Daily Editorial Analysis 28 October 2026

India’s ‘Balancing Act’ Risks Eroding Russia’s Trust

Context

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek (August 31–September 1, 2026) and the BRICS summit in New Delhi (September 12–13, 2026) marked significant developments in Indian foreign policy.
• India endorsed declarations supporting Iran and Prime Minister Narendra Modi appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine.
• It revealed the growing challenges of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment amid intensifying geopolitical rivalries.

The Strategic Significance of SCO and BRICS

• The SCO and BRICS provide platforms for cooperation among Russia, India, China, and other emerging powers.
• Russia uses them to demonstrate that it is not internationally isolated, while China seeks to expand its geopolitical influence and challenge Western dominance.
• India participates in these organisations while maintaining relations with Western forums such as the G-7.
• This approach enables New Delhi to protect its national interests without aligning exclusively with any major power.

A surprise pivot

• At Bishkek, India endorsed a declaration condemning attacks on Iran, reaffirming its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mourning the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in U.S.-Israeli air strikes.
• This represented a departure from India’s traditional reluctance to directly criticise Washington and Tel Aviv.
• India also supported strong statements affirming Palestinian rights and the two-state solution, despite maintaining close relations with Israel.
• Meanwhile PM Modi publicly urged Mr. Putin to end Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine.
• India’s position may have been influenced by its desire to secure the participation of Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit.
• Following Operation Sindoor (2025), India faced concerns about diplomatic marginalisation, while Pakistan gained prominence through its mediation role in the Iran conflict.
• A successful BRICS summit was therefore important for restoring India’s international standing.

Contradictory shifts

• India’s support for Iran did not signify a complete break with Washington. Mr. Modi’s public appeal to Putin demonstrated concern about the Ukraine conflict and reassured Western governments of India’s continuing engagement with their position.
• Consequently, India supported declarations accommodating Russian interests while publicly urging Moscow to end the war.
• These contrasting approaches expose the difficulties of multi-alignment.
• India seeks to maintain relations with Israel while opposing attacks on Iran, purchase Russian oil while strengthening Western partnerships, and participate in BRICS without appearing anti-American.
• Modi and Mr. Xi met on the sidelines of the New Delhi summit, although they had not held bilateral talks in Bishkek.
• Neither summit declaration mentioned Ukraine, allowing the organisations to avoid directly criticising Moscow.

The problem of selective diplomacy

• At the 2022 SCO summit in Samarkand, PM Modi told Putin that today’s era is not an era of war.
• India subsequently used this statement to explain that purchasing discounted Russian oil did not imply support for Russia’s invasion.
• However, India has not issued comparable public admonitions to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over military campaigns across West Asia or to U.S. President Donald Trump following American attacks on Iran.
• India’s own military action against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor also complicates its opposition to warfare.
• Such selective diplomacy may undermine India’s credibility.
• Moscow could interpret Mr. Modi’s statements as performative gestures intended to reassure the West rather than expressions of consistently applied principles.

Where ties with Russia stand

• Russia remains important to India for energy security, defence cooperation, and military supplies.
• However, India has diversified its defence procurement by increasingly turning to France, Israel, and the United States, reducing its dependence on Russian arms.
• Meanwhile, Russia is strengthening its partnership with China.
• Although India and Russia continue to share strategic interests, their relationship is becoming increasingly transactional, shaped by immediate economic and geopolitical considerations.
• India must therefore balance closer Western engagement with the need to preserve its longstanding relationship with Moscow.
• Excessive criticism could weaken mutual trust, while continued dependence on Russian supplies could constrain India’s strategic flexibility.

Conclusion

• The 2026 SCO and BRICS summits demonstrated both the opportunities and limitations of India’s multi-alignment strategy.
• India’s positions on Iran and Ukraine reflect its efforts to preserve diplomatic flexibility, but inconsistent responses to international conflicts risk undermining its credibility.
• India must reconcile strategic autonomy with diplomatic consistency, diversify its partnerships, and protect its national interests without becoming dependent on any single power.
• Its global influence will ultimately depend on strategic clarity, credible diplomacy, and principled decision-making in an increasingly fragmented international order.

