routes have traditionally been used. Most Supreme Court judges are elevated from the High Courts, while a smaller number are appointed directly from the Bar. The third route has never been exercised.
High Court provision:

- Article 217 deals with appointment of High Court judges.
- During the Emergency, the 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) introduced a similar provision for appointing distinguished jurists to High Courts.
- However, this provision was subsequently removed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment (1978).

Why Was the Jurist Route Introduced?

The provision originated during the Constituent Assembly debates on May 24, 1949.
H.V. Kamath - Broaden the talent pool:
- H.V. Kamath argued that Supreme Court appointments should not be confined exclusively to judges and practising advocates.
- The Constitution should permit persons possessing “outstanding legal and juristic learning”, even if they had never practised in court.
- He cited the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an example of a judicial institution drawing upon wider legal expertise.
M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar - Need for constitutional expertise:

- Ayyangar supported the proposal, observing that practising lawyers may not necessarily encounter the complex constitutional and public-law questions routinely dealt with by a constitutional court.
B.R. Ambedkar: He did not oppose the principle. His concern was primarily with the terminology—particularly whether “distinguished” was the appropriate word. The provision was ultimately adopted.

Who Is a “Distinguished Jurist”?

The Constitution does not define the term.
Broadly, it can encompass persons with exceptional expertise in legal practice, teaching, research or jurisprudence, including eminent legal academics who may lack conventional courtroom experience.
However, India presents an institutional difficulty - Bar Council rules generally restrict full-time law teachers from simultaneously practising law.
Consequently, outstanding academics may not possess the litigation experience traditionally associated with judicial appointments.

Why Has the Provision Remained Unused?

Perceived lack of suitable candidates: Successive governments and, later, the judicial collegium may have believed that Indian legal academia has not produced candidates with sufficient depth and distinction for appointment to the SC
Lack of serious exploration: An alternative explanation is that neither the government nor the collegium has seriously explored the constitutional avenue.
Problem reinforced by the present collegium system:

- Although Article 124(3) refers to the President's opinion, contemporary Supreme Court appointments are initiated through the Supreme Court collegium.
- Therefore, a distinguished jurist would ordinarily need to be identified and recommended by the collegium before the government processes the appointment.

Why Revive the Provision?

Justice Bhuyan's argument goes beyond simply increasing the number of potential candidates.
A distinguished jurist could -
- Diversify the composition of the Supreme Court Bench;
- Bring stronger expertise in constitutional and public law;
- Introduce perspectives from legal scholarship and academia;
- Enrich judicial reasoning beyond narrowly technical questions;
- Strengthen the Court's capacity to deal with increasingly complex constitutional, institutional and socio-legal issues.
Thus, Article 124(3) can potentially serve as a mechanism for bringing specialised legal knowledge into India's highest constitutional court.

The Institutional Challenge

The larger issue is not merely whether India has eminent jurists, but how they should be identified and appointed.
The absence of a transparent, accepted definition of “distinguished jurist”, combined with the predominance of the collegium system, creates uncertainty over -
- Who qualifies
- Who identifies the candidate
- What criteria are applied
- How independence and merit are protected
The experience of legal scholar Upendra Baxi, who was reportedly considered for judicial elevation but was never appointed, illustrates how the jurist route has remained largely theoretical.

Source: IE

Article 124(3) FAQs

Q1: What are the three routes for appointment as a Supreme Court judge under Article 124(3)?

Ans: Qualify as a High Court judge for five years, an advocate for ten years, or a “distinguished jurist” in the President’s opinion.

Q2: Why has the “distinguished jurist” route under Article 124(3) remained unused?

Ans: Due to failure of the government and collegium to seriously explore the provision.

Q3: How can distinguished jurists contribute to the functioning of the Supreme Court?

Ans: They can diversify the Bench and bring specialised expertise in constitutional law, public law, legal scholarship and jurisprudence.

