Centre Plans Uniform OBC Creamy Layer Policy Across Jobs

OBC Creamy Layer Equivalence

OBC Creamy Layer Equivalence Latest News

  • The central government is working on ensuring uniform application of the ‘creamy layer’ condition in OBC reservations across different sectors, including central and state government jobs, public sector enterprises, and universities.
  • A proposal—prepared after consultations with multiple ministries, NITI Aayog, and the National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC)—seeks to address anomalies that have emerged from earlier Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) circulars.
  • The move aims to ensure fairness and consistency in determining eligibility for reservation benefits, so that all deserving OBC candidates are treated equally across institutions and services.

The Concept of ‘Creamy Layer’

  • The idea of the creamy layer in OBC reservations originated from the Supreme Court’s Indra Sawhney vs Union of India (1992) judgment. 
  • The Court upheld the Mandal Commission’s recommendations for OBC reservations but ruled that the more affluent and advanced sections among OBCs — called the creamy layer — must be excluded from quota benefits.
  • Following this, the DoPT issued a circular in 1993 specifying who would fall under the creamy layer. 
  • Children of high constitutional functionaries, senior officers in government, PSUs, and armed forces (above certain ranks), as well as those in the professional class, trade, industry, or large property ownership, were excluded.
  • The rules also specified that:
    • Children of parents directly recruited to Group A/Class I posts, or promoted to such posts before age 40, were ineligible.
    • Children of parents both recruited to Group B posts also came under the creamy layer.
    • In the armed forces, only children of officials up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel could avail reservation.
    • For non-government employees, an income/wealth ceiling was applied. 
      • Initially set at ₹1 lakh per year, this has been revised periodically and has stood at ₹8 lakh per annum since 2017
      • Importantly, income from salaries and agriculture is excluded from this limit.
  • Thus, the creamy layer framework ensures that reservation benefits go to the truly disadvantaged sections of OBCs and not to those who are already socially and economically advanced.

Also Check: Difference between Creamy Layer and Non-Creamy Layer of OBC

2004 Clarification on Creamy Layer

  • In 2004, the DoPT recognised gaps in the 1993 criteria, particularly for jobs outside the government sector, and issued a detailed clarification in October 2004. 
  • This aimed to standardise how the creamy layer status was determined for children of those working in non-government organisations.
  • The new rule specified that parental income from salary and other sources (excluding agriculture) would be calculated separately. 
  • If either income stream exceeded the then ceiling of ₹2.5 lakh annually for three consecutive years, the children would be deemed part of the creamy layer and ineligible for OBC reservation benefits.
  • However, during 2004–14, these clarifications were not widely enforced.

Stricter Enforcement Post-2014

  • In late 2014, DoPT began scrutinising caste certificates more rigorously to check their compliance with the 2004 clarification. 
  • This led to significant consequences in recruitment processes.
  • Between the Civil Services Examinations of 2015–2023 (batches 2016–24), the DoPT rejected more than 100 caste certificates of candidates who otherwise qualified as OBCs under the 1993 norms but were categorised as creamy layer under the 2004 criteria.
  • Interestingly, many of these candidates were still accepted as OBCs in other competitive exams based on the same caste certificates, highlighting inconsistencies in enforcement across different recruitment processes.

Efforts to Find ‘Equivalence’ in OBC Creamy Layer

  • The rejection of more than 100 OBC candidates’ caste certificates by DoPT (based on the 2004 clarification) created disputes. 
  • To address this, the government began consultations across ministries and institutions. 
  • The aim is to ensure uniformity and fairness in determining who falls under the creamy layer across sectors like universities, PSUs, and autonomous bodies.

Key Proposals under Consideration

  • University Teachers - Since salaries of assistant professors and above start at Level 10, equivalent to Group A jobs, their children are proposed to be classified as creamy layer.
  • Autonomous and Statutory Bodies - Employees’ positions would be aligned with central government posts based on group, level, and pay scale, to establish parity.
  • University Non-Teaching Staff - Their creamy layer status will also be decided based on group/level/pay scale equivalence with government jobs.
  • State PSU Executives - Proposed to be treated as creamy layer, just like central PSU executives since 2017.
    • However, executives with income within ₹8 lakh (the ceiling for private sector persons) will not be classified as creamy layer.
  • Government-Aided Institutions - Employees will be placed under creamy layer or non-creamy categories depending on the equivalence of their posts, service conditions, and pay scales with central or state governments.

