Daily Editorial Analysis 14 September 2026

Terror’s Changing Face, India’s Counter-Terror Strategy 

Context

• The September 11, 2001 attacks transformed global counter-terrorism.
• Over the past 25 years, terrorism has evolved from large, centrally controlled organisations into decentralised networks and lone-wolf attacks.
• Drones, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have created new security challenges.
• India’s response has similarly shifted from diplomatic restraint to active deterrence against cross-border terrorism.

The Changing Nature of Global Terrorism

• The rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State demonstrated the destructive potential of international terrorist organisations.
• However, their decline as centralised structures has given rise to smaller, autonomous groups and individual attackers.
• Modern terrorists exploit encrypted communications, digital propaganda, cyber operations, and emerging technologies.
• These developments make it difficult to identify threats before attacks occur.
• Counter-terrorism therefore requires not only military action but also intelligence-sharing, technological preparedness, and efforts to prevent radicalisation.

India’s Early Struggle with Cross-Border Terrorism

• India’s experience with terrorism predates 9/11. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the Mumbai serial blasts of 1993, and the Coimbatore blasts of 1998 exposed weaknesses in national security.
• The IC-814 hijacking in 1999 forced India to release Pakistan-based terrorists, including Masood Azhar, demonstrating the limitations of its response mechanisms.
• The Parliament attack in December 2001 led to Operation Parakram, but nuclear deterrence and international pressure prevented direct military action against Pakistan.

The Passive Response and Its Consequences

• India suffered several attacks, including those at Akshardham, Varanasi, Pune, and Delhi.
• The 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008 became a defining moment in India’s fight against terrorism.
• Despite evidence of Pakistan-based involvement, India avoided military retaliation.
• This approach reduced the immediate risk of escalation but also created the perception that terrorist attacks could occur without proportionate consequences.
• The need for a stronger deterrent became increasingly evident.

The Shift Towards Active Deterrence

• After the change of government in 2014, India adopted a more assertive counter-terrorism policy.
• The Uri attack in September 2016 led to surgical strikes across the Line of Control, marking a significant departure from earlier restraint.
• Following the Pulwama attack in February 2019, the Indian Air Force conducted strikes on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot.
• This demonstrated India’s willingness to cross Pakistani airspace to target terrorist infrastructure.
• The Pahalgam attack in April 2025 led to Operation Sindoor, launched on May 6–7.
• The operation targeted Pakistan-based terror infrastructure and reinforced India’s policy of imposing direct costs on those responsible for cross-border terrorism.

India’s Contemporary Counter-Terrorism Framework

• The launch of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026 reflects the development of a comprehensive national framework.
• Its emphasis on whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches recognises that terrorism cannot be defeated through military force alone.
• Four priorities are essential:
  • Eliminating Terrorist Networks: Security agencies must continue dismantling terrorist networks, particularly in Kashmir.
  • Preventive Military Action: India must maintain the capability to respond to emerging threats across the Line of Control.
  • De-radicalisation and Social Integration: Education, employment, community engagement, and rehabilitation can reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies.
  • Disrupting Terror Financing: International cooperation is necessary to trace and block financial networks supporting terrorist organisations.

The Importance of International Cooperation

• Terrorism is a transnational threat requiring coordinated international action.
• India has used platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS to oppose countries that support or shelter terrorists.
• The inclusion of a paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the BRICS Delhi Declaration reflects growing international recognition of India’s security concerns.
• India’s consistent opposition to double standards on terrorism is essential for building an effective global response.

Conclusion

• Twenty-five years after 9/11, terrorism remains a serious global threat despite changes in its organisational structure and methods.
• India has moved from a reactive policy to active deterrence and comprehensive counter-terrorism.
• Military action must be combined with intelligence coordination, technological preparedness, de-radicalisation, financial disruption, and diplomacy.
• India’s long-term success will depend on preventing terrorism before attacks occur while ensuring that terrorism never becomes a strategic asset for any state.

Terror’s Changing Face, India’s Counter-Terror Strategy FAQs

Q1. What did the 9/11 attacks change?
Ans. The 9/11 attacks transformed global counter-terrorism strategies.

Q2. When did India conduct its first surgical strikes across the LoC?
Ans. India conducted its first surgical strikes in September 2016.

Q3. What was Operation Sindoor?
Ans. Operation Sindoor was India’s military response to the Pahalgam terror attack.

Q4. What is the purpose of PRAHAAR?
Ans. PRAHAAR provides a comprehensive national framework for countering terrorism.

Q5. Why is international cooperation important in counter-terrorism?
Ans. International cooperation helps disrupt terrorist networks and prevent terror financing.

Source: The Hindu

The Evidence Gap in Dole Politics

Context:

• Cash transfers have become a regular feature of Indian politics, in the form of free electricity, free bus travel, monthly payments to women, subsidised food and utility subsidies.
• Experts argue that governments attach lofty purposes such as dignity and empowerment to these schemes but rarely publish the evidence linking payments to outcomes. They call for rigorous accountability before and after rollout.
• This article highlights the growing role of cash transfers in Indian politics, their expanding fiscal footprint, the evidence gap surrounding their outcomes, and the need for stronger accountability.