India’s ‘Balancing Act’ Risks Eroding Russia’s Trust FAQs

Q1. What is India’s main foreign policy strategy?
Ans. India’s main strategy is strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.

Q2. Why did India endorse the Bishkek Declaration?
Ans. India endorsed it to support Iran’s sovereignty and maintain relations with SCO members.

Q3. What message did PM Modi convey to President Putin?
Ans. PM Modi urged Putin to end the war in Ukraine.

Q4. Why is India’s diplomacy criticised as selective?
Ans. India is criticised for applying its opposition to war inconsistently across different conflicts.

Q5. What challenge faces India-Russia relations?
Ans. India’s growing Western engagement and Russia’s closer ties with China may weaken their longstanding partnership.

Source: The Hindu

India’s Next Investment Cycle Will Shape Its Carbon Future

Context

• The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has warned that the world could cross the 1.5°C global warming threshold within the next few years, increasing pressure for faster decarbonisation.
• India must balance economic growth with climate commitments, but its unfinished infrastructure development offers an opportunity to adopt low-carbon growth from the beginning.
• According to NITI Aayog, 86% of India’s building stock in 2070 is yet to be constructed. Total floor space is projected to rise from 18 billion square metres in 2020 to 42 billion by 2070.
• Steel capacity is targeted to reach 300 million tonnes by 2030–31, while cement production could increase to 660 million tonnes by 2030.
• These projections demonstrate the need to integrate sustainability into infrastructure planning to prevent long-term environmental damage.

The Advantage of Choice

• India’s Infrastructure Opportunity
• • India’s infrastructure deficit is often considered an obstacle to decarbonisation because demand for steel, cement and electricity will continue to grow.
  • However, much of its future infrastructure remains a choice rather than an inheritance.
  • India can incorporate energy efficiency and cleaner technologies into new investments, avoiding costly retrofits and stranded assets.
  • The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that approximately 80% of the building stock advanced economies will use in 2050 already exists.
  • In the European Union, 85% of buildings predate 2000, around three-quarters perform poorly in energy efficiency, and only about 1% are renovated annually.
• Strengthening Building Regulations
  • India can avoid similar problems by adopting sustainable building designs from the outset.
  • The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) reports that 27 States have notified the Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC) 2017, but only 21 have legally incorporated it.
  • The Energy Conservation and Sustainable Building Code (ECSBC) 2024 and Eco-Niwas Samhita (ENS) 2024 provide updated standards for commercial and residential buildings.
  • States should integrate these codes into building permits, occupancy certificates and grid connections, making compliance enforceable rather than voluntary.

The Issue in the Power Sector

• Expanding Transmission and Storage
  • India has expanded renewable-energy generation rapidly, but transmission infrastructure has not kept pace.
  • The IEA estimates that transmission bottlenecks have constrained approximately 60 GW of renewable capacity.
  • Meanwhile, the Ministry of Power plans around 590 GW of generation additions between 2023 and 2032.
  • Without adequate transmission and storage, renewable electricity may not reach consumption centres reliably.
  • Electrification of transport, cooling and industry will further increase demand.
  • Therefore, transmission networks and energy storage must be developed alongside, or sometimes ahead of, new generation capacity.
• Decarbonising Steel and Cement
• • Decarbonising steel and cement is more difficult because technologies such as hydrogen-based green steel and large-scale carbon capture remain economically or technologically challenging.
  • Premature technology mandates could increase costs and lock industries into inefficient processes.
  • Using Public Procurement to Encourage Green Industry
  • Instead, public procurement can create demand for low-emission materials.
  • Government agencies, Indian Railways and the National Highways Authority of India purchase substantial quantities of steel and cement, giving them considerable influence over industrial practices.
  • India’s green-steel taxonomy and proposed aggregated procurement through competitive bidding offer a practical approach.
  • Tenders can establish emissions-intensity thresholds without prescribing production methods.
  • Competition would encourage innovation, reveal the additional cost of greener materials and allow standards to become progressively stricter.
  • Aligning these thresholds with the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) would ensure consistent policy incentives and encourage industrial decarbonisation.

