India’s Water Diplomacy, Major Disputes, Strategic Challenges

India shares several transboundary rivers with its neighbours, making water an important aspect of foreign policy and regional cooperation. While shared rivers promote irrigation, hydropower, and flood management, they also create challenges related to water sharing, dam construction, and upstream-downstream disputes. As water scarcity, climate change, and regional tensions increase, water diplomacy has become important for maintaining good relations with neighbours and ensuring India’s water security

India’s Bilateral Water Diplomacy 

Water diplomacy refers to the use of diplomatic tools such as treaties, negotiations, and institutional mechanisms to manage rivers shared between two or more countries. India’s bilateral water diplomacy operates with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar, reflecting its extensive network of transboundary river relations shaped by both cooperation and strategic concerns.

India–Pakistan Water Relations

India and Pakistan’s water relationship is governed by the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 with the mediation of the World Bank. 

• Under the Indus Water treaty, the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) were allocated to India, while the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were assigned largely to Pakistan, with India retaining limited rights for non-consumptive uses such as hydropower generation, navigation, and domestic consumption.
• The treaty established a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism consisting of the Permanent Indus Commission, a Neutral Expert for technical disputes, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the final forum.
• For decades, the treaty survived wars, military crises, and political hostility. However, disputes over the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects intensified disagreements regarding treaty interpretation. Pakistan repeatedly challenged the design of these projects, while India argued that they were fully compliant with treaty provisions.
• A major turning point occurred after the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April 2025. India placed the treaty in abeyance, linking its restoration to Pakistan ending support for cross-border terrorism. 
• Subsequently, Pakistan raised the issue in international forums, including the UN Security Council, while the Permanent Court of Arbitration questioned India’s unilateral suspension. India rejected these proceedings, maintaining that the arbitration process itself lacked legitimacy.

Today, the IWT faces its most serious challenge since 1960. Water has increasingly become an instrument of strategic statecraft rather than merely a technical resource-sharing arrangement. However, any weakening of treaty-based water governance also carries long-term implications for India, particularly in dealing with upstream countries such as China.

India–China Water Diplomacy

India’s water relationship with China is the most strategically sensitive because China is the upper riparian state for several major rivers originating in the Tibetan Plateau, including those that flow into India.

• The most important concern is the Brahmaputra River, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet and the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh. Since this river is crucial for water supply, agriculture, and ecology in India’s Northeast, any upstream activity directly affects downstream regions.
• Unlike India’s water agreements with countries like Pakistan or Bangladesh, there is no formal water-sharing treaty between India and China. Cooperation is limited to MoUs for hydrological data sharing and flood-season information exchange, which are non-binding and limited in scope.
• China’s construction of large hydropower projects on the upper Brahmaputra has raised concerns in India regarding water security, ecological balance, and lack of transparency. The proposed Great Bend (Medog) hydropower project, which could become the world’s largest, has further increased these concerns.
• Another major issue is China’s occasional restriction or suspension of hydrological data sharing during political tensions, which affects India’s flood forecasting and disaster preparedness in the Northeast. This creates uncertainty and strengthens India’s strategic concerns about upstream control.

This situation is often explained through the concept of Hydro-hegemony, where an upstream country uses its geographic advantage and control over water flow and information to strengthen its strategic influence over downstream countries.

In response, India has started focusing on independent monitoring systems and hydropower projects, including the Upper Siang Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh, to reduce dependency and improve resilience.

India–Bangladesh Water Diplomacy 

• India and Bangladesh share 54 transboundary rivers, making water a central element of bilateral relations. The Joint Rivers Commission (1972) is the main institutional mechanism for cooperation in flood forecasting and data sharing.
• The Ganga Water Treaty (1996) is a major success, ensuring equitable sharing of water at the Farakka Barrage. It is considered a model treaty for transboundary water management.
• However, the Teesta River dispute remains unresolved. Bangladesh depends heavily on Teesta water for agriculture, while India faces domestic opposition from West Bengal, delaying agreement.
• Despite tensions, both countries continue cooperation and are working towards renewal of the Ganga Treaty in 2026.

India–Nepal Water Diplomacy 

India and Nepal share important Himalayan rivers such as the Koshi, Gandak, and Mahakali, which flow from Nepal into India. These rivers have high potential for irrigation, hydropower, and flood control, making water cooperation very important for both countries.

Cooperation is based on key agreements like the Koshi Agreement (1954), Gandak Agreement (1959), and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). These agreements aimed to manage floods, improve irrigation, and develop hydropower through joint efforts.

• The Koshi Agreement (1954) focused mainly on flood control and the construction of the Koshi barrage.
• The Gandak Agreement (1959) aimed at irrigation development through the Gandak barrage system.
• Later, the Mahakali Treaty (1996) provided a more integrated framework for the shared use of river waters, including irrigation, hydropower, and flood management.

