UPSC Mains Current Affairs for 21 November 2025

High Pendency and Staffing Gaps in Juvenile Justice Boards

November 21, 2025

Juvenile Justice Latest News

A first-of-its-kind study by the India Justice Report (IJR) has revealed that more than 55% of cases before India’s Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) were pending as of October 31, 2023, highlighting systemic gaps in staffing, data management, and infrastructure.
The findings, based on over 250 RTI responses from 21 States, show that JJBs have disposed of less than half of 1,00,904 cases filed before them.

Status of Juvenile Justice Boards Across India

According to the IJR study, while 92% of India’s 765 districts have constituted JJBs, the pendency rate is alarmingly high and varies widely:
- Odisha: 83% pendency
- Karnataka: 35% pendency
- National Average: 55% pendency
Moreover, 24% of JJBs are not fully constituted, and 30% lack an attached legal services clinic, both essential for delivering child-centric justice.

Findings from the India Justice Report Study

The report titled “Justice and Children in Conflict with the Law: A Study of Capacity at the Frontlines” evaluates the functioning of institutions created under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
High Pendency and Workload
- Each JJB handled an average of 154 pending cases annually, reflecting a serious mismatch in caseload and capacity.
Staffing and Infrastructure Shortfalls
- Major vacancies in JJB positions, particularly social workers and support staff,
- Insufficient funds for training and capacity-building,
- Lack of child-friendly infrastructure in many districts.
- These gaps directly affect the quality and timeliness of hearings.
Poor Data Systems and Transparency
- Unlike the National Judicial Data Grid for courts, no central repository exists for JJB data. RTI responses revealed:
  - 11% of queries were rejected outright,
  - 24% received no reply,
  - Only 36% received complete responses.
High Number of Juveniles Apprehended
- 40,036 juveniles were apprehended in 31,365 cases,
- Over 75% were aged 16-18 years, indicating a rising trend of older adolescents entering the justice system.

Structural Gaps in the Juvenile Justice Architecture

The IJR study highlights that despite a decade since the JJ Act 2015, the decentralised juvenile justice architecture remains weak:
Inter-Agency Coordination Deficit
- The four nodal agencies, Police, Department of Women & Child Development, State Child Protection Society (SCPS), and State Legal Services Authority (SLSA), often operate in silos.
- More than 500 RTI queries were submitted across 28 States and 2 UTs, covering 530 districts. The fragmented responses reflect poor coordination and monitoring.
Inadequate Legal Support
- With 30% of JJBs lacking legal aid clinics, many children face the system without proper defence representation, contrary to the child-centric principles of the JJ Act.
Vacancies in Child Care Institutions
- Not just JJBs, but even child care institutions suffer from significant staff shortages, affecting rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.

Way Forward

To strengthen the juvenile justice ecosystem, experts recommend:
- Establishing a National Juvenile Justice Data Grid,
- Filling vacancies across JJBs and child care institutions,
- Ensuring the availability of legal aid services in all districts,
- Enhancing inter-agency data sharing,
- Increasing budgetary allocations for child protection services,
- Regular monitoring and public reporting of JJB functioning.
Such reforms are essential for safeguarding children in conflict with the law and ensuring a fair, timely, and child-friendly justice process.

Source: TH

Juvenile Justice FAQs

Q1: What percentage of cases before JJBs are pending?

Ans: Over 55% of cases were pending as of October 31, 2023.

Q2: How many JJBs are not fully staffed?

Ans: 24% of JJBs were not fully constituted, indicating significant vacancies.

Q3: What challenges do JJBs face in providing legal aid?

Ans: About 30% of JJBs lack an attached legal services clinic.

Q4: How many juveniles were apprehended in 2023?

Ans: 40,036 juveniles were apprehended in 31,365 cases nationwide.

Q5: What key structural gap did the IJR highlight?

Ans: The absence of a central, standardised national data system for monitoring JJBs.

India’s Proposed CAFE 3 Norms and the Auto Industry Split

November 21, 2025

CAFE 3 Norms Latest News

India plans to implement the third phase of Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE 3) norms from FY28–FY32 to improve fuel efficiency and reduce carbon emissions from passenger vehicles.
However, the weight-based structure of the new norms has triggered significant disagreement within the auto industry, especially between manufacturers of small cars and those with a portfolio dominated by heavier SUVs.

Background

What are CAFE norms?

- CAFE norms regulate average fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions across a manufacturer’s fleet.
- It proposes a movement from the current Modified Indian Driving Cycle (MIDC) to the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), which the European Union adopted in 2018.
- India follows a weight-based formula that becomes progressively stricter each year.
CAFE 3:
- It introduces a new weight-based efficiency formula - 0.002 × (W − 1170) + c.
- Here W is the average fleet weight, 1,170kg is the fixed constant for weight, 0.002 is a fixed constant multiplier, and ‘c’ is a constant that changes every year.
- Since ‘c’ continues to decrease from FY28 to FY32, the rules will become stricter over time.