Q4: What was the rationale behind introducing the “distinguished jurist” provision in the Constitution?

Ans: To widen the pool by enabling persons with outstanding legal and juristic learning to enter the Supreme Court.

Q5: What is the significance of Article 124(3) in the context of judicial appointments?

Ans: It provides constitutional flexibility to induct eminent legal scholars into the Supreme Court.

Bishkek Declaration – Key Highlights and India’s Message on Terrorism

September 2, 2026

Bishkek Declaration Latest News

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has adopted the Bishkek Declaration at its 26th summit.

About the SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic and security grouping. It has ten member states:
- Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
India became a full member in 2017. The organisation marked 25 years at the Bishkek summit, making it one of the largest regional groupings by population and geographical spread.
The SCO's core focus has traditionally been on combating what it calls the "three evils", terrorism, separatism and extremism, alongside cooperation in trade, connectivity and cultural exchange.

News Summary

The 2026 Bishkek SCO summit was the 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, held from 31 August to 1 September in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
The Bishkek Declaration was signed by the leaders of all member states, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Terrorism

The declaration strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and emphasised that double standards in the fight against terrorism are unacceptable.
Member states called on the international community to combat terrorism, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, with the UN playing a central role.
This was to be achieved by fully implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in accordance with the UN Charter and principles of international law.
Reaffirming their commitment to combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, the members emphasised the inadmissibility of attempts to exploit terrorist, separatist and extremist groups for selfish purposes.

Cyber and Information Security

The declaration noted the importance of countering the use of the internet for terrorist, separatist and extremist purposes.
Member states agreed to strengthen coordination in the areas of international information security, information protection, and combating new types of crime.

West Asia

The statement expressed deep concern over developments in West Asia and advocated a political and diplomatic resolution to the conflict.
Reaffirming support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, member states advocated resolution of the conflict solely through political and diplomatic means, and welcomed all efforts aimed at de-escalating the situation.
The declaration also condoled the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader.

Global Governance

The SCO countries advocated reform and improvement of the system of global governance and regulation.
They also stated adherence to a policy that excludes bloc-based and confrontational approaches to resolving issues of international and regional development, favouring peaceful resolution of disagreements between states.

India's Message at the Summit

Prime Minister Modi's address focused on three themes: the spillover effects of conflict, terrorism, and connectivity.
Conflict Has No Borders
- PM Modi told the summit that the crisis in West Asia has shown that a conflict in one region does not remain confined there. He noted that it affects global energy security, maritime trade and supply chains.
- He observed that the Global South bears the brunt of these consequences, and reiterated India's consistent position that the resolution of all tensions and conflicts is possible only through dialogue and diplomacy, not on the battlefield.
- The remarks came as the war in West Asia, which began in February 2026 with US and Israeli attacks on Iran, entered its sixth month.
On Terrorism
- PM Modi described terrorism as a grave challenge for all of humanity and argued that the response cannot be limited to an "action-reaction" mindset.
- He called for dismantling the entire ecosystem of terror financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and said member states must speak in one voice to declare that there is no room for double standards on the issue.
- He added that countries which use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and provide shelter and support to terrorists must be sent a strong message that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset for anyone.
On Connectivity
- Underlining the need for robust and reliable connectivity, PM Modi said India supports all initiatives that connect markets, facilitate trade and open new avenues for growth.
- He stressed, however, that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is paramount in such endeavours, describing this as the core spirit of the SCO Charter.

India's Vision: Security, Connectivity, Opportunity

PM Modi recalled India's three pillars for the SCO: S for Security, C for Connectivity, and O for Opportunity.
Noting the grouping's 25-year record, he said a solid foundation for cooperation had been laid and the goal for the next 25 years should be to translate cooperation into tangible results.
India has launched several initiatives within the SCO framework, including a Start-up Forum, a Young Authors' Conclave and a Young Scientists' Forum. The first session of the SCO Civilizational Dialogue Forum, proposed by India last year, will be held in India this year.