Costs and Risks

• Addressing High Financing Costs
  • The IEA estimates that India’s cost of capital for grid-scale renewable projects is about 80% higher than in advanced economies.
  • High upfront costs and expensive borrowing can make otherwise viable clean-energy projects unattractive.
  • Targeted support through payment-security mechanisms, partial credit guarantees and concessional debt can reduce financing and payment risks, encouraging private investment.
• Balancing Public Support and Financial Risks
• • Public finance must be used carefully. Subsidising unproven technologies could transfer commercial risks to taxpayers.
  • Governments should distinguish between mature technologies requiring financial support and emerging technologies that still face significant technical and economic uncertainty.
  • A balanced financing strategy can promote clean infrastructure while protecting public resources and maintaining financial discipline.

Conclusion

• India must invest heavily to build its future economy, but the environmental consequences will depend on the choices made today.
• Efficient infrastructure, renewable energy and sustainable construction should be prioritised wherever technologies are mature.
• By making informed investment decisions today, the country can reduce future costs, strengthen energy security, limit emissions and achieve sustainable economic growth.

India’s Next Investment Cycle Will Shape Its Carbon Future FAQs

Q1. What is India’s advantage in decarbonisation?
Ans. India can build future infrastructure using energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies.

Q2. Why are building regulations important?
Ans. Building regulations ensure energy efficiency and reduce future emissions.

Q3. What is the major challenge in India’s power sector?
Ans. Inadequate transmission infrastructure limits the effective use of renewable energy.

Q4. How can public procurement promote green steel and cement?
Ans. Public procurement can create demand for low-emission industrial materials.

Q5. How can India reduce clean-energy financing risks?
Ans. India can use credit guarantees, payment-security mechanisms and concessional loans to reduce financing risks.

Source: The Hindu

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Theatre Commands – Ending the Turf War to Build Jointness

Context

• Seven years after the government tasked the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with restructuring military commands and establishing theatre commands, India remains caught in inter-service disagreements.
• The Army seeks assured air support, the Air Force fears fragmentation of scarce air assets, while the Navy worries that a predominantly continental outlook may undermine maritime priorities.
• While these concerns deserve consideration, prolonged disagreement is increasingly difficult to justify given the changing nature of warfare and India’s complex security environment.

Why the Status Quo is Unsustainable

• India currently has 17 geographically dispersed, single-service commands, each reporting to its respective Service Headquarters.
• Their areas of responsibility do not necessarily correspond with those of the other services.
• In a modern conflict involving the western or northern borders or the maritime domain, operations could simultaneously cross several command boundaries.
• Lack of coordination among multiple commands can cause delays at a time when AI-enabled, algorithmic and network-centric warfare demands rapid decision-making.
• Theatre commands seek to overcome this fragmentation by placing the forces required for a particular geographical or operational theatre under a single theatre commander, with adequate operational authority.
• Theatreisation is not merely administrative restructuring; it is intended to achieve jointness, integrated planning, faster decision-making and coordinated application of military power.

The Air Power Debate

• The strongest resistance has centred on the Air Force’s doctrine of “centralised control and decentralised execution.”
• Critics argue that assigning aircraft to different theatre commanders could fragment India’s already limited air assets.
• However, theatreisation need not require physically distributing squadrons among theatres, and
  • Air assets can remain at their existing bases.
  • Centralised control over air power can be retained.
  • Operational tasking can be decentralised according to theatre requirements.
  • A senior IAF Component Commander can advise the theatre commander on the employment of air power.
• Thus, the real issue is not the doctrine itself but who exercises operational control over air assets.

