Rupee Depreciation – Rupee at ₹91/USD a Crisis Signal or External Shock

Rupee Depreciation

Rupee Depreciation Latest News

  • The Indian Rupee (INR) recently breached the psychological level of ₹91/USD, triggering speculation about a possible slide towards ₹100/USD.
  • The rupee depreciation comes amid global trade uncertainties, especially high U.S. tariffs on Indian goods, and has sparked a debate on whether this trend is structurally worrisome or cyclical and manageable.
  • Experts present divergent views on the implications for macroeconomic stability, capital flows, exports, and growth.

Key Drivers of Rupee Depreciation

  • External factors:
    • U.S. tariffs (up to 50%) on Indian exports under the Trump administration.
    • Global market volatility and risk-off sentiment.
    • Broad-based depreciation of INR against major global currencies (USD, Euro, Yen, Pound, Swiss Franc, etc.).
  • Domestic structural factors:
    • Persistent Current Account Deficit (CAD).
    • Dependence on capital inflows to finance growth.
    • Rising outward remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) and demand for gold as a hedge.

Divergent Expert Views

  • View 1 - Key arguments on depreciation as a serious concern:
    • A “leaking rupee” hampers income growth targets.
    • Reduces foreign portfolio investment (FPI) attractiveness due to currency risk.
    • Encourages capital flight via LRS and dollar-linked assets.
    • Shrinks domestic capital availability, increasing the cost of capital.
    • Weakens macroeconomic growth potential in a high-growth phase.
    • On exports: The notion that a weak rupee boosts exports is a myth -
      • Indian exports lack pricing power (unlike Apple/Microsoft).
      • Mostly B2B exports, where buyers negotiate based on rupee cost structures.
      • Major exporter China succeeded on constant currency competitiveness, not depreciation.
  • View 2 - Key arguments on depreciation not alarming:
    • Depreciation is externally driven, not due to domestic macro weakness.
    • India’s macroeconomic fundamentals remain strong adequate forex reserves, manageable CAD, robust GDP growth
    • Seen as a temporary aberration, not a structural crisis.
    • Opportunity angle:
      • Indian Government Bonds (IGBs) are effectively 6% cheaper for foreign investors due to currency depreciation.
      • Could attract fresh capital inflows into Indian markets.

Impact on Export Competitiveness

  • Changing export structure: Shift towards value-added exports: engineering goods, specialty chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics.
  • Problem with depreciation: These sectors have high import intensity in their value chains. A weaker rupee raises input costs, potentially reducing net export competitiveness.

Outlook for the Rupee

  • Short-term pressure: Likely due to tariffs and global uncertainty.
  • Medium-term optimism: Expected India–U.S. trade deal by early 2026. Anticipated improvement in capital flows.
  • Long-term scenario:
    • Assuming 2–3% annual depreciation, the rupee may stay under pressure but avoid disorderly collapse.
    • Possibility of rupee strengthening below ₹90/USD if external conditions stabilise.

Challenges and Way Forward

  • Managing CAD: This should be done without excessive capital inflow dependence. Strengthen export competitiveness through productivity gains, not currency depreciation.
  • Preventing capital flight amid currency volatility: Promote stable, long-term capital inflows (FDI over volatile FPI).
  • Balancing export competitiveness with rising import costs: Diversify export markets and products to reduce tariff vulnerability.
  • Maintaining investor confidence: Maintain credible macroeconomic fundamentals - fiscal discipline, inflation control, forex buffer. Accelerate trade negotiations to reduce tariff-related shocks.

Conclusion

  • The rupee’s fall past ₹91/USD reflects a complex interplay of external trade shocks and structural economic constraints rather than an immediate macroeconomic crisis. 
  • While strong fundamentals provide resilience, over-reliance on depreciation as a growth or export strategy is misplaced. 
  • For India, sustainable competitiveness, capital stability, and policy credibility—not a weaker currency—will determine long-term economic strength.

