Daily Editorial Analysis 18 June 2026

Women’s Representation in the Supreme Court – Breaking the Last Glass Ceiling

Context

• The appointment of Justice V. Mohana as a judge of the Supreme Court marks a significant milestone in India’s judicial history.
• She is only the second woman advocate to be directly elevated from the Bar to the Supreme Court, after Justice Indu Malhotra (2018).
• Despite this achievement, women remain severely underrepresented in India’s higher judiciary, necessitating structural reforms to ensure gender equality.

Persistent Gender Gap in the Higher Judiciary

• Women’s journey to the highest levels of the legal profession has been marked by systemic barriers.
• Direct appointments from the Bar
  • The Supreme Court has directly appointed nine male judges from the Bar, many of whom enjoyed long tenures.
  • Some, such as Justice S.M. Sikri and Justice U.U. Lalit, became Chief Justices of India (CJI).
  • Current judges Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice K.V. Viswanathan are also expected to become CJIs.
  • In contrast, Justice Indu Malhotra, the first woman directly elevated from the Bar, served for less than three years and never became part of the Collegium.
• This reflects the limited opportunities available to women for meaningful representation and leadership within the judiciary.

Global Best Practices for Gender Representation

• Several countries have introduced constitutional or legal mechanisms to ensure gender balance in their apex courts.
• Belgium
  • In 2014, Belgium amended Article 34(5) of the Special Act of 1989 governing its Constitutional Court.
  • The amendment mandates that at least one-third of judges must belong to each gender.
  • Until the quota is achieved, after every two male appointments, the third appointment must be a woman.
  • The court also follows linguistic and professional representation quotas.
• South Africa
  • Section 174(2) of the Constitution requires the judiciary to reflect the country’s racial and gender composition.
  • The Constitutional Court currently has 6 women out of 11 judges and is headed by a woman Chief Justice.
  • It is among the world’s first women-majority constitutional courts.

Representation Quotas – Not a New Concept

• The representation-based appointments already exist in India.
• For example, Supreme Court appointments often consider regional representation from different High Courts.
• Recent judicial appointments have factored in such geographical diversity.
• Therefore, introducing a gender-based quota would not be conceptually unprecedented.
• The argument is that if regional representation is accepted as a legitimate criterion, gender representation should also receive institutional recognition.

India’s Poor Record on Women’s Representation

• Despite Justice Mohana’s appointment, women remain grossly underrepresented in the Supreme Court.
• Current status: Only 2 women judges out of 37 judges, constituting merely 4% of the Supreme Court’s strength.
• International comparison: South Africa have 54.5% of women Judges in apex Court, Canada (50%), Belgium (50%), Germany (50%), US (44.4%), Australia (42.85%), France (33.33%), Singapore (~24%), Nepal (~17%), and UK (~17%).
• India lags significantly behind both developed and developing democracies in ensuring gender diversity in its highest court.

Suggested Reforms

• Constitutional amendments
  • Amend Article 124 (Establishment and appointment of judges of the Supreme Court) and Article 217 (Appointment and conditions of judges of High Courts).
  • This will mandate that judicial appointments reflect the gender and social composition of Indian society, ensuring representation of women, minority communities, SCs, STs, and OBCs.
• Judicial policy on gender representation: Until constitutional amendments are enacted, the Supreme Court should adopt a written policy committing itself to 33.3% women judges.
• Targeted appointment mechanism: India could emulate Belgium’s model –
  • After every two male appointments, the next appointment must be a woman.
  • Continue this process until one-third representation is achieved.

Conclusion

• Justice V. Mohana’s elevation is an important symbolic and institutional However, the appointment of a few individual women judges cannot substitute for systemic gender inclusion.
• With women comprising only 5.4% of the Supreme Court, India remains far behind global standards.
• Achieving meaningful representation requires a clear roadmap involving constitutional reforms, institutional commitment, and targeted appointments.
• Gender-balanced courts are not merely a matter of representation but are essential for strengthening the legitimacy, inclusiveness, and democratic character of the judiciary.

Women’s Representation in the Supreme Court FAQs

Q1. Why is greater representation of women in the higher judiciary essential?

Ans. It enhances judicial legitimacy, inclusiveness, diversity of perspectives, and the realization of substantive gender justice.

Q2. How have countries like Belgium institutionalized gender diversity in their apex courts?

Ans. Belgium uses statutory gender quotas, while South Africa’s Constitution mandates.

Q3. What does the low representation of women in India’s Supreme Court indicate?

Ans. It highlights persistent structural barriers and the absence of a formal mechanism.

Q4. Why is the proposal for a 33.3% quota for women judges in the Supreme Court considered justified?

Ans. Since judicial appointments already consider regional representation, gender-based representation is a logical extension.

Q5. What constitutional reforms have been suggested to improve women’s representation in the higher judiciary?

Ans. Amendments to Articles 124 and 217 have been proposed to reflect the gender and social composition of Indian society.

