Daily Editorial Analysis 17 August 2026

India is Losing West Asia, But It Is Not Too Late

Context

• West Asia is undergoing a once-in-a-generation shift in its security architecture and political alignments.
• Amid this churn, India’s decade-long gains in the region are fading, and it is unclear whether New Delhi has a coherent strategy to respond.
• Against this backdrop, this article highlights the changing security architecture of West Asia and the erosion of India’s decade-long gains in the region.
• It examines Pakistan’s rising diplomatic role, the Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defence pact, risks to India’s strategic interests, and the need for an active, independent regional strategy.

India’s Fading Footprint in West Asia

• India had built significant goodwill in the region over the past decade:
  • In 2016, Saudi Arabia conferred its highest civilian honour on India’s Prime Minister.
  • In 2021, the I2U2 grouping bound India, Israel, the US, and the UAE in a shared framework.
  • In 2024, Iran leased the Chabahar port to India, boosting its connectivity ambitions.
• These achievements now belong to the past, as regional dynamics have shifted sharply against India’s favour.

The Regional Conflict and Pakistan’s Rising Role

• Over the last four months, the US-Israel war with Iran has escalated into a wider regional conflict.
• Iran has struck GCC countries, Saudi Arabia has hit Iraqi militias, Houthis have attacked Saudi ships, and Israel has carried out strikes across multiple states.
• Gulf countries are now questioning the reliability of the US security umbrella, with the UAE favouring engagement and Saudi Arabia leaning towards deterrence.
• Within this uncertainty, Pakistan has gained diplomatic standing as a mediator in the US-Iran conflict, stepping in where Türkiye, Qatar, and Egypt could not succeed.
• This has translated into a new collective defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, signed in Mecca.

Why This Pact Matters for India

• The pact is aimed less at Iran and more at deterring Israel, since all three signatories see themselves as potential future targets.
• It pools Saudi capital, Pakistani military strength, and Turkish technology.
• A future Israel-Pakistan conflict could draw India in, given its close ties with Israel.
• Greater Turkish backing for Pakistan in any future India-Pakistan conflict cannot be ruled out.

The Strategic Choices Before India

• India’s current approach rests on confidence in Israel’s eventual victory, given its US backing.
• However, American domestic politics are shifting, with both the political right and left increasingly questioning unconditional support for Israel — raising doubts about Israel’s ability to prevail on its own.
• India’s UAE relationship also faces strain from the UAE’s growing rift with Saudi Arabia and its positions on UN-unrecognised governments in conflicts such as Sudan.
• Three broad paths lie before India:
  • Alliance-building with Israel and the UAE — but this risks damaging ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
  • Continued inaction — but this leaves Indian mariners exposed to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb.
  • An active, independent regional strategy — positioning India as a trust-builder rather than a party to any bloc.

The Third Way: An Active Regional Strategy

• The article proposes a proactive Indian role, including:
  • Re-engaging Saudi Arabia, with whom India has no major disagreements.
  • Rebuilding trust between Arab states and Iran, beginning with the UAE-Iran relationship.
  • Supporting Jordan’s security needs through defensive technology at a time of strained US resources.
  • Contributing to future UN peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, especially as UNIFIL’s mandate faces an uncertain future.
  • Coordinating with Egypt to protect India-bound shipping through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, if India cannot join the Saudi-led Red Sea maritime force.
  • Exploring a military presence in the Red Sea region, such as in Somaliland or Socotra.
  • Expanding military training exchanges and joint exercises across the region.
  • Appointing a Special Envoy for West Asia to coordinate India’s interests beyond the Israel-Palestine peace process alone.

Conclusion

• India’s West Asia policy stands at a crossroads: drift risks strategic irrelevance, while premature alliances risk alienating old partners.
• A proactive, trust-building approach — engaging all sides — offers India the surest path to restoring its regional influence and safeguarding vital maritime and economic interests.

India is Losing West Asia, But It Is Not Too Late FAQs

Q1. Why is India’s influence in West Asia considered to be declining?

Ans: India’s decade-long gains are fading as regional alignments shift, Pakistan gains diplomatic influence, and Gulf states reconsider their dependence on the United States.

Q2. Why is the Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defence pact significant for India?

Ans: The pact combines Saudi capital, Turkish technology, and Pakistani military strength, potentially affecting India’s strategic interests and future India-Pakistan or Israel-related conflicts.

Q3. What strategic choices does India face in West Asia?

Ans: India can build alliances with Israel and UAE, remain inactive, or pursue an independent regional strategy focused on trust-building and balanced engagement.

Q4. What does an active regional strategy for India involve?

Ans: It involves re-engaging Saudi Arabia, rebuilding Arab-Iran trust, supporting Jordan, protecting maritime routes, expanding defence cooperation, and appointing a Special Envoy for West Asia.

Q5. Why should India avoid joining a West Asian bloc?

Ans: Joining a bloc could alienate important partners such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, whereas balanced engagement allows India to preserve strategic autonomy and regional influence.

Source: TH

E20 Ethanol Blending – The Real Debate Is Food, Fuel and Irreversibility

Context

• The controversy over E20 petrol (20% ethanol blending) has largely focused on claims that it damages engines and significantly reduces mileage.
• While evidence does not substantiate widespread engine damage, the controversy exposes a more important policy question: how far should India expand ethanol blending?
• This question is more significant given ethanol blending’s implications for food security, water use, farm incomes, energy security and the environment.