Source: IE | TH

Bishkek Declaration FAQs

Q1: Which countries are members of the SCO?

Ans: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

Q2: What did the Bishkek Declaration say on terrorism?

Ans: It strongly condemned terrorism in all forms and stated that double standards in the fight against terrorism are unacceptable.

Q3: What was the SCO's position on the West Asia conflict?

Ans: It expressed deep concern, reaffirmed support for Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and advocated resolution solely through political and diplomatic means.

Q4: What are the three pillars of India's SCO vision?

Ans: Security, Connectivity and Opportunity.

Q5: When did India become a full member of the SCO?

Ans: India became a full member in 2017.

Untouchability and Purity: Constitutional and Legal Framework in India

September 2, 2026

Untouchability and Purity Latest News

A "shuddhikaran" (purification) ritual performed at Haldwani's Ramlila ground — two days after a senior political leader addressed a rally there — has triggered a controversy over whether the act amounts to "untouchability" under law.
The episode raises a deeper constitutional question: does law recognise untouchability even when there is no denial of entry, but a "purification" of a place after a Dalit person has used it?

What the Constitution and Law Prohibit

Article 17 declares "untouchability" abolished, forbids its practice "in any form," and makes enforcement of any disability arising from it a punishable offence. The Constitution does not define "untouchability".
The Supreme Court has held Article 17 is enforceable against non-State actors as well.
Parliament operationalised Article 17 through the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 after a 1976 amendment.
The Act penalises preaching and practice of untouchability, and enforcement of disabilities — covering denial of temple entry, social disabilities and discrimination in public facilities.
Section 7(1)(d) specifically punishes insulting a Scheduled Caste member "on the ground of untouchability" — but the insult must be connected to untouchability, not merely humiliating.

Supreme Court's Interpretation: Sukanya Shantha v Union of India (2024)

Case involved striking down caste-discriminatory provisions in prison manuals.
Court linked untouchability to the caste system's notions of "purity and pollution", used historically to reinforce caste hierarchy.
It held that the absence of a constitutional definition does not restrict Article 17's scope, since discrimination manifests through "manifold complexities" of social life.
Key principle laid down was: "There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person."
This extends Article 17 beyond physical exclusion to discriminatory treatment based on touch or presence.

Rajasthan High Court Precedent: Surya Narayan Choudhary v State of Rajasthan (1988)

The case was concerned with discrimination against Dalit devotees at the Shrinathji temple, Nathdwara.
Dalits were permitted temple entry only after a purification process.
High Court held this was an additional discriminatory condition not applied to other devotees.
It directed the practice be discontinued, holding it violative of Articles 14, 15 and 17.
Key distinction from Haldwani: At Nathdwara, purification was a precondition for entry; at Haldwani, the ritual occurred after use of the venue, and its cause is disputed.
Hence, this precedent doesn't directly decide the Haldwani case, but establishes that caste-specific ritual purification as a condition of access violates Article 17.

Distinguishing from the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Article 17/PCR (Protection of Civil Rights Act) Act must be distinguished from the separate criminal regime under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Section 3(1)(r): Punishes intentional insult/intimidation of an SC/ST member with intent to humiliate, in a place within public view, by a non-SC/ST person.
Hitesh Verma v State of Uttarakhand (2020): Not every insult to an SC/ST person attracts this provision — the insult must be connected to the person's caste identity.
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v State (NCT of Delhi) (2026): Reiterated that "public view" is an essential ingredient for the offence.

What Would Establish Untouchability in the Haldwani Case?

The determining factor is evidence of a caste-based connection — whether the venue was seen as needing cleansing because of caste-based notions of pollution attached to Kharge's touch or presence.
If such a connection exists, the reasoning in Sukanya Shantha and Surya Narayan Choudhary becomes directly relevant.
If the ritual was for reasons unconnected to caste, mere timing after the rally does not by itself establish untouchability.
The word "shuddhikaran" alone cannot answer this question — the legal test is the underlying connection to caste-based pollution, not the label or timing of the act.