The Speenhamland Lesson

• In May 1795, English magistrates met at the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland, Berkshire.
• With food prices rising and the French Revolution unsettling the establishment, they decided to top up agricultural wages from parish funds, linking payouts to bread prices and family size.
• Hungarian economic historian Karl Polanyi later saw this as an early assertion of a human “right to live” against the harshness of the market. Critics disagreed.
• Once wage support, poor relief and public finance were merged into one instrument, it became unclear what the system was protecting: poor families, the wage structure, employers or social peace.
• Subsidising wages from public funds blurred price signals and weakened incentives.
• Analysts draw a clear lesson: relief may be justified, but the instrument must still be judged by its effects. India’s dole politics must face the same test.

Why Cash Support Matters in India

• Cash transfers can be essential in a poor, informal economy. The Economic Survey 2025-26 notes that transfers to women amount to:
  • 11–24 per cent of the monthly income of women daily-wage workers;
  • 11–87 per cent of the income of self-employed women.
• However, a transfer that begins as relief can become a permanent fiscal commitment unless there is a clear account of who receives it, what it changes and what it displaces.

The Growing Fiscal Footprint

• Dole politics now stakes major claims on State finances. According to PRS Legislative Research:
  • Unconditional cash transfers to women expanded from two States in 2022-23 to 12 States in 2025-26.
  • The estimated annual cost is Rs 1.68 lakh crore, about 5 per cent of GDP.
• State-level examples:
  • West Bengal has moved from Lakshmir Bhandar to Annapurna Yojana, budgeting Rs 36,000 crore for a Rs 3,000 monthly transfer to about 1.3 crore women.
  • Tamil Nadu allocated Rs 14,412 crore for the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai in its 2026-27 interim budget.
  • Assam set aside Rs 5,000 crore for Orunodoi.

Cash Cannot Replace Public Goods

• Cash may improve welfare, but it should not substitute for the public goods that make welfare durable.
• The same woman who values Rs 1,500–3,000 a month also needs a functioning health centre, childcare, a good government school and access to better work.
• A cash transfer may soften the strain caused by weak institutions, but it cannot fix them.

The Missing Evidence

• Governments rarely publish the model that connects payments to outcomes. Key unanswered questions include:
  • Who exactly is being targeted?
  • What baseline data justifies the scheme?
  • What effect is expected on consumption, debt, nutrition, schooling, health spending, labour supply or women’s bargaining power?
• Without such answers, dole politics is defended by the moral language of welfare rather than evidence.
• An ADB study prepared for the 16th Finance Commission found that India lacks a systematic dataset of government expenditure on cash-transfer schemes.

Learning from Other Democracies

• Other democracies also redistribute and face welfare politics. But benefits such as unemployment insurance, food support and healthcare subsidies are usually tied to eligibility rules, contribution records, job-search obligations or periodic reassessment.
• India need not copy these mechanically. Some transfers, especially to women in poor households, may be better left unconditional.

A Framework for Accountability

• Experts propose a two-stage evidence framework for any large recurring transfer:
  • Before rollout: a welfare impact statement covering
    • Objective and eligibility rule
    • Expected coverage
    • Five-year fiscal cost
    • Alternatives considered
    • Likely leakage and exclusion errors
    • Measurable outcomes
  • After rollout: household surveys recording not just receipt of the transfer but its effects on
    • Consumption and debt
    • Health spending and schooling
    • Mobility and work incentives
    • Control over household expenditure
    • Subjective well-being
  • Anonymised microdata should then be released for independent research. Schemes spending public money at this scale must survive severe scrutiny.

Conclusion

• Cash transfers have real value in India’s informal economy, but they are fast becoming permanent fiscal commitments without evidence of impact.
• Welfare impact statements, post-rollout surveys and open data would not remove politics from welfare, but would make it more honest. Evidence is ultimately a matter of democratic fairness.

The Evidence Gap in Dole Politics FAQs

Q1. Why have cash transfers become significant in Indian politics?

Ans. Cash transfers have become significant because governments increasingly use monthly payments, free services and subsidies to provide relief and support vulnerable households.

Q2. What is the main evidence gap in dole politics?

Ans. The evidence gap concerns governments rarely publishing clear models showing who receives transfers, what outcomes they seek and how payments affect households.

Q3. Why can cash transfers not replace public goods?

Ans. Cash transfers may improve welfare temporarily, but they cannot replace functioning healthcare, childcare, government schools and better employment opportunities needed for durable welfare.

Q4. What accountability framework is proposed for recurring transfers?

Ans. The proposed framework requires welfare impact statements before rollout and household surveys afterwards to measure fiscal costs, outcomes, leakage and behavioural effects.

Q5. How can India make dole politics more evidence-based?

Ans. India can make dole politics more evidence-based by publishing welfare assessments, conducting post-rollout surveys and releasing anonymised microdata for independent research.

Source: TH

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