E20 and Engine Concerns – Separating Fact from Fear

• Ethanol contains roughly two-thirds the energy of petrol. Since E20 contains only one-fifth ethanol, the expected energy-related reduction in mileage is around 6–7%, not the exaggerated 30% often circulated online.
• E20 can also reduce carbon monoxide and unburnt hydrocarbon emissions, offering environmental benefits.
• Evidence on engine durability is broadly reassuring. For example,
  • Oak Ridge National Laboratory tested 86 vehicles over nearly 10 million km using blends up to E20 and found no increased wear in vehicles not rated for E20.
  • Indian testing by ARAI, the Petroleum Institute and Indian Oil similarly did not establish widespread engine damage.

• Genuine vulnerability – Older two-wheelers

  • The important exception is India’s estimated 75–80 million pre-BS4 two-wheelers, many of which use carburettors.
  • These cannot automatically adjust to the additional oxygen in ethanol blends, potentially causing lean combustion and overheating. Older ethanol-incompatible rubber seals may also deteriorate.
  • The original policy roadmap envisaged retaining a lower ethanol blend for such vehicles.
  • Restoring E10 alongside E20 could protect the legacy fleet while allowing gradual retrofitting.

The Bigger Question – Should Blending Go Beyond E20?

• The real policy dilemma begins with proposals for E27/E30. Higher blending could increasingly shift agricultural resources from food towards fuel.
• India’s annual crude oil import bill is around ₹11–12 lakh crore, while the edible oil import bill is approximately ₹1.6–1.75 lakh crore.
• E20 reduces the crude oil bill by only about 3–4%, whereas edible-oil self-sufficiency offers a potentially more achievable reduction in import dependence.
• India currently produces only around 40% of its edible oil requirement and aims to raise domestic production substantially by 2030–31.

Maize and the Food-vs-Fuel Trade-off

• The ethanol feedstock structure has changed significantly. For example, maize accounts for about half of ethanol production, and grains collectively contribute nearly 67%.
• Maize competes with soybean, groundnut and mustard for agricultural land.
• Policy incentives intensify this competition because ethanol procurement prices can make maize attractive irrespective of market conditions.
• Distillation by-products are also sold as animal feed, potentially weakening demand and prices for soybean meal.
• Thus, oilseed farmers may face a double disadvantage through both land competition and weaker oilseed prices.

Water Security – Focus on Blue Water

• Water consumption must be assessed carefully. Headline claims about thousands of litres of water per litre of ethanol often combine:
  • Green water — rainfall naturally received by crops.
  • Blue water — water drawn from rivers, canals, groundwater and wells.
• For water-stressed regions, particularly parts of Maharashtra and Karnataka, policy should primarily regulate blue-water consumption, since it directly competes with other human and ecological requirements.

Is More Ethanol Necessarily Greener?

• The environmental case for moving beyond E20 is not conclusive.
• Higher blending would rely substantially on grain-based ethanol, while Indian life-cycle assessments differ on whether grain ethanol delivers significant climate benefits after accounting for cultivation, processing and associated inputs.
• Therefore, the green argument for higher blending requires stronger scientific scrutiny, rather than being treated as self-evident.

Gains and Costs of the Ethanol Programme

• Ethanol blending has produced significant benefits –
  • Helped clear sugarcane arrears.
  • Created an assured market for farmers.
  • Supported rural incomes.
  • Enabled distilleries to utilise surplus sugar.
  • Reduced some dependence on imported fossil fuels.
• However, remaining at E20 also has costs. For example,
  • Distilleries have invested in capacity based on expectations of higher ethanol demand,
  • While loans and the management of sugar surpluses are increasingly linked to the ethanol programme.
• Hence, both the benefits of expansion and the costs of stopping at E20 must enter the policy calculus.

Policy Principle – Prioritise Reversible Decisions

• The most important policy insight is the distinction between reversible and irreversible interventions.
• Measures such as ethanol procurement prices, lower-blend “protection fuel”, water-use regulations, and edible-oil import duties can be modified relatively quickly.
• In contrast, once agricultural land and water are committed to fuel production, and cropping patterns and distillery capacity are established, reversing the policy becomes difficult and costly.
• Therefore, India should adopt a precautionary, evidence-based approach before increasing the mandatory blend beyond E20.

Way Forward

• Restore E10 or another lower blend for the older vehicle fleet.
• Correct pricing incentives that disproportionately favour maize over oilseeds.
• Regulate ethanol production based on blue-water availability in water-stressed regions.
• Reassess edible-oil import duties and agricultural incentives to promote domestic oilseed production.
• Undertake a comprehensive food-versus-fuel cost-benefit analysis before moving beyond E20.
• Continue scientific assessment of ethanol’s life-cycle emissions and water footprint.

Conclusion

• The E20 controversy should not be reduced to a question of engine damage or mileage.
• The deeper issue is whether India should commit scarce land, water and agricultural resources to progressively higher fuel blending when the gains in energy security remain modest and some consequences may be difficult to reverse.

Ethanol Blending FAQs

Q1. What does the E20 controversy reveal about the challenges of India’s ethanol-blending policy?

Ans. While E20 does not cause widespread engine damage, its expansion raises concerns over food security, water stress, etc.

Q2. Why should E10 be retained alongside E20 in India?

Ans. E10 would protect the estimated 75–80 million older pre-BS4 two-wheelers vulnerable to ethanol-related issues.

Q3. What is the emerging food-versus-fuel trade-off in India’s ethanol policy?

Ans. Greater reliance on maize and other grains for ethanol can compete with soybean, groundnut and mustard for land.

Q4. How should water use in ethanol production be regulated?

Ans. Policy should focus on blue-water consumption drawn from groundwater, rivers and canals rather than green rainwater.

Q5. Why should India adopt a cautious approach before moving beyond E20?

Ans. India should first implement reversible measures and conduct a comprehensive food-fuel-energy-environment cost-benefit analysis.

Source: IE

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