Daily Editorial Analysis 28 October 2025

Big Tech’s Contempt for Indian Public Health

Context

• Drug advertising has been a matter of public concern in India since 1927, when Sir Haroon Jaffer raised the issue of control of the craze for medicinal drugs in the Council of State.
• The concern eventually led to the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act (DMRA), 1954, which prohibits advertisements for drugs claiming to cure or prevent a list of 54 diseases and medical conditions.
• The purpose of this law was to protect citizens from misleading claims and pseudo-medical treatments.
• However, the digital age has transformed the advertising landscape. The rise of social media, search engines, and online marketplaces has created an environment where the spirit of the DMRA is routinely violated.

The Evolution of Drug Advertising: From Legislative Vigilance to Digital Evasion

• The DMRA was crafted at a time when government oversight could effectively target print and broadcast media.
• In the digital era, this model no longer holds. Online advertising operates across borders, managed by algorithms and corporations based outside India.
• As a result, unverified medical advertisements, especially those promoting ayurvedic, homeopathic, or miracle” cures, have multiplied on the Internet.
• Searches for products such as ayurveda blood pressure tablets or homeopathy diabetes cures routinely display paid promotions under sponsored tags.
• Many of these advertisements claim to treat serious conditions like diabetes and cancer, violating the DMRA’s explicit prohibitions.
• The situation is made worse by promotional videos featuring spiritual figures who claim to cure all diseases using traditional medicine.
• Such practices have turned online platforms into powerful vehicles for misinformation that can endanger public health.

Double Standards in Global Corporate Behaviour and Legal Evasion

• Double Standards in Global Corporate Behaviour

  • A striking contrast exists between the conduct of technology companies in India and their behaviour in the United States. In the U.S., health-related advertisements are tightly controlled.
  • Platforms employ pre-screening systems and adhere to detailed content guidelines to ensure compliance with laws enforced by agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
  • False or unapproved therapeutic claims are swiftly removed, and violations invite criminal prosecution.
  • In India, the same companies apply no such rigour. Their advertising policies make no mention of the DMRA or its prohibitions, enabling advertisers to promote unverified medical products.
  • This double standard exposes a clear hierarchy in corporate compliance. Companies obey strong regulations in Western nations but neglect similar responsibilities in developing ones.

• Legal Evasion and Institutional Weakness

  • Technology companies often justify their inaction by claiming intermediary status under Indian law, a designation that shields them from liability for user-generated content.
  • Yet this argument collapses in the context of paid advertising.
  • Advertisements are not user-generated; they are actively solicited, approved, and monetised by the platforms themselves. Contracts are signed, payments are accepted, and advertising slots are deliberately allocated.
  • These are the actions of publishers, not passive intermediaries.
  • Regulatory weakness compounds the problem. The Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in 2008 over violations of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PNDT) offers a telling example.
  • Accountability is further weakened by the legal separation between Indian subsidiaries and their S.-based parent companies.

The Way Forward: Reclaiming Sovereignty through Reform

• Addressing these failures requires firm regulatory and legal reform.
• Criminal proceedings against responsible managerial personnel would mark a decisive step toward enforcement.
• Mandating that key decision-makers for advertising and content operations in India be citizens based in India would ensure accountability to domestic courts and laws.
• Such measures would align India’s digital governance with its sovereign right to protect public health.
• Another necessary reform is the conditional revocation of intermediary immunity.
• Platforms that disregard laws like the DMRA should not benefit from the protections granted to neutral intermediaries.
• Immunity must be contingent on compliance with Indian law. Without this condition, the privilege becomes an instrument of impunity rather than innovation.

Conclusion

• The history of India’s struggle against misleading medical advertisements, beginning in 1927 and codified in 1954, reveals a continuous tension between public welfare and commercial exploitation.
• The digital era has intensified this conflict, as foreign corporations exploit legal loopholes and weak enforcement to profit from misinformation.
• The unchecked spread of unverified health claims not only undermines the DMRA but also endangers millions who rely on such remedies in good faith.
• Restoring accountability demands a reassertion of legal authority, the creation of transparent enforcement mechanisms, and the political will to treat violations as serious crimes rather than administrative oversights.

Big Tech’s Contempt for Indian Public Health FAQs

Q1. What is the main purpose of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954?
Ans. The main purpose of the DMRA is to prohibit advertisements that make false or misleading claims about curing or preventing certain diseases and to protect the public from deceptive medical promotions.

Q2. How has the rise of the Internet affected drug advertising in India?
Ans. The rise of the Internet has made it easier for companies to spread unverified medical claims through digital platforms that operate beyond India’s legal control.

Q3. Why do Big Tech companies face criticism in the context of Indian drug advertisement laws?
Ans. Big Tech companies face criticism because they enforce strict health advertising rules in countries like the United States but ignore similar laws such as the DMRA in India.

Q4. What legal loophole allows technology companies to avoid punishment for violating Indian laws?
Ans. Technology companies use the “intermediary” status under Indian law to claim immunity from liability, even though they actively manage and profit from paid advertisements.

Q5. What reforms are suggested to make Big Tech accountable in India?
Ans. Suggested reforms include prosecuting responsible executives, requiring India-based managers for advertising decisions, and revoking intermediary immunity for non-compliant platforms.