The Likely Beneficiaries of Proposed Changes

  • Benefits for Government Employees’ Families
    • If the proposed reforms are implemented, the children of lower-level government employees with annual salaries above ₹8 lakh will gain the most. 
    • This would correct anomalies where, for instance, children of government teachers enjoy OBC quota benefits, while children of employees in government-aided institutions of similar rank are excluded solely based on income.
  • Addressing State-Level Anomalies
    • Similar inconsistencies exist in state government organisations. 
    • In one highlighted case, the child of an employee working at a fuel pump run by a state-owned oil company was declared creamy layer based on income, despite the post being equivalent to lower-level government jobs.
  • Limited Impact on Private Sector
    • For employees in the private sector, little change is expected. 
    • The proposal acknowledges that establishing ‘equivalence’ in posts and pay in private jobs is extremely difficult due to wide variations. 
    • Thus, their creamy layer status will continue to be decided only on the income/wealth test.

Source: IE | IE

OBC Creamy Layer Equivalence FAQs

Q1: What is the creamy layer concept in OBC reservation?

Ans: It excludes affluent OBC members from reservation benefits to ensure fairness.

Q2: Why is equivalence being considered in creamy layer application?

Ans: To bring uniformity across jobs, PSUs, and educational institutions.

Q3: Which ministries are involved in the OBC creamy layer proposal?

Ans: Social Justice, Education, Law, Labour, DoPT, NITI Aayog, and NCBC.

Q4: Who are most likely to benefit from creamy layer reforms?

Ans: Children of lower-rank government employees with annual salaries above ₹8 lakh.

Q5: What is the current income ceiling for creamy layer exclusion?

Ans: ₹8 lakh annually, excluding salary and agricultural income.

Ending Perpetual Tolling: PAC’s Push for Highway Toll Reforms

Highway Toll Collection Reform

Highway Toll Collection Reform Latest News

  • The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has recommended major reforms to toll collection practices on national highways. 
  • A key proposal is to end the system of perpetual tolling, where tolls continue indefinitely even after the full recovery of construction and maintenance costs.
  • The PAC submitted its report to Parliament recently, highlighting the need for fairness, transparency, and rationalisation in toll collection, ensuring that road users are not overburdened.

Key Recommendations of the PAC on Toll Collection

  • The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has recommended a major overhaul of toll collection practices. 
  • It suggests that toll charges on national highways should be discontinued or reduced once construction costs and maintenance expenses have been fully recovered, ending the practice of perpetual tolling.
  • The committee raised concerns that current practices allow indefinite toll collection regardless of road quality, traffic volume, or affordability. 
  • It proposed the establishment of a specialised regulatory authority to ensure transparency and fairness in toll determination, collection, and regulation.
  • PAC also pointed out that toll charges currently increase annually by a fixed 3% plus partial indexation to the Wholesale Price Index (WPI).
  • However, there is no independent mechanism to verify whether these hikes are justified in relation to actual operational or maintenance costs. 
  • It further recommended that commuters should be reimbursed when road construction disrupts usage.
  • On FASTags, while acknowledging their widespread use, the committee noted that traffic bottlenecks persist due to scanner malfunctions at toll plazas. 
  • It recommended setting up on-site services for motorists to top up, buy, or replace FASTags, ensuring smoother traffic movement.

How Toll is Determined

  • Under Section 7 of the National Highways Act, 1956, the government is empowered to levy fees for services or benefits on national highways, while Section 9 authorises it to frame rules. 
  • Based on this, toll collection is governed by the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection) Rules, 2008.
  • The user fee is based on base rates fixed under these rules, and not directly linked to the cost of highway construction or recovery. 
  • Toll rates increase annually by 3% since April 1, 2008, along with an additional adjustment of 40% of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) rise to cover variable costs of operation and maintenance.
  • Tolls are collected either by the Union government (for publicly funded highways) or by private concessionaires under models like Build-Operate-Transfer (BoT), Toll-Operate-Transfer (ToT), or Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs). 
  • A 2008 amendment allowed toll collection to continue in perpetuity, even after concession periods end, with revenues directed to the Consolidated Fund of India if NHAI manages the highway.
  • Toll revenues have grown significantly, from ₹1,046 crore in 2005-06 to about ₹55,000 crore in 2023-24, of which ₹25,000 crore is transferred to the Consolidated Fund of India, while the rest remains with concessionaires at toll plazas.

Ministry’s Response

  • The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways acknowledged the Public Accounts Committee’s concerns.
  • It confirmed that a comprehensive study with NITI Aayog has been initiated to revise the user fee determination framework.
  • The scope of the study has already been finalised and will consider key factors such as:
    • Vehicle operating costs
    • Damage to highways caused by vehicle use
    • Users’ willingness to pay
  • This reflects the Ministry’s intent to create a fairer and more transparent toll policy aligned with actual costs and user affordability.

Source: TH

Highway Toll Collection Reform FAQs

Q1: Why did PAC review India’s toll collection system?

Ans: PAC flagged perpetual tolling and lack of fairness in highway toll charges.

Q2: What major reform did PAC propose for toll collection?

Ans: Stopping tolls once construction and maintenance costs are fully recovered.

Q3: What role will a new toll authority play?