Why the Industry Is Divided

Impact of the weight-based formula:
- Lighter cars face steeper efficiency improvements than heavier ones.
- Example: A 740 kg car needs to become 48% more efficient by FY32. A 2,500 kg SUV needs only 25% improvement, despite higher absolute emissions.
- Result: Greater regulatory burden on small, budget cars.
Small-car manufacturers’ concerns:
- Disproportionate impact: Small cars operate on low margins and cannot easily absorb the cost of: hybrid systems, electrification, lightweighting technologies.
- Consumers may be priced out: Stricter norms may raise costs of entry-level cars. Could discourage first-time buyers and shrink the affordable car segment.
- Distortion of CAFE’s original intent: Maruti Suzuki argues CAFE was meant to push big cars to improve fuel efficiency, not punish small cars.
Why some carmakers support CAFE 3:
- Tata Motors’ stance: Claims no concerns in achieving the norms. Rejects weight-based definitions of small cars as “Arbitrary”, potentially compromising safety standards.
- Others (Mahindra, Tata): Oppose higher exemptions for lighter cars.

Comparison With Global Norms

Relaxed standards for smaller cars in many countries like the US, China, Japan, and South Korea.
Europe: Stricter norms overall, but smaller cars have relaxed CO₂ targets, while larger vehicles have tougher benchmarks.
India’s system is the opposite, creating a regulatory imbalance.

Key Technical Issues

“Brick in the Boot” concern:
- Manufacturers may artificially increase weight to enter a more relaxed efficiency band.
- May lead to production of bigger, heavier cars; reduced affordability; and increased emissions in absolute terms.
Relaxation for small cars:
- Debate on the 3 g CO₂/km relaxation for small cars with mass (≤ 909 kg), engine (≤ 1200 cc), length (≤ 4,000 mm).
- Maruti and Renault want more relaxation.
- Tata and Mahindra oppose increasing it.
Shift to WLTP: WLTP gives more realistic fuel economy figures than MIDC. Some manufacturers (e.g., Mahindra) requested a delay due to compliance challenges.

Challenges

Threat to small-car market: Rising costs may make entry-level cars unaffordable. Could worsen the market shift toward high-emission SUVs.
Safety vs affordability trade-off: Weight-based relaxation may unintentionally encourage lighter designs at the cost of safety.
Technological feasibility: Small cars have limited scope for expensive efficiency technologies.
Potential loss of first-time buyers: A socially regressive outcome as small cars improve mobility for lower-income groups.
Risk of regulatory distortion: The framework may not truly reduce total CO₂ emissions, only improve averages on paper.

Way Forward

Review of weight-based approach: Consider aligning with global best practices—relaxing norms for lighter cars.
Technology-neutral incentive structure: Encourage all low-carbon technologies - mild hybrids, strong hybrids, EVs, cleaner ICE improvements.
Gradual phase-in of WLTP: Provide adequate transition time for manufacturers.
Targeting real emission reduction: Shift toward absolute emissions caps instead of purely weight-based formulas.
Policy support for small cars: Financial incentives or tax benefits to protect the budget segment.

Conclusion

The proposed CAFE 3 norms mark a critical step in India’s low-carbon mobility transition.
However, their weight-based structure disproportionately burdens small cars, risks market distortions, and may undermine affordability for first-time buyers—contrary to the objective of inclusive and sustainable mobility.
A balanced, evidence-based recalibration that ensures environmental integrity while protecting the small-car segment is essential for achieving India's long-term climate and mobility goals.

Source: IE

CAFE 3 Norms FAQs

Q1: What are the key reasons behind the auto industry’s divide over India’s proposed CAFE 3 norms (FY28–FY32)?

Ans: The divide stems from the weight-based formula that places a disproportionate efficiency burden on lightweight, budget cars.

Q2: How the proposed CAFE 3 norms could impact the affordability of India’s small-car segment?

Ans: By requiring up to 48% efficiency improvement in small cars, the norms may raise costs.

Q3: What are the global emission frameworks?

Ans: Unlike the US, China, Japan, and Europe—which relax norms for smaller cars—India’s framework penalizes them.

Q4: What are the concerns related to shifting from the MIDC to WLTP under CAFE 3?

Ans: WLTP provides more accurate real-world emission readings, but manufacturers fear compliance challenges and seek more transition time.

Q5: What policy measures can balance emission reduction goals under the CAFE 3 regime?

Ans: Revising weight-based targets, offering small-car incentives, adopting technology-neutral standards, and phasing WLTP gradually.

