Sedition Law – Supreme Court Allows Sedition Trials to Proceed

Sedition Law

Sedition Law Latest News

  • The Supreme Court has clarified that sedition trials and appeals under Section 124A IPC may proceed where the accused has no objection, partially relaxing its 2022 freeze on such proceedings.

Sedition Law in India

  • The colonial sedition law in India was contained in Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), introduced in 1890 by the British. 
  • It made it an offence to bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt, or excite disaffection towards the government established by law in India.
  • Punishment under Section 124A ranged from:
    • Imprisonment for life (with or without fine), or
    • Imprisonment up to three years (with or without a fine), or
    • Fine alone.
  • The law was used against several freedom fighters, including Mahatma Gandhi and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, to suppress political dissent.

Constitutional Position and Kedar Nath Singh Case

  • After independence, sedition’s validity was challenged as violating freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)
  • In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court:
    • Upheld Section 124A as constitutionally valid,
    • But narrowed its scope: sedition would apply only where speech or expression involves: 
      • Incitement to violence, or
      • Intention or tendency to create public disorder or disturb law and order.
  • Mere criticism of the government, however strong or intemperate, was held not to be sedition unless it had a violent or disorderly tendency.

Criticism and Misuse

  • Over time, Section 124A came under intense criticism for:
    • Being vague and overbroad,
  • Being used against journalists, activists, students and ordinary citizens for: 
    • Social media posts,
    • Peaceful protests,
    • Political criticism.

2022 Supreme Court Interim Order

  • On 11 May 2022, while the Union Government said it would re-examine and reconsider Section 124A, the Supreme Court passed an important interim order and put the operation of Section 124A on hold, pending the review.
  • The Court directed Union and State governments: 
    • Not to register new FIRs under Section 124A.
    • To keep all ongoing investigations, trials and proceedings in abeyance.
  • Also stated that those already in jail under sedition could seek bail.
  • This effectively froze the practical use of Section 124A, though it was not formally struck down.

Transition to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

  • With the replacement of the IPC by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), a new provision, Section 152 BNS, criminalises acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. 
  • Petitioners have argued that Section 152 is effectively a “repackaged” sedition law, and its validity is under challenge before the Supreme Court.
  • The Court has also noted orally that the Executive’s decision to “review” sedition under the old IPC does not prevent Parliament from enacting a similar provision in the new code, since the legislature functions independently.

News Summary

  • Four years after its 2022 interim order effectively put sedition proceedings on hold, the Supreme Court has now clarified that trials and appeals involving Section 124A IPC can proceed if the accused has no objection.
  • The Court issued this clarification while hearing a plea by a man who has been in jail for 17 years in a sedition case, with his criminal appeal pending before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
  • The Bench recorded that the petitioner expressly wanted his appeal to be heard in full, including the charge under Section 124A. On that basis, the Court stated:
    • Wherever the accused has no objection to the continuation of the trial, appeal, or any other proceeding in which he has been charged under Section 124A IPC, there shall be no impediment for the courts to decide such matters on merits and in accordance with law.
  • The Supreme Court directed the Madhya Pradesh High Court to take up the petitioner’s appeal forthwith, along with connected matters, and decide them on the merits.

Context: 2022 Stay on Sedition Proceedings

  • In its 11 May 2022 interim order, a Bench headed by then CJI N.V. Ramana had put all trials, investigations and proceedings under Section 124A in abeyance and “Hoped and expected” that the Centre and States would: 
    • Not file new FIRs,
    • Not continue investigations,
    • Not to take coercive steps under Section 124A, while the Union re-examined the provision.
  • The Court had then emphasised the need to balance:
    • The security interests and integrity of the State, and
    • The civil liberties of citizens.
  • The new clarification does not lift the 2022 protections generally; instead, it carves out a limited exception: where the accused themselves want their cases to proceed (for example, to secure an acquittal or an early final decision), courts are free to conduct trials or hear appeals and pronounce judgments.

Link with Ongoing BNS Challenges

  • In February 2026, CJI Surya Kant had also observed orally that the Union’s earlier decision to review sedition under the IPC cannot stop Parliament from introducing a similar offence in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. 
  • This remark came while hearing PILs challenging various provisions of the BNS, including Section 152, which criminalises acts deemed to endanger India’s sovereignty, unity and integrity.
  • Petitioners argue that Section 152 BNS is essentially a “rebranded” sedition clause, and the Court is currently examining whether it suffers from the same constitutional defects long alleged against Section 124A IPC.