Ans: It will ensure fairness, transparency, and independent evaluation of tolls.

Q4: What issues did PAC highlight with FASTags?

Ans: Persistent bottlenecks due to faulty scanners at toll plazas.

Q5: How is toll currently determined in India?

Ans: By 2008 NH Fee Rules with 3% annual hikes plus WPI-linked adjustments.

Nominations to Union Territory Assemblies

Union Territory Assemblies

Union Territory Assemblies Latest News

  • The Union Home Ministry informed the J&K High Court that the Lieutenant Governor can nominate five members to the Assembly without ministerial advice, reviving the debate on nominations to Union Territory legislatures.

Introduction

  • The process of nominating members to Union Territory (UT) Assemblies has sparked a renewed debate after the Union Home Ministry submitted an affidavit before the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court.
  • It stated that the Lieutenant Governor (LG) of Jammu & Kashmir can nominate five members to the Legislative Assembly without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
  • This position has revived discussions about the scope of executive power, constitutional principles, and the balance between the Union government and UT administrations.

Constitutional Provisions on Nominations

  • The Indian Constitution envisages nominated members in both Parliament and State legislatures. 
  • While the provision for Anglo-Indian representation in legislatures was abolished in 2020, the Rajya Sabha continues to have 12 nominated members appointed by the President on the advice of the Union Cabinet. 
  • Similarly, Legislative Councils in six States have one-sixth of their members nominated by the Governor based on ministerial advice.
  • In the context of UTs, nominations are guided by specific Parliamentary statutes.
    • Delhi: The Government of NCT of Delhi Act, 1991 provides for 70 elected members, with no nominated MLAs.
    • Puducherry: The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 allows the Union government to nominate up to three members to the Assembly.
    • Jammu & Kashmir: The J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 (amended in 2023) provides 90 elected seats and authorises the LG to nominate five members, including women, Kashmiri migrants, and displaced persons from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Judicial Precedents

  • The nomination process has been tested before the courts multiple times.
  • Puducherry Case (2018): In K. Lakshminarayanan vs Union of India, the Madras High Court upheld the Union government’s power to nominate three members without ministerial advice. 
    • However, it recommended statutory clarity to avoid ambiguity. The Supreme Court later set aside these recommendations while upholding the nominations.
  • Delhi Services Case (2023): In Government of NCT of Delhi vs Union of India, the Supreme Court elaborated on the principle of the “triple chain of command,” ensuring accountability of civil servants to ministers, ministers to legislatures, and legislatures to the electorate. 
    • While not directly related to nominations, this reasoning strengthens the argument for requiring LGs to act on ministerial advice in matters of Assembly composition.

Implications for Democracy

  • The issue assumes importance because UTs with Assemblies have elected governments that are accountable to the people. 
  • When the ruling party at the Centre differs from that in the UT, nominations made unilaterally by the LG or Union government could alter the political balance, potentially converting a majority into a minority government.
  • This is particularly significant in smaller legislatures like J&K (90 seats) and Puducherry (30 seats), where nominated members could influence the stability of elected governments.

Jammu & Kashmir - A Special Case

  • J&K stands apart due to its history of statehood and greater autonomy prior to its reorganisation into a UT in 2019. 
  • Although the Supreme Court upheld this transition, the Union government has assured restoration of statehood in due course. 
  • Given this background, democratic principles suggest that the LG’s power to nominate should ideally be exercised on the advice of the elected Council of Ministers, rather than independently.

Way Forward

  • To avoid constitutional ambiguity and political friction, the following measures are necessary:
    • Statutory Clarity - Parliament should amend relevant laws to define the procedure and authority for nominations unambiguously.
    • Democratic Safeguards - Nominations should not undermine electoral mandates or alter Assembly majorities.
    • Advisory Role of Council of Ministers - LGs should generally act on ministerial advice to preserve representative democracy.
    • Case-Specific Adaptations - J&K’s unique political context requires sensitive handling to ensure legitimacy and fairness in nominations.

Source: TH

Union Territory Assemblies FAQs

Q1: Who has the power to nominate members to the J&K Assembly?

Ans: The J&K Lieutenant Governor can nominate up to five members as per the Reorganisation Act, 2019.

Q2: How many members can be nominated to the Puducherry Assembly?

Ans: The Union government can nominate up to three members to the Puducherry Assembly.

Q3: Does the Delhi Assembly have nominated members?

Ans: No, the Delhi Assembly has only 70 elected members with no nominated MLAs.

Q4: What did the Supreme Court’s ‘triple chain of command’ principle establish?

Ans: It established accountability of civil servants to ministers, ministers to legislatures, and legislatures to the electorate.

Q5: Why is the nomination issue significant for UTs?

Ans: In smaller assemblies like J&K and Puducherry, nominated members can influence majority equations, impacting democratic stability.

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