Immigrants Expulsion Act 1950 Explained: Assam’s First Deportation Orders

November 21, 2025

Immigrants Expulsion Act 1950 Latest News

Assam has invoked the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 for the first time since the state cabinet approved its use earlier this year.
The Sonitpur district administration has ordered five people—four women and one man—who were declared foreigners by a tribunal in 2024, to leave India within 24 hours.
However, the individuals are currently untraceable, with police stating they have been “absconding,” and locals claiming they left the area over a decade ago.

About Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950

The Immigrants Expulsion from Assam Act (IEAA) was enacted on March 1, 1950, in response to the Assam government’s demand for a legal mechanism to control large-scale migration from East Pakistan after Partition.
Migration had already become a major political and demographic concern in the state.

Why the Centre Drafted the Law

Since citizenship is a Union subject, the Central government drafted the Act and delegated specific powers to Assam.
Originally, it was even named the Undesirable Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, highlighting its intent.
Recognising post-Partition instability, the Act excluded refugees, stating that people displaced due to “civil disturbances” in Pakistan would not be subject to expulsion under the law.

Powers Granted Under the Act

The Act empowered the Centre to order anyone:
- who was ordinarily a resident outside India,
- who entered Assam before or after 1950, and
- whose presence was deemed “detrimental” to India’s general public or to any Scheduled Tribe in Assam,
to remove themselves from Assam or India within a specified time and through a designated route.
The law authorised any officer of the Union government or Assam government to implement these expulsion orders.

Application of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950

The Act was applied only briefly. Its enforcement faced practical and political challenges almost immediately after it came into effect.

Communal Tension and Mass Exodus

Historians note that while the Act was being finalised, communal violence in Lower Assam led to 40,000 to 1 lakh Muslims fleeing to East Pakistan.
This made identification of “immigrants” difficult because many affected individuals were actually Assam’s original residents, especially Bengali Muslims.
A triggering incident involved an old Assamese Muslim resident being ordered to leave within three days, which angered the then PM Nehru.
He objected to the implementation of such orders during a sensitive time.

Nehru–Liaquat Pact Influence

The timing coincided with the Nehru–Liaquat Pact (April 1950), aimed at safeguarding minorities in both India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s PM Liaquat Ali Khan raised concerns about Assam’s expulsion orders.

Centre Orders Suspension of the Act

On April 10, 1950, two days after the pact, Nehru wrote to the then Assam CM Gopinath Bordoloi instructing him to stop all action under the IEAA.
Nehru stressed that minority safety and restoring peace were the top priorities — continuing expulsions would worsen tensions.
Historical accounts suggest that only a few hundred people were actually impacted by the Act before its enforcement was halted.

Source: IE | TH | N18

Immigrants Expulsion Act 1950 FAQs

Q1: What triggered Assam’s use of the Immigrants Expulsion Act, 1950 in 2025?

Ans: Assam used the Act after five people were declared foreigners by a tribunal. Sonitpur administration ordered them to leave India within 24 hours, marking the Act's first known invocation in decades.

Q2: What powers does the Immigrants Expulsion Act, 1950 give to authorities?

Ans: The Act allows the Centre or authorised officers to expel persons from Assam or India if their presence is deemed detrimental to public interest or tribal communities.

Q3: Why was the Act originally enacted in 1950?

Ans: It was enacted to manage post-Partition migration from East Pakistan and give Assam a legal mechanism to expel “undesirable immigrants,” excluding refugees fleeing civil disturbances.

Q4: Why was the Act’s implementation stopped soon after it began?

Ans: Communal tensions, mass displacement, and concerns raised under the Nehru–Liaquat Pact led Prime Minister Nehru to suspend all expulsion actions to safeguard minorities.

Q5: How widely was the Act used before its current revival?

Ans: Historical accounts indicate the Act affected only a few hundred people before its enforcement was halted in 1950, making its 2025 use the first in decades.

Supreme Court Clarifies Governor’s Powers on State Bills and Legislative Assent

November 21, 2025

Governor’s Powers Latest News

The Supreme Court ruled that Governors cannot hold on to state legislature Bills indefinitely, emphasising that cooperative federalism requires constructive engagement with elected governments, not obstruction.
However, the Constitution Bench also held that courts cannot impose fixed timelines on Governors or the President for granting assent, nor can they create a doctrine of “deemed assent” or force the President to seek judicial advice on pending Bills.
The five-judge Bench—headed by Chief Justice B R Gavai—gave this opinion on a presidential reference asking whether constitutional courts could set deadlines for action under Articles 200 and 201, which deal with gubernatorial and presidential assent to Bills.