Conclusion

Article 17's abolition of untouchability extends beyond physical exclusion to caste-based notions of purity and pollution attached to a person's touch or presence, as clarified in Sukanya Shantha.
Whether a specific act — such as the Haldwani ritual — constitutes untouchability ultimately turns on demonstrable caste-based intent, not on ritual terminology or coincidental timing.

Source: TH | EPW

Untouchability and Purity FAQs

Q1: What does Article 17 say about Untouchability and Purity?

Ans: Article 17 abolishes untouchability in every form and prohibits disabilities arising from it, making enforcement punishable while addressing caste-based notions of purity.

Q2: How are Untouchability and Purity connected under constitutional law?

Ans: Untouchability and Purity are connected because the Supreme Court has linked caste-based discrimination to historical notions of purity and pollution.

Q3: What did Sukanya Shantha say about Untouchability and Purity?

Ans: Sukanya Shantha linked Untouchability and Purity to caste hierarchy, holding that no stigma can be attached to any person's existence, touch or presence.

Q4: Can purification rituals constitute Untouchability and Purity discrimination?

Ans: Purification rituals may implicate Untouchability and Purity where evidence establishes caste-based pollution attached to someone's touch or presence, rather than merely coincidental timing.

Q5: What evidence would establish Untouchability and Purity in the Haldwani case?

Ans: Evidence connecting the ritual to caste-based notions of pollution would establish Untouchability and Purity concerns; the ritual's name or timing alone is insufficient.

Indus Waters Treaty: The Road Ahead for India and Pakistan

September 2, 2026

Indus Waters Treaty Latest News

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has passed two more orders against India in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute — ruling that India's decision to hold the Treaty in "abeyance" is impermissible, and directing India to halt construction at the Ratle Hydroelectric Project.
India rejected the Court's legitimacy entirely, setting the stage for a prolonged, unresolved standoff.

The Latest Rulings

The PCA ruled India's decision to put the Treaty in abeyance was not permissible under the Treaty or international law — meaning the Treaty remains fully in force.
It directed India to halt construction at the Ratle Hydroelectric Project until the technical dispute is resolved.
This is the fourth award from the Court, all favouring Pakistan.
The Court, constituted in September 2022, has previously declared itself competent to adjudicate and held its decisions "final and binding".
With this order, the Court has likely completed its work, having addressed all issues raised by Pakistan.

Why India Rejects the Court

India calls the Court illegally-constituted, alleging it was set up by the World Bank in breach of Treaty terms.
A neutral expert had already been appointed to adjudicate the same issue; the Treaty does not permit parallel resolution processes.
India refused to appoint its two arbitrators; the Court nonetheless proceeded with two arbitrators appointed by Pakistan and three "umpires" nominated by Treaty-specified institutions.
India maintains its decision to hold the IWT in abeyance remains in force, rejecting the Court's award outright.

Why the Court's Orders Carry No Real Force

The PCA has no enforcement mechanism — its orders cannot compel material change given India's firm rejection.
For Pakistan, however, the orders remain valuable diplomatic ammunition to raise the issue at international forums and build a domestic narrative.

Pakistan's Limited Options Going Forward

Best case for Pakistan: Get the UN Security Council to pass a resolution against India, framing the dispute as a security issue (Pakistan is a non-permanent UNSC member for four more months).
Alternative: Persuade the Security Council or UN General Assembly to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Both scenarios are far-fetched — India's greater diplomatic clout at the UN makes such moves unlikely to succeed.
Pakistan's fallback option: sustained narrative-building portraying India as a treaty-violator.