Lessons from the US – Managing Inter-Service Rivalry

• The US experience demonstrates that service rivalry cannot simply be wished away; it requires political arbitration and negotiated allocation of roles and missions.
• Key West Agreement, 1948:
  • Following the creation of an independent US Air Force, intense disputes emerged among the Army, Navy and Air Force over operational responsibilities.
  • Then Defence Secretary (James Forrestal) brought the Joint Chiefs together at Key West and compelled them to negotiate their respective roles.
  • The broad settlement was –
    • Air Force: Primary responsibility for strategic air warfare.
    • Navy: Carrier aviation.
    • Marine Corps: Its amphibious and expeditionary role.
    • Army: Land combat.
  • The agreement established an important principle: military roles and missions should be settled through negotiation under civilian political authority.
• 1966 Army-Air Force Agreement
• • Another dispute arose over fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters during the Vietnam era.
  • The Army and Air Force negotiated a redistribution of responsibilities, with the Army giving up most fixed-wing aircraft in exchange for greater responsibility for combat helicopters.
• Lesson for India: Inter-service disagreements can be resolved through institutionalised negotiation, political oversight and clearly defined responsibilities.

Modern Warfare is Changing

• India cannot simply copy foreign models, but neither can it ignore contemporary conflicts.
• For example, Ukraine has demonstrated how missiles, drones and other asymmetric capabilities can challenge conventional naval power; Ukrainian attacks severely damaged Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
• Similarly, Iran’s use of missiles and drones illustrates how long-range and unmanned systems can compensate, to some extent, for limitations in conventional air power.
• These developments underline the growing importance of multi-domain operations, unmanned systems, precision weapons, networked warfare and integrated command structures.
• The emerging model of warfare increasingly blurs the boundaries between land, sea, air, space and cyber domains, making inter-service integration a strategic necessity rather than merely an organisational preference.

Britain – Innovation in Military Leadership

• The UK provides another useful lesson in institutional flexibility. For example, Sir Richard Knighton, an aeronautical engineer and the first non-pilot to head the Royal Air Force, later became Chief of the Defence Staff.
• Such appointments demonstrate an institutional willingness to move beyond traditional service conventions when strategic circumstances demand it.
• India’s prolonged seven-year debate, by contrast, reflects the difficulty of overcoming entrenched service identities and organisational interests.

Way Forward for India

• Though the US itself took decades to achieve deeper jointness, India faces a security environment that does not permit indefinite experimentation or delay.
• Therefore, it needs –
  • Bold and reform-oriented Service Chiefs willing to challenge entrenched organisational practices.
  • A strong CDS capable of acting as an honest broker among the three services.
  • Civilian political oversight to resolve disputes over roles, resources and operational control.
  • A clearly articulated National Security Strategy (NSS) to provide strategic direction.
  • Greater emphasis on joint planning, interoperability, integrated logistics and tri-service training.
  • Theatre structures tailored to India’s geography, threat perception and force availability, rather than mechanically replicating foreign models.

Conclusion

• Theatreisation is ultimately a test of India’s ability to move from service-centric thinking to jointness.
• Inter-service concerns must be negotiated rather than allowed to become an indefinite veto over reform.
• India’s next security crisis will not wait for organisational disagreements to be settled; therefore, a workable theatre-command structure must be established before-not after-the next crisis.

Theatre Commands FAQs

Q1. Why is theatreisation considered essential for India’s modern warfare requirements?

Ans. It can overcome fragmented single-service commands, enable jointness, reduce coordination delays, etc.

Q2. What is the significance of the IAF doctrine in the theatre-command debate?

Ans. Aircraft can remain centrally controlled while being decentrally tasked according to operational requirements.

Q3. What lessons can India learn from the US experience of resolving inter-service disputes?

Ans. The Key West Agreement shows that service roles should be settled through negotiation.

Q4. How are contemporary conflicts changing the requirements of military jointness?

Ans. Ukraine demonstrates the growing importance of drones, missiles, precision weapons, etc.

Q5. What are the key prerequisites for successful theatreisation in India?

Ans. India needs a decisive CDS, cooperative Service Chiefs, political oversight, a clear National Security Strategy, etc.

Source: IE