Source: TH

Rupee Depreciation FAQs

Q1: What are the key factors behind the recent depreciation of the Indian Rupee beyond ₹91 per dollar?

Ans: The depreciation is driven by external shocks such as high U.S. tariffs, global market volatility, persistent CADand volatile capital flows.

Q2: Why does a depreciating rupee not automatically enhance India’s export competitiveness?

Ans: Most Indian exports lack pricing power and have high import intensity, making depreciation raise input costs and reduce net competitiveness.

Q3: Why is a weakening rupee seen as a challenge for India’s capital formation and growth prospects?

Ans: A weaker rupee discourages foreign capital inflows, encourages outward remittances under LRS, and raises the overall cost of capital in the economy.

Q4: How do strong macroeconomic fundamentals moderate concerns over the rupee’s depreciation?

Ans: Adequate forex reserves, manageable CAD and robust GDP growth prevent depreciation from turning into a macroeconomic crisis.

Q5: What policy measures can help India manage exchange rate volatility without relying on depreciation-led growth?

Ans: Strengthening productivity, diversifying exports, attracting stable FDI, maintaining fiscal discipline, etc.

MGNREGA vs New Rural Employment Bill: Why the Government Is Replacing MGNREGA

MGNREGA

MGNREGA Latest News

  • Recently, Parliament passed the Viksit Bharat Guarantee For Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) or VB-G RAM G Bill, just three days after it was circulated, replacing MGNREGA (2005)
  • The move drew strong protests from the Opposition and civil society, who accused the government of pushing the legislation without prior consultation or adequate debate.

Origins of MGNREGA: From Civil Society Vision to Law

  • In 2005, Parliament passed a national rural employment guarantee law, which was expanded to all districts by 2008. 
  • After 2009, it was renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).

Role of the National Advisory Council (NAC)

  • In 2004, the National Advisory Council (NAC) brought together civil society leaders, retired officials, and intellectuals. 
  • At its very first meetings, Aruna Roy and economist Jean Drèze proposed two landmark ideas: the Right to Information Act and a rural employment guarantee. 
  • The initial MGNREGA draft was prepared swiftly, emerging from the NAC’s August 19, 2004 meeting.

Dilution and Pushback

  • The Bill sent to Parliament diluted the NAC’s vision—removing universal coverage, weakening the “guarantee,” and limiting benefits to below-poverty-line families. 
  • This prompted widespread protests by civil society groups, especially the Right to Food Campaign.

Parliamentary Review and Restoration

  • The weakened Bill was examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development. 
  • The committee recommended restoring most original provisions. 
  • The government accepted these changes, leading to the Bill’s passage in 2005—cementing MGNREGA as a rights-based employment guarantee.

Why MGNREGA Was Unique: Rights, Reach, and Resilience

  • MGNREGA guaranteed 100 days of paid unskilled work per rural household on demand, making it a legal entitlement rather than a welfare dole. 
  • Wages in 2025–26 ranged from ₹241 to ₹400, offering a basic safety net against extreme poverty.
  • Universal and Non-Targeted Design - Unlike most schemes, MGNREGA was universal—not restricted by caste, category, or Below Poverty Line status. Anyone willing to work could access it, avoiding exclusion errors tied to disputed poverty metrics.
  • Scale and Inclusion - About 12.61 crore active workers depend on the scheme.  Women account for nearly 58% participation over the past five years, many entering paid work for the first time. SCs and STs form 35% of the workforce, with studies showing up to 30% higher consumption for Dalit and Adivasi households during lean seasons.
  • Crisis Buffer During COVID-19 - MGNREGA proved crucial during the pandemic. A survey led by Azim Premji University found that in Karnataka, over 60% of households felt the scheme contributed to village development and stability.
  • Reducing Distress Migration - Avoiding migration emerged as the top reason for continuing MGNREGA. A large majority recommended expanding support to 100 days per person, not just per household.
  • Building Citizenship and Collective Action - Beyond incomes, MGNREGA fostered civic engagement and rights awareness, strengthening worker organisation and unionisation in States like Rajasthan and Karnataka—an impact rare among welfare programmes.
  •  

Government’s Rationale for Introducing a New Rural Employment Bill

  • The government argues that MGNREGA suffers from serious flaws, citing widespread corruption and misuse of funds by State governments, as stated by the Union Rural Development Minister in Parliament. 
  • However, critics note that these were largely implementation challenges, not design failures. 
  • MGNREGA already had strong safeguards, including social audits and a transparent IT-based system tracking work demand, execution, and wage payments.