Significance

  • The clarification offers procedural flexibility: accused persons who do not want their sedition cases to remain frozen for years can seek an early adjudication.
  • At the same time, the general freeze on sedition prosecutions remains in place for those who wish to rely on the 2022 interim protection.
  • The broader, substantive question of whether sedition-type offences (under either IPC 124A or BNS 152) are constitutional is still pending before the Supreme Court.

Source: TH | Live Law

Sedition Law FAQs

Q1: What is Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code?

Ans: Section 124A IPC is the colonial-era sedition provision that criminalised words or acts bringing hatred or contempt, or exciting disaffection, against the government established by law in India.

Q2: What did the Supreme Court decide in May 2022 about sedition cases?

Ans: In May 2022, the Supreme Court put all sedition trials, investigations, and proceedings under Section 124A in abeyance and asked governments not to register fresh FIRs.

Q3: What has the Supreme Court clarified now about ongoing sedition cases?

Ans: The Court has clarified that if an accused has no objection, courts can proceed with trials, appeals, or other proceedings involving Section 124A and decide them on merits.

Q4: In which case did this clarification arise?

Ans: The clarification came while hearing the plea of a man jailed for 17 years in a sedition case, whose criminal appeal is pending.

Q5: How is sedition linked to the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)?

Ans: Section 152 of the BNS criminalises acts endangering India’s sovereignty, unity, and integrity.

Russia–China Proximity and India’s Security Challenge Explained

Russia–China Proximity

Russia–China Proximity Latest News

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, coming just days after US President Donald Trump’s trip, highlights China’s growing role as a central hub of global diplomacy. 
  • While the US seeks to stabilise strained relations with China, Russia is looking to secure continued economic support from Beijing and maintain its strategic relevance amid global geopolitical shifts. 
  • Given that the US, China, and Russia are key systemic powers, the nature of their interactions will significantly shape the future global order. 
  • Putin’s visit is therefore important not just for bilateral ties, but for regional and global strategic stability, raising questions about whether the deepening Russia–China partnership could eventually evolve into a formal military alliance.

History of Russia-China Relations

  • Russia-China relations have evolved through three phases—imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet. 
  • Despite a long 4,300-km border, ties were mostly stable, though China remembers 19th-century territorial losses to Russia as part of its “century of humiliation.” 
  • Relations strengthened after China’s Communist revolution, culminating in the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, but ideological and strategic differences triggered the Sino-Soviet split and 1969 armed clashes. 
  • This enabled US-China rapprochement in the 1970s, affecting India’s security. 
  • After the Soviet collapse, ties revived with the 1992 Strategic Partnership Treaty, reaching new heights under Putin and Xi, who declared a “no-limits” partnership in 2022.

Deepening Russia–China Strategic Partnership

  • Russia and China have developed strong political and economic interdependence, driven by complementary strengths. 
  • While China provides markets, technology, and capital, Russia supplies energy and defence products. 
  • Western sanctions after the Ukraine war significantly increased Russia’s dependence on China, which now accounts for about 32% of Russia’s total trade ($228 billion out of $700 billion in 2025). 
  • Chinese firms have filled the vacuum left by Western companies in automobiles, telecom, and electronics, while Russia increasingly relies on Chinese semiconductors and industrial technology. 
  • Energy ties have deepened through the Power of Siberia gas pipelines. 
  • Politically, frequent leadership interactions reflect strategic closeness, while bilateral trade in yuan and ruble signals growing de-dollarisation of economic ties.

Key Outcomes of the Putin–Xi Summit

  • Expanded Bilateral Cooperation - The Putin–Xi summit was seen as more productive than the earlier Trump–Xi meeting, resulting in a joint statement and over 40 agreements covering: Energy, Technology, Investment etc. However, no concrete agreement was reached on the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline.
  • Strategic Objective - The summit reflected the shared goal of building strong bilateral ties resilient to global uncertainty and Western pressure, especially in the backdrop of geopolitical tensions.
  • Common Geopolitical Stand - Without directly naming the United States, both leaders criticised unilateralism and hegemonic policies and reiterated support for: A multipolar world order; Democratisation of global institutions.
  • Core Message - The summit underscored Russia and China’s determination to deepen strategic cooperation, protect shared interests, and collectively counter Western dominance in global affairs.

