Daily Editorial Analysis 24 September 2026

India And The Plausible Multilateralism Of BRICS

Context:

• BRICS gatherings always trigger heated debate in India. Optimists see BRICS as an institution capable of multipolarising the global order. Sceptics highlight internal divisions and fear domination by Russia and China.
• A third group dismisses it entirely as strategic noise, arguing India should instead focus on deepening ties with the United States.
• The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, drew special attention because of its timing and location.
• It was the first BRICS summit since the US and Israel launched war against Iran on February 28, 2026, in India’s extended neighbourhood. India — a close strategic partner of both the US and Israel — hosted the Presidents of Iran, Russia and China at the same table.
• This article highlights how BRICS enables India to manage strategic differences with China, Russia, Iran and the United States while preserving its policy of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy.

A Difficult Consensus in Delhi

• Building agreement among 11 member countries — including the UAE and Iran, who remain locked in an undeclared conflict — was itself an achievement.
• The Delhi Declaration shows that despite disputes, members continue to find value in a BRICS worldview built around a more representative global order.
• This consensus required compromise from every side, including India.

India’s Balancing Act on West Asia

• India’s position had grown awkward in the run-up to the summit.
  • PM Modi visited Israel just two days before the Israel-US bombing of Iran began.
  • India initially avoided condemning the attacks or the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — creating an impression of tilting towards Washington and Tel Aviv.
  • India also watched from the sidelines as Pakistan stepped in as a mediator between the US and Iran, seizing the diplomatic opening.
• India then repositioned itself as West Asia’s traditional balancer, using multilateral platforms to do so without damaging bilateral ties:
  • India endorsed the Bishkek resolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September, condemning the strikes on Iran and expressing condolences over Khamenei’s killing.
  • India hosted Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian at the Delhi summit even as the West Asia war continued.
  • The image of Modi walking hand in hand with Pezeshkian is unlikely to fade quickly in Washington or Tel Aviv.

Managing the China Relationship

• The India-China border dispute remains unresolved and continues to simmer. But there is momentum toward resetting ties, and multilateral forums like BRICS let India and China stay engaged even without high-level bilateral visits.
• The underlying logic: a lack of engagement between competing major powers deepens mistrust, and mistrust combined with a security dilemma can turn dangerous.
• Staying engaged — bilaterally and multilaterally — creates guardrails for competitive coexistence.

Convergence Despite Divergence

• On major global issues — AI regulation, global trade and finance rules, climate change, border conflicts, and the status of multilateral bodies — BRICS members hold different approaches and priorities.
• Yet they converge on one point: unilateralism by any bloc or power harms their interests and the planet.

The “Washington Predictability”

• Analysts frame US behaviour not as unpredictable, but as totally predictable in one sense — a consistent focus on its own dominance above all else.
• Several BRICS members have had difficult direct experiences with this:
  • India was recently hit with varying US tariffs.
  • India was among the countries most economically affected by the US-Israel war on Iran.
  • On September 16, 2026, the US House passed the Russia sanctions Bill, threatening tariffs of up to 100% on countries including India.
• India’s foreign policy under PM Modi has sometimes been read as a tilt toward the US camp, reinforced by his early remark that India had overcome its “hesitation of history” with Washington.
• But this coexists with the official framing of “sabke saath” — multi-alignment.
• Experts contend that India has not abandoned the hesitations of strategic realism, even if it shed historical hesitancy.

The Lesson of Frontline States

• History and current events both warn against becoming a frontline in great-power rivalry.
• Pakistan’s experience is one instructive example.
• UAE and Iran — better off dealing with each other directly — found a partial corrective through their bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Delhi BRICS summit, using a multilateral platform to address a bilateral problem.
• Ukraine, by contrast, backed by NATO and fighting Russia for over four years, has no direct platform to engage Moscow, leaving its diplomatic options entirely dependent on Brussels and Washington.

What India Should Learn

• The argument is not that India should downgrade ties with the US. The US partnership remains vital for India’s development.
• But India must avoid becoming a frontline in the US-China competition. BRICS lets India pursue this path without championing an anti-US agenda or undermining cooperation with Washington.
• Washington, having previously accepted India’s adherence to strategic autonomy, has reportedly been pushing to draw India into a more subordinate relationship.
• India’s answer should be to pursue multiple pathways to its rise, rather than accept unequal great-power alliances.

Why BRICS’s Divisions Are Not a Weakness

• BRICS is unlike the G-7, where American primacy and the Western order are broadly accepted by all members.
• Its internal divisions actually prevent any single country from dominating the grouping.
• Meanwhile, an external convergence — a shared belief that the post-war international system is unfair and needs a more representative replacement — holds the group together.
• The dialectic between internal contradiction and external convergence is producing a synthesis. The contradictions are not a reason to question BRICS’s existence — they are part of the reason it should exist and grow.

Conclusion

• BRICS works for India not by resolving disagreement, but by managing it. The Delhi summit showed India balancing Tehran, Washington, and Beijing simultaneously — without abandoning any relationship.
• Strategic autonomy is not neutrality; it is the deliberate refusal to become anyone’s frontline.

India And The Plausible Multilateralism Of BRICS FAQs

Q1. What was significant about the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi?

Ans: The summit brought Iran, Russia and China together with India amid West Asian conflict, demonstrating BRICS’s capacity for difficult diplomatic engagement.

Q2. How does BRICS help India manage its relationship with China?

Ans: BRICS provides India and China a multilateral platform for engagement, helping maintain communication and creating guardrails despite unresolved bilateral tensions.

Q3. What common concern unites BRICS members despite their differences?

Ans: Despite divergent priorities, BRICS members broadly converge around the view that unilateralism by any major bloc can harm their interests.

Q4. Why is strategic autonomy important for India’s foreign policy?

Ans: Strategic autonomy allows India to maintain important partnerships while avoiding dependence on any single power or becoming a frontline in great-power rivalry.

Q5. Why does the article argue that BRICS’s internal divisions are not necessarily a weakness?

Ans: Internal divisions can prevent domination by one member, while shared concerns about the international system provide sufficient common ground for cooperation.

Source: TH

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