How the New Bill Differs from MGNREGA

  • From Demand-Driven to Supply-Driven - MGNREGA guaranteed work on demand. The new Bill shifts to a supply-driven model, with employment capped by a fixed Union budget and provided only in Centre-notified rural areas, ending the scheme’s universal character.
  • Funding Pattern and State Burden - While MGNREGA effectively operated on a 90:10 Centre–State cost share, the new Bill raises States’ burden. Funding will be 60:40 for most States, and 90:10 for northeastern and Himalayan States, increasing fiscal pressure on State governments.
  • More Days, Less Autonomy - The guaranteed workdays rise from 100 to 125, but the Centre gains greater control—deciding State-wise allocations using unspecified parameters and notifying eligible rural areas each year.
  • Selective Coverage and Blackout Periods - Unlike MGNREGA’s universal access, implementation will be selective. The Bill also allows blackout periods during peak agricultural seasons, temporarily suspending work to ensure farm labour availability—another major departure from the original Act.

Source: TH

MGNREGA FAQs

Q1: Why does the government want an MGNREGA replacement?

Ans: The government argues MGNREGA faces corruption and misuse by States, prompting the VB-G RAM G Bill to improve efficiency and fiscal control.

Q2: How was MGNREGA different from other welfare schemes?

Ans: MGNREGA was demand-driven, universal, and rights-based, guaranteeing 100 days of work without caste, poverty-line, or regional restrictions.

Q3: What are the key changes in the new rural employment Bill?

Ans: The MGNREGA replacement shifts to a supply-driven model, caps budgets, limits coverage to notified areas, and increases guaranteed workdays to 125.

Q4: How does the new Bill change Centre–State funding?

Ans: Unlike MGNREGA’s 90:10 structure, the new Bill raises States’ share to 40% for most States, increasing their financial burden.

Q5: Why is the MGNREGA replacement controversial?

Ans: Critics argue it weakens the right to work, centralises control, allows blackout periods during peak farm seasons, and undermines rural livelihood security.

Child Marriage in India: Trends, Regional Gaps, Laws and the Road to 2030

Child Marriage in India

Child Marriage in India Latest News

  • The Union government launched a 100-day awareness drive to mark one year of the Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat Abhiyan, reaffirming India’s pledge to end child marriage by 2030. 
  • While child marriage has declined over the past decade, progress remains uneven across States and socio-economic groups, leaving substantial gaps to meet the UN target.

Global Push to End Child Marriage: Targets, Stakes, and Slow Progress

  • Ending child marriage is central to SDG 5 on gender equality, with Target 5.3 aiming to eliminate child, early, and forced marriages. 
    • Target 5.3 is to eliminate all harmful practices, including child marriage, as well as early and forced marriages, and female genital mutilation. 
  • Progress is measured by the share of women aged 20–24 married before 18. 
  • Experts warns that failure to end child marriage will derail at least nine SDGs, spanning poverty, health, education, economic growth, climate action, and peace. 
  • In 2023, UNICEF estimated 64 crore women worldwide were married as children, with India accounting for one-third. 
  • At current rates, progress must accelerate 20-fold to meet the 2030 goal.