Are Russia and China Moving Towards a Military Alliance

  • Russia and China are drawing closer due to changing global geopolitics, particularly their shared perception of the United States as a structural rival. 
  • However, they are not natural allies in terms of culture, ideology, political systems, or historical affinity.
  • A military alliance involves a formal commitment to defend each other against external threats. Despite growing cooperation, both countries are cautious about the risks associated with such alliances.
  • China does not want to be dragged into Russia’s confrontation with the West, especially over Ukraine. Russia, likewise, is reluctant to become entangled in China’s tensions with the US over Taiwan.
  • While strategic and military cooperation between Russia and China is expected to deepen, a formal military alliance appears unlikely in the near future, as both seek flexibility rather than binding security commitments. 
  • Recent US-China diplomatic engagement has further reduced the likelihood of such an alliance in the short term.

Implications for India’s Security

  • Russia’s growing dependence on China poses a significant strategic challenge for India. For the past two decades, India has maintained a balancing strategy by deepening security ties with the United States while preserving strong relations with Russia. 
  • However, this diplomatic space is shrinking as both Washington and Moscow seek closer engagement with Beijing. 
  • As a result, India may need to recalibrate its strategic approach, as reliance on the US for continental security balancing appears increasingly uncertain, particularly under the current geopolitical circumstances.

Source: IE

Russia–China Proximity FAQs

Q1: Why is Russia–China Proximity becoming a strategic concern for India?

Ans: Russia–China Proximity is a concern because Russia’s growing dependence on China may reduce India’s strategic space and complicate its long-standing security balancing strategy.

Q2: How has the Ukraine war accelerated Russia–China Proximity?

Ans: The Ukraine war strengthened Russia–China Proximity by increasing Russia’s dependence on Chinese markets, technology, finance, and diplomatic support amid Western sanctions.

Q3: Can Russia–China Proximity evolve into a military alliance?

Ans: While Russia–China Proximity is deepening strategically, a formal alliance remains unlikely due to mutual fears of entrapment in each other’s conflicts and strategic overdependence.

Q4: How does Russia–China Proximity affect India’s foreign policy options?

Ans: Russia–China Proximity narrows India’s diplomatic flexibility by weakening its traditional strategy of balancing strong ties with both Russia and the United States.

Q5: What does Russia–China Proximity mean for India’s long-term security strategy?

Ans: Russia–China Proximity means India may need new strategic partnerships, stronger indigenous defence capabilities, and a recalibrated continental security approach.

Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus: Why the Centre Opposes New Hydropower Projects

Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus

Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus Latest News

  • The Union Government has informed the Supreme Court that it does not support new hydroelectric projects on the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi rivers, the main headstreams of the Ganga, marking a significant policy shift. 
  • The issue gained prominence after the 2013 Kedarnath disaster, following which the Supreme Court ordered a review of existing and proposed hydropower projects in Uttarakhand and halted fresh environmental and forest clearances. 
  • The government’s current unified position comes after more than a decade of internal disagreements, balancing Uttarakhand’s economic interests, the need to preserve ecological flow in the Ganga, and concerns over the fragile Himalayan ecosystem.

Committees, Reviews and Policy Deadlock

  • Following the Supreme Court’s 2013 order, the Environment Ministry set up an expert panel led by Ravi Chopra to assess whether hydropower projects worsened the Kedarnath disaster and threatened biodiversity in the upper Ganga basin.
  • The committee concluded that 23 of 24 proposed hydroelectric projects would harm biodiversity, a view supported by the Environment Ministry.

Institutional Disagreement

  • The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and Central Water Commission (CWC) opposed this conclusion, arguing that hydropower had a minimal ecological footprint and was not linked to the 2013 disaster.
  • Meanwhile, project developers approached the Supreme Court seeking removal of the clearance freeze.

Second Expert Committee (EB-II)

  • In 2015, the Supreme Court directed the formation of a second panel under B.P. Das to examine:
    • Cumulative environmental impact 
    • Carrying capacity of the Ganga basin 
    • Glacial movement and seismic risks 
    • Socio-economic implications

Continued Policy Deadlock

  • EB-II initially cleared the six disputed projects. However, internal differences emerged between the Environment Ministry, Jal Shakti Ministry, and Power Ministry, delaying a final decision.
  • In its broader review of 70 hydropower projects, EB-II found:
    • 19 already operational 
    • Recommended 28 of the remaining 51 projects 
  • However, the Jal Shakti Ministry opposed these recommendations in 2019, prolonging the deadlock.
  • In 2021, the Centre adopted a compromise position, supporting only seven projects that were already substantially completed or had advanced financial investments.