India's Strategic Response

Primary focus: expeditious completion of projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to fully utilise its Treaty-permitted rights.
- Pursuing eight infrastructure projects worth ₹50,000 crore in Jammu and Kashmir.
- One project — diverting Chenab waters to the Beas — exceeds Treaty provisions, which prohibit inter-basin transfer.
India disengaged from the neutral expert process last year (set up at its own request) to avoid appearing to still operate under the Treaty.
It continues sharing hydrological data with Pakistan, but only via the High Commission in Islamabad — not through the Permanent Indus Commission.
India has linked the Treaty's abeyance to Pakistan's continued support for cross-border terrorism.
It has proposed renegotiating the Treaty on a strictly bilateral basis, without third-party involvement (e.g., World Bank) — a condition Pakistan is unlikely to accept.

Sharing Water Without a Treaty

The deadlock appears unresolvable in the near term; rivers will likely continue flowing without a formal agreement.
This is not unprecedented — India shares rivers with China, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar, mostly without formal water-sharing treaties.
Abeyance ≠ stopping water flow: India cannot physically halt flows even if it wished to; Pakistan continues receiving water as before, and will continue to do so even after India completes its western river projects.
Pakistan's water stress stems primarily from inefficient water management, not from Indian action.
The uncertainty may actually push Pakistan toward better water management practices and storage infrastructure.

Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty dispute has reached a practical stalemate: the Court of Arbitration's unenforceable rulings favour Pakistan on paper, but India's firm rejection and infrastructural push on the western rivers signal that it treats the Treaty as effectively defunct.
With renegotiation unlikely and international escalation improbable, transboundary water-sharing may continue informally, as it does with India's other neighbours.

Source: IE

Indus Waters Treaty FAQs

Q1: What is the current status of the Indus Waters Treaty?

Ans: The Indus Waters Treaty is effectively in a practical stalemate, with India rejecting arbitration rulings while continuing hydrological data-sharing with Pakistan.

Q2: Why has India rejected the Indus Waters Treaty arbitration process?

Ans: India rejects the Indus Waters Treaty arbitration process, arguing that the Permanent Court of Arbitration was improperly constituted and parallel dispute mechanisms are impermissible.

Q3: What did the Permanent Court of Arbitration rule on the Indus Waters Treaty?

Ans: The Court ruled that India's decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance was impermissible and ordered construction at Ratle to stop.

Q4: What are India's strategic priorities regarding the Indus Waters Treaty?

Ans: India's strategy focuses on completing projects on western rivers, maximising permitted water use and pursuing bilateral renegotiation without third-party involvement.

Q5: Will India stop water flows to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty?

Ans: No, placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance does not mean physically stopping river flows; Pakistan continues receiving water despite the dispute.

VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS: Key Changes in Rural Employment Scheme

September 2, 2026

VB-G RAM G Latest News

The Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 — popularly known as VB-G RAM G — is set to come into force from July 1, 2026, replacing the two-decade-old Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).
The Ministry of Rural Development had recently released eight draft rules governing the new scheme's implementation. Public objections and suggestions have been invited within a month, after which the rules will be formally notified.

What is MGNREGA — Brief Background

MGNREGA (enacted 2005) was India's flagship rural employment guarantee scheme — providing 100 days of guaranteed wage employment per year to rural households willing to do unskilled manual work.
It benefited over five crore rural families in 2025-26 and was entirely Centre-funded for wages.

Key Features of VB-G RAM G

VB-G RAM G now replaces MGNREGA with significant structural changes.

Increased Work Days — With a Seasonal Pause

The guaranteed employment has been increased from 100 to 125 days per year — a 25% increase in the employment guarantee.
However, a 60-day pause during peak agricultural sowing and harvesting seasons has been built in — to ensure adequate availability of farm labour during critical agricultural periods.

Shift in Funding — States Bear More Burden

This is the most significant and controversial change. Under MGNREGA, the Centre bore 100% of the wage bill.
Under VB-G RAM G, states must now bear 40% of the funding burden — a major fiscal shift that will strain state exchequers, particularly those with high rural employment demand.
The only exceptions are northeastern and Himalayan states and UTs with a legislature (where the Centre bears 90%) and UTs without legislature (where the Centre bears 100%).