Child Marriage in India: Progress, Plateaus, and Persistent Inequalities

  • Sharp Decline, Slower Momentum - India reduced child marriage significantly from 47.4% (2005–06) to 26.8% (2015–16), a steep 21-point fall. However, progress slowed thereafter, declining only to 23.3% by 2019–21.
  • Wide Regional Variations - Rates remain highest in West Bengal (42%), Bihar (40%), and Tripura (39%), with several other States above the national average. In contrast, Lakshadweep, J&K, Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Goa, and Nagaland report the lowest prevalence.
  • Education and Income Gaps - Child marriage is strongly linked to socio-economic status. Nearly half of girls with no education marry before 18, compared to just 4% with higher education. Similarly, 40% of girls from the poorest households marry early, against 8% from the richest quintile.

Tackling Child Marriage in India: Laws, Campaigns, and Social Change

  • India enacted the Prevention of Child Marriage Act, 2006, after which child marriage rates halved. 
  • The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 further strengthened protection. 
  • However, experts stress that laws alone are insufficient without changing social norms—especially by expanding girls’ education, the most effective factor in delaying marriage.

Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat Abhiyan: On-Ground Action

  • Under the campaign, 54,917 Child Marriage Prevention Officers have been appointed nationwide. 
  • In one year, 1,520 child marriages were prevented through persuasion or administrative action, with Madhya Pradesh and Haryana leading. 
  • Still, 198 cases could not be stopped, requiring police or child welfare intervention. 
  • The campaign also works with faith leaders, youth groups, and community networks to encourage reporting and shift attitudes at the grassroots.

Girls’ Empowerment and Welfare Schemes

  • The Beti Bachao Beti Padhao scheme focuses on improving child sex ratio and girls’ education, though implementation has been uneven. 
  • Complementary measures include financial incentives (Laadli schemes), improved school sanitation, and cycles for safe travel, aimed at keeping girls in school longer.

State-Level Incentives: Mixed Signals

  • Some States support girls’ education through targeted aid. 
  • For example, West Bengal’s Kanyashree scheme provides annual support to girls aged 13–18 and a lump sum for those delaying marriage and pursuing higher education. 
  • Some women’s activists argue that the State with the highest child marriage rates is sending a confusing message through the Rupashree scheme. 
  • While the scheme gives ₹25,000 to poor families only if the daughter is over 18, offering money at the time of marriage may still encourage early marriages instead of delaying them further.

Debate on Raising the Legal Age of Marriage for Women

  • The Centre has proposed increasing the minimum marriage age for women to 21 years, aligning it with men to support higher education, skill development, economic independence, and better maternal and child health. 
  • However, the proposal has faced opposition seeking deeper scrutiny. 
  • Critics caution that without parallel social reforms, the change could criminalise large sections of society, as 61% of women aged 20–24 were married before turning 21.

Source: TH | UNICEF

Child Marriage in India FAQs

Q1: What is the current status of child marriage in India?

Ans: Child marriage in India declined from 47.4% in 2005–06 to 23.3% in 2019–21, but progress has slowed and remains uneven across regions and communities.

Q2: Which States have the highest child marriage rates in India?

Ans: West Bengal, Bihar, and Tripura report the highest child marriage rates, followed by Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.

Q3: How does education affect child marriage in India?

Ans: Education is the strongest deterrent: 48% of girls with no education marry early, compared to just 4% among those with higher education.

Q4: What laws address child marriage in India?

Ans: The Prevention of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and the POCSO Act, 2012 form the legal framework, supported by campaigns like Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat Abhiyan.

Q5: Why is ending child marriage critical for India’s development goals?

Ans: Child marriage in India impacts poverty, health, education, gender equality, and economic growth, threatening progress on at least nine UN Sustainable Development Goals.

SHANTI Act and India’s Nuclear Energy Roadmap

SHANTI Act

SHANTI Act Latest News

  • Parliament has enacted the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, replacing older nuclear laws to accelerate nuclear power expansion and attract private participation. 