Revisiting Hydropower Assessments in Upper Ganga

  • In 2024, the Supreme Court directed a committee headed by Cabinet Secretary T.V. Somanathan to reconsider the recommendations of the EB-II, stating that if the Centre rejected them, it must provide clear reasons.
  • After consulting the Uttarakhand government, central ministries, and civil society, the committee recommended only five hydropower projects:
    • Bowala Nandprayag 
    • Devsari 
    • Bhyundar Ganga 
    • Jhalakoti 
    • Urgam-II

Key Concerns Considered

  • Disaster Vulnerability - The committee flagged the threat from glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), citing the 2023 Sikkim disaster as evidence of severe downstream risks.
  • Ecological Impact - Projects with significant ecological consequences were excluded from consideration.

Centre’s Final Position

  • In January 2026, the Supreme Court gave the Centre three months for a final decision. 
  • The government ultimately argued against new hydropower projects, describing the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins as unique (‘sui generis’) due to their ecological, geological, and cultural significance.

Evidence of Fragility

  • The Centre cited recent disasters such as:
    • 2021 Rishi Ganga floods 
    • Joshimath flash floods 
    • Land subsidence in Joshimath 
  • It also highlighted the region’s rich ecological sensitivity, including:
    • Nanda Devi National Park 
    • Valley of Flowers National Park 
    • Gangotri National Park 
    • Kedarnath Wildlife Sanctuary 
    • Bhagirathi Eco-Sensitive Zone

Conclusion

  • The Centre’s evolving stance on hydropower projects in the upper Ganga reflects a broader shift from development-first thinking to ecological caution in fragile Himalayan regions. 
  • The long policy journey underscores the challenge of balancing energy needs, economic interests, and environmental sustainability. 
  • As climate risks intensify and disasters become more frequent, the upper Ganga may emerge as a defining test case for environmentally responsible infrastructure planning in India.

Source: IE

Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus FAQs

Q1: Why has the Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus emerged after years of debate?

Ans: The Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus emerged after repeated environmental assessments, disaster warnings, and concerns that hydropower projects could worsen ecological fragility in the Himalayan region.

Q2: How did the Kedarnath disaster influence the Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus?

Ans: The Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus gained momentum after the 2013 Kedarnath disaster triggered judicial scrutiny of hydropower projects and their impact on fragile mountain ecosystems.

Q3: What environmental concerns shaped the Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus?

Ans: The Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus was shaped by concerns over biodiversity loss, glacial lake outburst floods, seismic vulnerability, ecological flow disruption, and repeated Himalayan disasters.

Q4: Why is the Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus significant for India’s environmental policy?

Ans: The Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus signals a policy shift from infrastructure-led development toward ecologically sensitive planning in disaster-prone and environmentally fragile regions.

Q5: What does the Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus mean for future hydropower planning?

Ans: The Upper Ganga No-Dam Consensus suggests future hydropower decisions may increasingly prioritise climate resilience, ecological sustainability, and disaster-risk assessments over immediate economic gains.

Rupee Depreciation, RBI Intervention and India’s External Sector Challenges

Rupee Depreciation

Rupee Depreciation Latest News

  • The Indian rupee has witnessed a sharp depreciation, sliding close to ₹97 per US dollar amid rising oil prices, geopolitical tensions in West Asia, foreign capital outflows, and global financial uncertainty. 
  • The debate has intensified over whether the Reserve Bank of India should actively intervene or allow the rupee to “find its market level”.

Why is the Rupee Falling?

  • Pressure from the capital account:
    • Contrary to conventional explanations, the recent depreciation is not primarily due to weak macroeconomic fundamentals. 
    • India continues to record relatively strong GDP growth, manageable inflation, and fiscal consolidation.
    • The core issue lies in the capital account:
      • Persistent Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) outflows since mid-2025.
      • Negative net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows during several months.
      • Rising US interest rates making dollar assets more attractive.
      • Heightened global risk aversion due to the West Asia crisis.
    • This has reduced dollar inflows into India while increasing demand for foreign currency.
  • Role of balance of payments (BoP):
    • India traditionally runs a Current Account Deficit (CAD) because imports exceed exports. 
    • This is usually financed through the FDI, portfolio investments, remittances, and external borrowing.
    • When capital inflows exceed the CAD, the BoP remains in surplus and supports the rupee. 
    • However,
      • 2023-24 saw a large BoP surplus, allowing RBI to accumulate reserves.
      • 2024-25 moved back into deficit.
      • Capital outflows in 2025-26 intensified depreciation pressures.
    • Thus, the rupee weakened despite stable domestic fundamentals.

