SHANTI Act and India’s Nuclear Energy Roadmap

SHANTI Act Latest News

• Parliament has enacted the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, replacing older nuclear laws to accelerate nuclear power expansion and attract private participation. 

India’s Nuclear Energy Programme: Background

• Nuclear energy has been a strategic component of India’s long-term energy planning since independence. 
• Guided by Homi Bhabha’s three-stage nuclear programme, India sought energy security while overcoming its limited uranium reserves by eventually using thorium, which is abundantly available domestically.
• At present, nuclear power contributes about 3% of India’s electricity generation, with an installed capacity of 8.8 GW, making it a relatively small but stable and low-carbon energy source. 
• However, meeting India’s growing electricity demand while transitioning to clean energy has renewed focus on expanding nuclear power alongside renewables.

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Existing Legal Framework Before SHANTI

• Before the new Act, India’s nuclear sector was governed by two major laws:
  • Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which restricted nuclear power generation to public sector entities
  • Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010, which imposed liability not only on operators but also allowed recourse against equipment suppliers
• While the CLND Act aimed to protect citizens in case of nuclear accidents, its supplier liability clause discouraged foreign and private companies from investing in India’s nuclear sector. 
• This became a major bottleneck after the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, as international reactor manufacturers remained wary of legal exposure. 

Key Features of the Act

• The SHANTI Act repeals both earlier laws and introduces a consolidated legal framework for nuclear energy development. 
• Its core objective is to scale up nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047, increasing nuclear power’s share in India’s energy mix.
• A major shift under SHANTI is opening the sector to private companies and facilitating foreign investment, while maintaining state oversight on safety and regulation. 
• State-owned utilities are expected to add around 54 GW, with the remaining capacity likely coming from private players.

Changes in Nuclear Liability Provisions

• Safety and liability lie at the heart of nuclear regulation. Under international norms, nuclear plant operators are strictly liable for damages, with immediate compensation to victims, irrespective of fault.
• The earlier CLND Act allowed operators to seek compensation from suppliers if equipment defects caused an accident. 
• SHANTI removes this supplier liability clause and even eliminates the explicit reference to “suppliers,” thereby addressing long-standing concerns of foreign reactor manufacturers.
• The Act introduces a graded liability system based on plant capacity:
  • Rs. 3,000 crore for plants above 3,600 MW
  • Rs. 1,500 crore for 1,500-3,600 MW
  • Rs. 750 crore for 750-1,500 MW
  • Rs. 300 crore for 150-750 MW
  • Rs. 100 crore for plants below 150 MW
• This graded approach aims to reduce risk perception and encourage private investment, though concerns remain about the adequacy of compensation in severe accidents. 

Regulatory Structure and Safety Oversight

• The SHANTI Act gives statutory backing to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), strengthening its legal status. 
• However, the Union government continues to control key aspects such as licensing and appointments, raising questions about regulatory independence.
• Given global nuclear disasters like Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011), safety oversight remains critical, and India’s cautious regulatory approach reflects these historical lessons.

Nuclear Expansion and Small Modular Reactors

• To meet its ambitious targets, India plans to rely significantly on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). 
• These reactors are smaller, factory-built units that can be assembled on-site, potentially reducing construction time.
• However, SMRs require enriched uranium-235, which India lacks in sufficient quantities, and they do not directly support India’s long-term thorium-based vision. 
• They are also costlier per unit of electricity and do not fundamentally solve the problem of radioactive waste.
• Meanwhile, India’s Fast Breeder Reactor, essential for moving to the second stage of the three-stage programme, has faced repeated delays and is now expected to be commissioned only by 2026.

Source : TH