Background of the Presidential Reference: Why the Issue Reached the Supreme Court

President Droupadi Murmu invoked Article 143(1) to seek the Supreme Court’s advice after controversy arose over delays by Governors and the President in acting on state Bills.
The trigger was an April 8 judgment in a Tamil Nadu case, where a two-judge Bench laid down strict timelines for Governors and the President to decide on Bills.
It also used Article 142 and declared 10 Tamil Nadu Bills as having received “deemed assent” because the Governor had not acted for long periods.
This unprecedented move raised constitutional concerns.
To resolve the ambiguity, the President submitted a five-page reference with 14 key questions.
These questions asked:
- whether courts can impose deadlines on constitutional authorities,
- whether “deemed assent” is valid, and
- what limits govern gubernatorial and presidential powers under Articles 200 and 201.

Supreme Court’s Stand on 14 Key Questions on Governor–President Powers

Governor’s Options on Bills Under Article 200 - The Court held that a Governor has only three options: Grant assent; Reserve the Bill for the President. Withhold assent by returning the Bill for reconsideration. There is no power to withhold assent indefinitely.
- Article 200 - Governor’s Assent to State Bills

Governor’s Discretion Under Article 200 - The Governor is not bound by the Cabinet’s advice when deciding on assent, return, or reservation of Bills. This function involves independent constitutional discretion.

Justiciability of Governor’s Actions - Courts cannot review the merits of the Governor’s decision, but prolonged, unexplained inaction is justiciable. The Court may direct the Governor to act.
Article 361 Immunity Not Absolute - Article 361 protects the individual Governor, not the institutional office. Immunity cannot be used to justify indefinite delays.
- Article 361 (Immunity of President and Governors) - Provides personal immunity to the President and Governors from court proceedings during their term, ensuring unhindered functioning in their constitutional roles.
No Court-Imposed Timelines on Governor - Courts cannot prescribe deadlines for Governors to act on Bills. Article 200’s phrase “as soon as possible” does not permit fixed judicial timelines.
President’s Discretion Under Article 201 - The President’s merit-based decision on assent or withholding assent to state Bills is not open to judicial review.
No Timelines for President Either - Courts cannot fix time limits for the President under Article 201.
- Article 201 – President’s Assent to Reserved Bills
President Not Required to Seek SC Opinion - The President need not consult the Supreme Court under Article 143 whenever a Bill is reserved for consideration.
- Article 143 (Presidential Reference to Supreme Court) - Allows the President to seek the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on significant questions of law or fact. The Court’s advice is not binding; the President may accept or reject it.
Courts Cannot Review Bills Before They Become Law - Judicial review applies only to laws, not Bills. Courts cannot examine the content or validity of a pending Bill.
Article 142 Cannot Substitute Constitutional Powers - The Supreme Court cannot use Article 142 to create “deemed assent” or otherwise replace the Governor/President’s constitutional role.
No Law Without Governor’s/President’s Assent - A Bill cannot become law unless the Governor or President formally grants assent.
No Answer on Mandatory Referral Under Article 145(3) - The Court declined to answer whether all issues requiring constitutional interpretation must first be tested under Article 145(3).
- Article 145(3) (Constitution Bench Requirement) - Mandates that a Bench of at least five judges must hear cases involving substantial questions of constitutional interpretation or any Presidential Reference under Article 143.
Scope of Article 142 - The Court refused a broad interpretation but reiterated that Article 142 cannot override the Constitution, especially requirements like legislative assent.
- Article 142 (Complete Justice Provision) - Empowers the Supreme Court to issue any order necessary to ensure complete justice in cases before it.
On Article 131 Jurisdiction - The Court declined to answer whether Article 131 is the exclusive route for resolving Centre–State disputes.
- Article 131 (Centre–State Disputes) - Grants the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate legal disputes between the Union and States or among States themselves.
No Judicial Substitution of Executive Power - Reaffirming earlier answers, the Court clarified that judicial powers cannot replace or replicate constitutionally assigned executive functions.

Source: IE | ToI | NDTV

Governor’s Powers FAQs

Q1: What did the Supreme Court say about Governors delaying Bills?

Ans: The Court ruled that Governors cannot sit indefinitely on Bills. They must either assent, reserve for the President, or return the Bill, ensuring no prolonged constitutional inaction.

Q2: Can courts impose fixed timelines on Governors or the President?

Ans: No. The Court held that judiciary cannot prescribe deadlines for constitutional authorities. Articles 200 and 201 require action “as soon as possible,” not within rigid judicial timeframes.

Q3: Is “deemed assent” constitutionally valid?

Ans: No. The Court rejected the doctrine of deemed assent, ruling that Article 142 cannot be used to bypass the Governor or President’s constitutional role in granting assent.

Q4: Can courts review the Governor’s or President’s decisions?

Ans: Courts cannot review merits of discretion, but they can intervene in cases of prolonged, unexplained inaction. Judicial review applies only to inaction, not decision-making wisdom.

Q5: Is the Governor bound by the Council of Ministers while giving assent?

Ans: No. The Court clarified that Governors exercise independent constitutional discretion under Article 200. They are not bound by ministerial advice when deciding on assent or reconsideration.