Source: IE

Health Data Must Drive Action, Not Just Headlines

Context

• Three major health surveys were recently released in India — the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6), the NSO 80th Round Household Consumption Survey on Health, and the National Health Accounts Estimates for India 2022-23.
• Together, they should have triggered serious national stocktaking. Instead, they generated headlines but little policy action — exposing a deep structural problem in how India uses its health data.
• This article highlights the disconnect between India’s extensive health data collection and the limited policy action that follows.
• It argues that health surveys should serve as instruments of accountability and course correction rather than merely generating headlines, political claims, or commercial opportunities.

The Paradox of Health Surveys in India

• India’s health surveys follow a predictable and unproductive cycle:
  • The government highlights achievements and celebrates positive indicators
  • Newspapers amplify numbers without sustained critical analysis
  • Academics wait for raw data, which arrives late
  • Industry identifies market opportunities from every health challenge flagged
• The result: surveys confirm what is already known, fail to spotlight what has stagnated, and rarely trigger immediate programmatic reform.
• A health survey is meant to be an instrument of course correction — not a ritual of self-congratulation.

What the Surveys Reveal: Old Problems, New Numbers

• The NFHS-6 data — collected in 2023-24 but released in mid-2026 — flags the rise of obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs) across all social and economic groups, not just urban and affluent populations.
• Anaemia remains persistent. Out-of-pocket health expenditure stays high. Child nutrition has stagnated in several areas.
• None of this is new. The surveys merely put fresh numbers to old warnings that were never adequately acted upon.

How Industry Exploits Health Data

• Where public health messaging is weak, private markets are quick to fill the gap:
  • Rising obesity → weight-loss products, apps, gyms, diagnostic packages
  • Rising diabetes → monitoring devices, private clinics, test packages
  • Rising NCDs → medicalisation, screening drives, private sector expansion
• Survey data, instead of driving public health reform, ends up fuelling commercial health markets. This is a failure of governance, not of data.

The Temporal Problem: Convenient Lag

• The gap between data collection (2023-24) and public release (2026) creates a politically convenient loophole.
• Governments can claim credit for positive trends as proof of current policy success, while dismissing troubling findings as “old data” linked to COVID-19 disruptions or past administrative failures.
• Similarly, raw data are released late, meaning peer-reviewed academic analysis often takes three to five years after data collection.
• By then, policymakers dismiss the findings as outdated. Data lose their impact precisely when they are needed most.

From Data to Action: Five Reforms Needed

• Mandatory Action Notes within 30–45 Days
  • Every major health survey must be followed by a national and state-level action note — jointly prepared by government and independent institutions — candidly identifying what improved, what stagnated, and what deteriorated.
  • Each finding must be linked to a specific programme and a clearly accountable authority.
• State-Level Working Reviews — Not Ceremonial Events
  • Health Secretaries, Finance Departments, district officials, public health experts, and civil society must review findings together.
  • The core question should not be “what can we highlight?” but “what must we change?”
• Integrated Data Systems
  • Survey data, HMIS (Health Management Information System) data, and the Integrated Health Information Platform (IHIP) data must be combined for coherent analytical output. Fragmented data produce fragmented policy.
• Early Release of Raw Data as a Public Good
  • Primary source data must be made available promptly so independent researchers can produce rapid analysis.
  • Data should not be treated as a guarded file — they must function as a public good.
• Data Must Influence Budget Allocations
  • Survey findings must directly shape how money is spent. Rising NCDs must mean larger primary care budgets.
  • High out-of-pocket medicine costs must mean stronger public drug availability.
  • Data without budgetary consequence are merely information.

Conclusion

• India collects vast health data but harvests little accountability from it.
• A survey that triggers no programme change, no budget reallocation, and no official accountability is not a public health tool — it is a public relations exercise.
• The true measure of any health survey is not the headlines it generates, but the reforms it compels.

Health Data Must Drive Action, Not Just Headlines FAQs

Q1. Why does the article criticize India’s use of health survey data?

Ans: The article argues that survey findings often generate publicity and discussion but rarely translate into meaningful policy reforms, programme changes, or accountability measures.

Q2. What major health concerns were highlighted by recent surveys?

Ans: Recent surveys reported rising obesity, diabetes, hypertension, persistent anaemia, high out-of-pocket health expenditure, and stagnation in several child nutrition indicators.

Q3. How does delayed data release reduce the usefulness of health surveys?

Ans: Long delays between data collection and publication weaken policy relevance, allowing governments to dismiss findings as outdated and reducing their corrective impact.

Q4. What reforms are proposed to improve the use of health data?

Ans: The article recommends action notes, integrated data systems, faster release of raw data, collaborative reviews, and linking survey findings directly to budget allocations.

Q5. Why should health survey findings influence budget decisions?

Ans: Budget allocations determine policy implementation; therefore, rising health challenges identified in surveys should lead to greater funding for targeted interventions and services.

Source: TH

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