India’s Nuclear Energy Programme: Background

  • Nuclear energy has been a strategic component of India’s long-term energy planning since independence. 
  • Guided by Homi Bhabha’s three-stage nuclear programme, India sought energy security while overcoming its limited uranium reserves by eventually using thorium, which is abundantly available domestically.
  • At present, nuclear power contributes about 3% of India’s electricity generation, with an installed capacity of 8.8 GW, making it a relatively small but stable and low-carbon energy source. 
  • However, meeting India’s growing electricity demand while transitioning to clean energy has renewed focus on expanding nuclear power alongside renewables.

Existing Legal Framework Before SHANTI

  • Before the new Act, India’s nuclear sector was governed by two major laws:
    • Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which restricted nuclear power generation to public sector entities
    • Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010, which imposed liability not only on operators but also allowed recourse against equipment suppliers
  • While the CLND Act aimed to protect citizens in case of nuclear accidents, its supplier liability clause discouraged foreign and private companies from investing in India’s nuclear sector. 
  • This became a major bottleneck after the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, as international reactor manufacturers remained wary of legal exposure. 

Key Features of the Act

  • The SHANTI Act repeals both earlier laws and introduces a consolidated legal framework for nuclear energy development. 
  • Its core objective is to scale up nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047, increasing nuclear power’s share in India’s energy mix.
  • A major shift under SHANTI is opening the sector to private companies and facilitating foreign investment, while maintaining state oversight on safety and regulation. 
  • State-owned utilities are expected to add around 54 GW, with the remaining capacity likely coming from private players.

Changes in Nuclear Liability Provisions

  • Safety and liability lie at the heart of nuclear regulation. Under international norms, nuclear plant operators are strictly liable for damages, with immediate compensation to victims, irrespective of fault.
  • The earlier CLND Act allowed operators to seek compensation from suppliers if equipment defects caused an accident. 
  • SHANTI removes this supplier liability clause and even eliminates the explicit reference to “suppliers,” thereby addressing long-standing concerns of foreign reactor manufacturers.
  • The Act introduces a graded liability system based on plant capacity:
    • Rs. 3,000 crore for plants above 3,600 MW
    • Rs. 1,500 crore for 1,500-3,600 MW
    • Rs. 750 crore for 750-1,500 MW
    • Rs. 300 crore for 150-750 MW
    • Rs. 100 crore for plants below 150 MW
  • This graded approach aims to reduce risk perception and encourage private investment, though concerns remain about the adequacy of compensation in severe accidents. 

Regulatory Structure and Safety Oversight

  • The SHANTI Act gives statutory backing to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), strengthening its legal status. 
  • However, the Union government continues to control key aspects such as licensing and appointments, raising questions about regulatory independence.
  • Given global nuclear disasters like Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011), safety oversight remains critical, and India’s cautious regulatory approach reflects these historical lessons.

Nuclear Expansion and Small Modular Reactors

  • To meet its ambitious targets, India plans to rely significantly on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
  • These reactors are smaller, factory-built units that can be assembled on-site, potentially reducing construction time.
  • However, SMRs require enriched uranium-235, which India lacks in sufficient quantities, and they do not directly support India’s long-term thorium-based vision. 
  • They are also costlier per unit of electricity and do not fundamentally solve the problem of radioactive waste.
  • Meanwhile, India’s Fast Breeder Reactor, essential for moving to the second stage of the three-stage programme, has faced repeated delays and is now expected to be commissioned only by 2026.

Source : TH

SHANTI Act FAQs

Q1: What is the SHANTI Act?

Ans: It is a new law governing nuclear energy that replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act, 2010.

Q2: Why was the CLND Act seen as restrictive?

Ans: Because it allowed operators to seek compensation from suppliers, deterring private and foreign investment.

Q3: What nuclear capacity does India aim to achieve under SHANTI?

Ans: India targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.

Q4: How does SHANTI change nuclear liability rules?

Ans: It removes supplier liability and introduces graded compensation limits based on plant size.

Q5: Are Small Modular Reactors central to India’s nuclear plans?

Ans: Yes, but they rely on enriched uranium and do not directly advance India’s thorium-based programme.

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