Debate on RBI Intervention

  • Argument for a market-determined rupee:
    • Economists argue that excessive intervention distorts markets.
    • A weaker rupee theoretically discourages imports, boosts exports, and restores external balance naturally.
    • They caution that defending a currency level can deplete forex reserves, delay necessary adjustments, and create future instability.
  • Argument for RBI intervention:
    • Some economists argue that uncontrolled depreciation, especially when driven by speculative finance rather than fundamentals, can become dangerous.
  • Risks of unchecked depreciation:
    • Imported inflation, especially through crude oil.
    • Higher production costs due to import dependence.
    • Rising inflation expectations.
    • Panic-driven capital flight.
    • Adverse investor sentiment.
  • The RBI therefore intervenes not to target a fixed exchange rate, but to prevent “excessive and disruptive volatility.”

Did Artificial Stabilisation Backfire?

  • A major policy debate concerns RBI actions during 2023-24, when the rupee was held largely within the ₹81-83 range.
  • RBI sold or bought dollars aggressively to smooth movements. Critics argue this created an “artificial plateau”.
  • As global pressures intensified later, the rupee saw a sharper fall because the depreciation that had been delayed earlier was eventually reflected quickly in the exchange rate.

Exchange Rate Dynamics and Market Psychology

  • Exchange rates are heavily influenced by sentiment.
  • If investors expect further depreciation foreign investors withdraw funds, exporters delay dollar conversions, importers rush to buy dollars, and speculators intensify pressure.
  • This creates a vicious cycle where expectations themselves accelerate depreciation.
  • Economists explained such “overshooting” behaviour, where currencies move beyond equilibrium values in the short run.

Why Does Depreciation May Not Boost Exports Much?

  • The textbook assumption that a weak currency automatically boosts exports is limited in India’s case because:
    • Indian exports are highly import-intensive.
    • Inputs such as crude oil, intermediate goods, and machinery become costlier.
    • Inflation erodes competitiveness gains.
  • Moreover, if many emerging market currencies weaken simultaneously against the dollar, relative export competitiveness changes little.
  • Thus, depreciation imposes immediate costs on households and firms without guaranteeing export gains.

RBI’s Policy Approach

  • The RBI maintains that exchange rates should remain market-determined, intervention is only to smooth volatility, and no fixed exchange rate target exists.
  • India still possesses substantial forex reserves, credible monetary institutions, and relatively stable macroeconomic indicators.
  • The IMF’s Integrated Policy Framework (IPF) also recognises forex intervention as a legitimate tool for emerging market economies during periods of excessive volatility.

Way Forward for India

  • Allow: Gradual market-driven adjustment while preventing speculative volatility.
  • Strengthen: Long-term capital inflows through manufacturing and technology reforms (globally attractive AI and advanced-tech investment opportunities).
  • Reduce: Import dependence, particularly in energy and critical intermediates.
  • Expand: Export diversification and competitiveness under initiatives like “Make in India”.
  • Deepen: Domestic financial markets to reduce vulnerability to external shocks.
  • Maintain: Adequate forex reserves as a buffer against global uncertainty.

Conclusion

  • India should avoid both extremes — neither rigidly defending the rupee nor allowing disorderly depreciation. A calibrated strategy is essential.
  • Ultimately, exchange-rate stability cannot rest solely on RBI intervention. Sustainable rupee strength will depend on improving India’s structural competitiveness, external resilience, and investor confidence in the long run.

Source: TH

Rupee Depreciation FAQs

Q1: Why is the recent depreciation of the Indian rupee primarily linked to capital account pressures?

Ans: Persistent FII outflows, weak FDI inflows, etc., have intensified pressure on the rupee despite strong domestic macroeconomic indicators.

Q2: How can excessive exchange rate depreciation become a self-fulfilling phenomenon?

Ans: Expectations of further depreciation trigger capital outflows, speculative activity, delayed dollar sales by exporters, etc.

Q3: Why may rupee depreciation fail to significantly boost India’s exports?

Ans: India’s exports are import-intensive, so higher import costs raise production expenses and offset competitiveness gains from depreciation.

Q4: What is the rationale behind RBI’s intervention in the forex market?

Ans: The RBI intervenes to curb excessive and disruptive volatility while allowing the exchange rate to remain broadly market-determined.

Q5: What structural reforms are necessary to strengthen India’s external sector resilience?

Ans: India must reduce import dependence, attract stable long-term capital, diversify exports, etc.

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