Top-Down Allocation — Centre Determines Devolutions

VB-G RAM G reverses the MGNREGA model where Central allocations were based on state-submitted labour budgets (demand-driven).
Now, the Centre determines the normative allocation to each state — making the resource allocation process top-down rather than demand-driven.
This gives the Centre greater control over fund flows but reduces states' ability to respond to fluctuating local demand.

16th Finance Commission Formula for Allocation

The Centre will use the Sixteenth Finance Commission's horizontal devolution formula to determine normative allocations to states. This will result in winners and losers among states:
- States likely to receive lower allocations — Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra.
- States likely to receive higher allocations — Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Punjab, Bihar.

Performance-Based Withheld Allocation

A new provision allows the Centre to keep aside a portion of the normative allocation and distribute it among states based on performance parameters — including timely payment of wages, compliance with social audit requirements, percentage of work completion in a financial year, and other Centre-specified indicators.
The proportion to be withheld has not yet been decided. This provision takes effect from the next financial year.

States Bear Excess Expenditure

If a state's demand for employment exceeds its normative allocation and expenditure goes beyond the Centre's share, the state must bear all additional expenditure — creating a significant fiscal risk for high-demand states.

DBT Wage Payments

All wage and unemployment allowance payments under VB-G RAM G will be made through Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) into bank or post office accounts — improving transparency and reducing leakages.
However, the wage rate under VB-G RAM G is yet to be declared by the Union government.

What Happens to Existing MGNREGS Workers

The existing MGNREGS job cards — once renewed and verified through e-KYC — will remain valid for seeking employment under VB-G RAM G.
This arrangement continues until state governments issue Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Cards under the new law. No worker will be left without access to work during the transition period.

The Eight Draft Rules Released

The Ministry has released eight draft rules covering all key aspects of the new scheme:
- National Level Steering Committee Rules
- Grievance Redressal Rules
- Administrative Expenses Rules
- Transitional Provisions under VB-G RAM G Rules
- Objective Parameters for Normative Allocation Rules
- Central Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Council Rules
- Manner of Payment of Wages and Unemployment Allowance Rules
- Manner and Procedure of Expenditure incurred by States in excess of Normative Allocation Rules
The Union government has allocated ₹95,692.31 crore for the VB-G RAM G scheme for 2026-27.

Key Concerns and Implications

For States — The shift of 40% wage burden to states is a major fiscal challenge, particularly for high-demand states like Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu — which may also receive lower allocations under the new formula. States with weak fiscal positions may struggle to fund demand surges.
For Workers — The 25 additional days of guaranteed work is positive. However, the 60-day agricultural pause and the yet-to-be-declared wage rate create uncertainty. The performance-based withheld allocation could also indirectly affect workers if states under-invest in compliance.
For Centre-State Relations — The shift from demand-driven to top-down allocation and the imposition of performance conditions on fund release represents a significant centralisation of control over a flagship rural welfare programme — raising federalism concerns.

Source: IE

VB-G RAM G FAQs

Q1: Why is VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS considered a major policy shift?

Ans: VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS represents a major rural employment transition affecting job guarantees, implementation mechanisms, and welfare delivery across rural India.

Q2: What changes are expected under VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS?

Ans: VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS may introduce revised eligibility rules, digital monitoring systems, altered wage structures, and new implementation guidelines for rural employment.

Q3: How could VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS affect rural workers?

Ans: VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS could influence employment access, wage security, transparency, and rural livelihood opportunities depending on implementation effectiveness.

Q4: Why is VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS politically significant?

Ans: VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS is politically significant because MGNREGS has long been a major rural welfare and employment support programme in India.

Q5: What challenges may arise when VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS is implemented?

Ans: Implementing VB-G RAM G to Replace MGNREGS may face challenges related to funding, administrative coordination, digital access, worker registration, and accountability mechanisms.