A major project under the Mahakali Treaty is the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, designed for electricity generation, irrigation, and flood management. It is considered a flagship project of India–Nepal water cooperation.

However, progress has been slow due to differences over benefit sharing, concerns related to sovereignty, and repeated implementation delays. Political and technical issues have also affected smooth execution of projects.

Overall, India–Nepal water relations show strong potential based on shared rivers, but weak implementation due to political and operational challenges.

India–Bhutan Water Diplomacy 

India–Bhutan water relations are based on a simple and successful idea of using rivers for hydropower development and mutual benefit. Bhutan has rich Himalayan rivers with strong hydropower potential, and India has supported their development over the years.

• Under this cooperation, India provides financial support, investment, and technical expertise, while Bhutan builds hydropower projects and sells electricity mainly to India. This creates a stable partnership where both countries benefit.
• Key projects include the Chukha Hydropower Project, which started this cooperation model, followed by the Tala Hydroelectric Project, and the ongoing Punatsangchhu projects, which further increase power generation capacity.
• Hydropower has become very important for Bhutan’s economy, as electricity exports form a major source of national income. For India, it helps in getting clean, reliable, and cost-effective energy, especially for the Northeast region.

India’s Water Diplomacy Strategy and Approach

India’s Water Diplomacy is a mix of cooperation, treaty-based management, and strategic use of water as a national security tool in relations with neighbouring countries.

• Bilateral treaty-based approach: India manages most transboundary rivers through bilateral treaties like the Indus Waters Treaty (Pakistan), Ganga Water Treaty (Bangladesh), and Mahakali Treaty (Nepal). These ensure structured water sharing and reduce conflict.
• Cooperation for regional stability: India generally prefers stable and peaceful water relations, even if it means accepting limits on its own river use under treaty obligations. This helps maintain long-term regional balance.
  • For example, under the Indus Waters Treaty, India accepted limits on using western rivers to maintain peace with Pakistan.
• Dual Riparian Position: India’s dual riparian position means it is upstream for Pakistan and Bangladesh but downstream for China, so it follows a cooperative, treaty-based approach where it has advantage, and a defensive, security-focused approach where it is dependent on upstream flows, making its water diplomacy context-specific and balanced.
• Hydropower cooperation model: With countries like Bhutan, India follows a hydropower-based cooperation model, where it invests in projects, shares benefits, and imports clean electricity. This is a successful win–win approach.
• Shift towards strategic approach: India’s water diplomacy is slowly shifting from only cooperation to a more security-oriented and strategic approach, where water is also linked with national interest and geopolitical concerns.
• China factor (hydro-hegemony challenge): China’s control over upstream rivers like Brahmaputra and lack of binding treaties increases India’s vulnerability. This pushes India to treat water as a strategic security issue, not just an environmental one.

Recent policy shift

Today, water is increasingly treated as a strategic resource linked to national security, energy needs, and geopolitical leverage. This change is visible in India’s evolving relations with its neighbours.

• In the India–Pakistan case, disputes over projects like Kishenganga and Ratle are no longer seen as purely technical issues. India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance in 2025, following the Pahalgam attack, shows that water cooperation is now linked with broader security concerns. Even earlier, the January 2023 notice for treaty modification indicated this shift was already underway.
• In the India–Bangladesh context, the Teesta dispute and upcoming Ganga Water Treaty renewal (2026) highlight a more interest-driven approach. India is now explicitly balancing Bangladesh’s water demands with domestic priorities of states like West Bengal and Bihar, showing that internal politics strongly influence external water diplomacy.
• In the India–China relationship, India is moving away from dependence on limited and expired data-sharing arrangements. Instead, it is investing in independent satellite monitoring, early warning systems, and the Upper Siang hydropower project, reflecting a shift towards strategic self-reliance and risk reduction in the Brahmaputra basin.

Overall, India’s recent policy shift reflects a more realist water diplomacy model, where cooperation continues, but is increasingly guided by national interest, security concerns, and domestic constraints.

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Institutional & Legal Framework

India’s water diplomacy is supported by a mix of bilateral institutions and international legal principles. However, most mechanisms remain weak, treaty-based, and dependent on political relations rather than strong enforcement systems.

Bilateral Institutions

India’s water diplomacy is operationalised through key bilateral institutions that facilitate coordination, data sharing, and dispute management in transboundary river systems.

• Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): The Permanent Indus Commission manages India–Pakistan water cooperation under the Indus Waters Treaty. It holds regular meetings to exchange data and address technical issues. However, in recent years, it has become largely non-functional due to the suspension (abeyance) of the treaty framework.
• Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) – India and Bangladesh): The Joint Rivers Commission was established in 1972 to manage shared rivers like the Ganga, Brahmaputra, and Teesta. It plays an important role in flood forecasting, data sharing, and technical coordination. It remains one of the more active bilateral water institutions in South Asia.
• Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) – India and China: The Expert Level Mechanism was created for cooperation on trans-border rivers such as the Brahmaputra and Sutlej. It mainly focuses on hydrological data sharing during flood seasons. However, its functioning has weakened due to the expiry of data-sharing agreements and reduced cooperation from China.

International Legal Framework

India’s water diplomacy is also guided by key international legal principles and conventions that define how shared rivers should be managed, although most of them are not strictly enforceable.

Helsinki Rules (1966)

• The Helsinki Rules are not legally binding but are an important foundation of international water law.
• They introduced the principle of equitable and reasonable use of shared river waters, meaning all riparian countries should get fair access based on need and geography.

UN Watercourses Convention (1997)

• UN Watercourses Convention (1997) provides a legal framework for managing international rivers. 
• It is based on two key ideas: equitable use of water and no significant harm to other countries.
• However, India is not a signatory, which limits its influence in global legal discussions on water disputes.

Harmon Doctrine

• The Harmon Doctrine represents the idea of complete sovereignty of an upstream country over river waters within its territory.
• Although this principle is rejected in modern international law, it helps explain the behaviour of some upstream countries, especially China, in transboundary river management.

India’s Water Diplomacy Key Challenges

India’s water diplomacy faces structural, geopolitical, institutional, and environmental constraints that limit effective management of shared river basins

• China’s upstream control: China controls the origin of major rivers like Brahmaputra, Indus, and Sutlej. No binding treaty and weak data sharing make India highly vulnerable. This strengthens China’s hydro-hegemony.
• India’s dual role problem: India is upstream for Pakistan but downstream for China. Its strong stand on Pakistan may be used as a precedent by China, reducing India’s bargaining power.
• Domestic political hurdles: River agreements like Teesta get delayed due to state-level opposition (West Bengal). This shows the Centre–state conflict in water diplomacy.
• Climate change stress: Existing treaties are based on historical river flow stability. However, glacier retreat, erratic monsoons, and extreme weather events are changing river behaviour, making older agreements less reliable and less adaptive.
• Weak data sharing: China often restricts hydrological data during tensions. This affects India’s flood forecasting and disaster preparedness in the Northeast.
• Infrastructure competition on shared rivers: Upstream countries are increasingly building dams and hydropower projects (especially China on Brahmaputra). This creates strategic anxiety in downstream countries and increases competition over river control.
• Limited legal enforcement: International water law (like Helsinki Rules or UN Watercourses Convention) is weakly enforced. Most principles are non-binding, making compliance dependent on political will rather than legal obligation.
• Absence of regional river governance: South Asia lacks a basin-wide institutional mechanism. Unlike the Mekong River Commission, river management is purely bilateral, limiting coordinated planning, dispute resolution, and ecosystem-based management.

Way Forward

A sustainable and forward-looking approach to India’s Water Diplomacy requires moving beyond fragmented bilateral responses and building a more coordinated, climate-resilient, and strategically balanced framework for managing shared river systems.

• Comprehensive treaty with China: India should negotiate a binding water-sharing treaty with China on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej, replacing weak and expired MoUs with a formal framework that ensures continuous, real-time hydrological data sharing and transparency.
• Resolving Teesta dispute: The Teesta deadlock should be addressed through structured Centre–state coordination, ensuring West Bengal’s water security concerns are resolved so that a balanced and durable agreement with Bangladesh can be finalised.
• Climate-proofing water treaties: Existing agreements, especially the Ganga Water Treaty, should be updated with flexible provisions to handle changing river flows, while future treaties with Nepal must integrate climate change and glacier melt impacts.
• Promoting regional river basin governance: India should lead the creation of a South Asian river basin framework, similar to the Mekong River Commission, to support collective planning, data sharing, and dispute prevention among riparian states.
• Ratifying UN Watercourses Convention (1997): India should consider joining the UN Watercourses Convention to strengthen its legal position in international forums and improve its ability to counter upstream hydro-hegemony, especially from China.
• Expediting Pancheshwar project: The long-pending Pancheshwar Hydropower Project with Nepal should be accelerated to strengthen bilateral trust and establish a model for recognising both power generation and downstream benefits in water-sharing agreements.
• Strengthening early warning systems: India must invest in satellite-based monitoring and advanced hydrological modelling for the Brahmaputra basin to reduce dependence on Chinese data and improve flood forecasting and strategic preparedness.