Source: The Hindu

A Start for North-South Carbon Market Cooperation

Context

• The European Union (EU) and India’s New Strategic EU–India Agenda, announced on September 17, 2025, marks a significant milestone in their evolving partnership.
• Structured around five key pillars; prosperity and sustainability, technology and innovation, security and defence, connectivity and global issues, and cross-cutting enablers, the agenda seeks to deepen collaboration across economic and geopolitical domains.
• Among its most consequential features lies a seemingly technical but transformative proposal: linking India’s Carbon Market (ICM) with the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

The Promise of the Linkage and the Structural Weakness of India’s Carbon Market

• The Promise of the Linkage

  • At its core, the proposed linkage between the Indian Carbon Market and CBAM offers a pragmatic solution to a pressing challenge: the risk of double carbon penalties for Indian exporters.
  • Under CBAM, the EU imposes a carbon levy on imports based on the embedded emissions in goods, ensuring a level playing field with domestic producers who already pay carbon prices under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).
  • By allowing carbon costs paid within India to be deducted from CBAM charges at the EU border, exporters would be spared the unfair burden of dual payments.
  • This arrangement could incentivise early decarbonisation, align domestic emissions reductions with global trade competitiveness, and reflect a rare case of climate justice in practice, recognising rather than penalising developing country efforts in carbon pricing.

• The Structural Weakness of India’s Carbon Market

  • Yet this vision rests on a shaky institutional foundation. India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), commonly called the Indian Carbon Market (ICM), remains underdeveloped compared to the EU’s mature ETS.
  • While the EU ETS has a two-decade track record of auction mechanisms, strict emission caps, and independent verification, India’s system is fragmented and experimental.
  • Its current credits often rely on project-based offsets or efficiency improvements rather than binding absolute emission caps.
  • For CBAM’s tonne-for-tonne accounting to work credibly, the EU must trust that India’s carbon credits represent verifiable emission reductions.
  • However, the absence of strong regulators, transparent registries, and compliance enforcement undermines that trust.
  • Unless India upgrades its carbon market to a compliance-grade mechanism with legal enforceability, the EU is unlikely to accept Indian carbon prices as valid deductions.

The Carbon Price Gap and Political Economy Risks

• Even if institutional reforms succeed, a major price disparity The EU ETS carbon price fluctuates between €60 and €80 per tonne, while India’s nascent market trades at €5 to €10 per tonne.
• Without price parity or alignment, EU regulators will deduct only minimal amounts, undermining the intended relief for exporters.
• This creates serious political and industrial risks in India. Exporters could face double burdens, paying both the domestic compliance cost and the full CBAM levy, leading to industrial resistance and pressure to dilute carbon rules.
• The resulting political economy tension, between industrial competitiveness and environmental ambition, is a central obstacle.
• Possible solutions such as sectoral carbon contracts or a negotiated carbon price floor are technically feasible but politically delicate, requiring long-term coordination between New Delhi and Brussels.

The Geopolitical Contradictions of CBAM and the Way Forward

• The Geopolitical Contradictions of CBAM

  • Beyond economics, the CBAM–ICM linkage raises geopolitical and sovereignty concerns.
  • India, along with other developing nations, has opposed CBAM at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in international climate dialogues, labelling it unilateral and protectionist.
  • By agreeing to integrate its carbon market with CBAM, India risks legitimising a mechanism it has formally resisted.
  • This contradiction could trigger future disputes: if the EU deems India’s carbon prices insufficient, exporters may face partial or full CBAM penalties, prompting political escalation or legal challenge.

• The Way Forward: Toward a Cooperative Future

  • Despite its challenges, the CBAM–ICM linkage holds transformative potential.
  • If implemented successfully, it could become a global model for North–South carbon market cooperation.
  • It would protect Indian exporters, accelerate industrial decarbonisation, and strengthen EU–India climate diplomacy.
  • Achieving this outcome requires a phased and transparent approach, where India strengthens its market integrity and the EU provides technical and policy support.
  • Only through collaborative design, clear equivalence criteria, and joint monitoring mechanisms can the two sides translate ambition into action.

Conclusion

• The proposed linkage between India’s carbon market and the EU’s CBAM represents both a visionary step toward global carbon fairness and a minefield of practical and political challenges.
• Its success depends on reconciling divergent regulatory standards, closing price gaps, and navigating geopolitical sensitivities.
• Without careful coordination, this breakthrough risks remaining a symbolic gesture, a promising clause buried in diplomacy.
• But if India and the EU commit to mutual trust, transparency, and shared responsibility, this initiative could redefine global climate cooperation and set a precedent for equitable transitions in the 21st century.

A Start for North-South Carbon Market Cooperation FAQs

Q1. What is the main purpose of linking the Indian Carbon Market (ICM) with the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)?
Ans. The main purpose is to prevent Indian exporters from paying double carbon costs and to encourage early industrial decarbonisation.

Q2. Why is India’s carbon market considered underdeveloped compared to the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS)?
Ans. India’s carbon market lacks binding emission caps, independent verification, and strong regulatory institutions, unlike the EU’s well-established ETS.

Q3. What major challenge arises from the carbon price gap between India and the EU?
Ans. The large price gap means EU regulators may deduct very little at the border, causing Indian exporters to face both domestic carbon costs and full CBAM levies.

Q4. Why is CBAM politically controversial for India?
Ans. CBAM is controversial because India has opposed it as a protectionist and unilateral measure, and linking with it could appear to legitimise a mechanism it previously resisted.

Q5. What could make the EU–India carbon market linkage successful in the future?
Ans. The linkage could succeed if India strengthens its carbon market integrity and the EU provides technical support and flexibility in recognizing India’s carbon pricing efforts.

Source: The Hindu

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