NDB and BRICS: How India Can Strengthen BRICS Without Strengthening China

NDB and BRICS Latest News

• BRICS leaders gathered at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, with India holding the chair. 
• Against this backdrop, analysts argue that India should focus on the New Development Bank (NDB) as the most practical avenue for BRICS cooperation. 
• Strengthening the NDB through greater capital, wider membership and local-currency lending can make the grouping relevant without advancing Beijing’s strategic position.

The Representation Grievance

• BRICS’ economic and demographic weight has not translated into institutional influence:
  • In 2011, the five original members contributed 20 per cent of global GDP but held only 11 per cent of voting share at the IMF.
  • Today, the expanded grouping accounts for nearly 40 per cent of global GDP and 55 per cent of the world’s population, yet its IMF voting share has barely grown.

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Why BRICS Lacks a Coherent Identity

• The grouping is divided over its purpose. Russia, China and Iran want it to be anti-West. India, Brazil and South Africa see it as non-West. 
• Given these divergences and the importance of India-US ties, Delhi cannot join the Beijing-Moscow de-dollarisation campaign. Doing so would worsen already strained relations with Washington and would be unsustainable in the medium term.
• India’s approach must therefore work within the constraints of membership: maximising the grouping’s potential without strengthening Beijing. 
• Within these limits, the NDB offers real possibilities.

The NDB: BRICS’ Most Tangible Tool

• The NDB was established by BRICS countries in 2015 to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging markets and developing countries. 
• It is the grouping’s most concrete instrument, and one that can contribute to the global financial order without directly challenging American predominance.

The NDB’s Underperformance

• Despite a decade in operation, the NDB has lagged well behind its peer, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established around the same time:
  • Projects approved – 139 (NDB); 350 (AIIB)
  • Commitments ~$43 billion (NDB); ~$69 billion (AIIB)
  • Members – Mostly core members (NDB); 111 approved members (AIIB)
  • Credit rating – AA/AA+ (NDB); AAA (AIIB)
• Additional weaknesses:
  • Stagnant asset growth restricts lending capacity.
  • Disbursement is exceptionally slow. Only about $20 billion of approved loans has actually been disbursed.
  • China and India together account for 51 per cent of the active portfolio. 
  • Transport infrastructure takes the largest share (38 per cent), followed by COVID-19 emergency assistance (25 per cent).

Breaking the Asset Bottleneck

• One solution is for the five founders to raise their paid-up capital. But this faces obstacles:
  • Russia, heavily sanctioned, cannot match higher commitments.
  • Sanctions have strained the bank’s credit standing and raised its dollar funding costs.
  • Ironically, though Moscow and Beijing champion de-dollarisation, the NDB has extended no new credit to Russia since March 2022 to protect its AA/AA+ rating.
  • The bank’s rules mandate equal voting shares among founders, so capital expansion is effectively held hostage by its financially weakest member.
  • New members can bring fresh capital, but the founders’ collective voting share cannot fall below 55 per cent.

What the NDB Has Done for India

• The bank has served India well. It has committed nearly $10 billion across 32 projects, including metro rail systems and the Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System (RRTS) corridor. 
• Expanding the NDB to match other multilateral lenders would require extending such benefits to many more emerging markets and developing countries.

The Local-Currency Advantage

• A notable strength of the NDB is its preference for local-currency lending. This appeals to emerging economies facing sustained foreign-exchange volatility due to global military and economic wars. 
• It offers a way to reduce reliance on the dollar without replacing it as the currency for trade invoicing.
• The bank’s 2022-26 General Strategy commits to 30 per cent of lending and borrowing in members’ local currencies, though most remains in dollars. 
• However, existing local-currency activity is heavily skewed towards the Renminbi. The NDB recently priced a ¥7 billion (about $1.04 billion) three-year Panda bond in the China Interbank bond market. 

Pushing the Rupee Bond

• Analysts urge India to push the long-delayed rupee bond over the line. 
• A rupee bond programme was floated in March 2026 to mobilise around Rs 25,000 crore over five years
• Since the 2026 New Delhi Declaration did not include a meaningful agreement on mobilising the NDB, India’s BRICS focus next year should be on simpler fixes to local-currency challenges.

Conclusion

• Unlike the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose recent summit produced bare-minimum outcomes, BRICS has tangible economic tools and its widest membership ever. 
• In a world drifting towards “subscription multilateralism,” exemplified by Washington’s pay-to-shape-the-rules Board of Peace, these concrete arrangements are what will set BRICS apart.

Source: TH | HT