Citizenship Scrutiny – EC Outlines Its Constitutional Powers

Citizenship Scrutiny

Citizenship Scrutiny Latest News

  • The Election Commission of India (ECI) has informed the Supreme Court that the Union Government’s citizenship-related powers are “limited’’ and do not override the Commission’s constitutional authority to verify citizenship for the purposes of electoral roll maintenance. 
  • This clarification came amid challenges by Opposition parties to the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process. 

Background

  • Opposition parties in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal have argued that the ECI is effectively conducting a citizenship screening exercise akin to a “de novo National Register of Citizens”, alleging that only the Centre has exclusive authority to determine citizenship. 
  • The ECI, however, has strongly refuted these claims in its 184-page affidavit. 
  • The heart of the dispute revolves around the constitutional and statutory overlap between the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Representation of the People Act (ROPA), 1950, especially in the context of voter eligibility under Article 326.

The ECI’s Clarification on the Limits of Central Authority

  • Section 9 of the Citizenship Act and the Centre’s “Limited Role’’
    • The ECI’s affidavit references Section 9 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which deals with the termination of citizenship when an Indian citizen voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship. 
    • According to the ECI, this section grants the Centre the power to determine “when or how” an individual acquired foreign citizenship, and only for this purpose. 
    • In other words, the Centre’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing foreign citizenship acquisition and deciding whether Indian citizenship should be terminated. 
    • This does not bar other authorities, including the ECI, from examining other citizenship-related aspects for electoral roll purposes.
    • ECI’s Constitutional Mandate to Assess Citizenship
  • Powers under Articles 324 and 326
    • The ECI asserts that its authority to assess citizenship arises directly from Article 324, which vests the Commission with plenary powers of “superintendence, direction, and control” over elections, and from Article 326, which specifies Indian citizenship as a prerequisite for voter registration. 
    • The Commission also argued that even Parliament’s authority to enact laws on elections under Article 327 cannot curtail the Commission’s constitutional mandate.
  • Role of ROPA, 1950
    • Section 16 explicitly disqualifies non-citizens from being included in the electoral rolls.
    • Section 19 requires electors to be ordinarily resident in the constituency where they seek registration.
  • Therefore, evaluating citizenship status is an intrinsic duty of the ECI when updating electoral rolls.

Understanding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

  • Purpose and Legal Basis
    • The SIR exercise is carried out under Section 21(3) of ROPA, which mandates an “intense” revision whenever “felt necessities’’ arise, such as concerns over inaccurate or inflated rolls. 
    • The ECI clarified that the SIR is not a citizenship determination exercise but a voter list purification exercise, essential to ensuring the integrity of electoral rolls, considered a Basic Feature of the Constitution linked to free and fair elections.
  • Process of Verification
    • The Commission stated that electors are only required to sign pre-filled enumeration forms (EFs) delivered to their homes by Booth Level Officers, a minimal and voter-friendly requirement. 
    • The burden is not being shifted to electors, as alleged; rather, the process ensures that voters who cannot be traced to previous revisions (such as the 2002 SIR) can confirm their eligibility. 

ECI’s Rationale for Conducting SIR

  • The ECI emphasised the need for accurate electoral rolls not just for enrolment but for ensuring that voters are able to reach polling stations and cast votes.
  • Thus, the following must be removed from voter lists:
    • Dead persons
    • Those who have permanently shifted
    • Non-citizens
  • This ensures that the electoral roll reflects only eligible, traceable voters. 

Opposition’s Concerns and ECI’s Response

  • Opposition parties have claimed that SIR is unconstitutional and duplicates functions reserved for the Union Government. 
  • They have also criticised the requirement of filling out or signing forms as burdensome.
  • The ECI rejected these arguments, maintaining that:
    • SIR is constitutional and necessary,
    • Proof sought from electors is limited to ensuring eligibility for voter lists.
    • It is not an NRC-like exercise nor an attempt to determine citizenship status beyond electoral purposes. 

Source: TH

Citizenship Scrutiny FAQs

Q1: What did the ECI clarify regarding the Centre’s citizenship powers?

Ans: The ECI stated that the Centre’s powers are limited to reviewing voluntary foreign citizenship acquisition.

Q2: Why is the ECI allowed to check citizenship?

Ans: Citizenship verification is essential under Articles 324 and 326 for voter roll inclusion.

Q3: Is the SIR an NRC-type exercise?

Ans: No, the ECI maintains SIR is only for voter list accuracy, not citizenship determination.

Q4: What legal provision governs the SIR process?

Ans: SIR is conducted under Section 21(3) of ROPA 1950.

Q5: Why must voters sign enumeration forms?

Ans: To confirm eligibility and ensure their continued inclusion in updated electoral rolls.

Parliamentary Decline in India – Shrinking Deliberation and Rising Executive Dominance

Parliamentary Decline in India

Parliamentary Decline in India Latest News

  • The Winter Session of Parliament begins amid a potential deadlock over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.
  • There are persistent concerns about legislative dysfunction, erosion of parliamentary deliberation, and the growing imbalance between the executive and the legislature.
  • This highlights a structural decline in productivity and oversight functions of Parliament across several Lok Sabhas.

Declining Health of Parliament

  • Routine disruptions and falling productivity: According to the PRS Legislative Research’s monsoon session data (between July 21 and August 21) - 
    • The Lok Sabha (LS) functioned just 29% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha (RS) for 34%. 
    • Question Hour, the institution's core mechanisms of accountability, were also badly hit (LS completing only 23% while the RS managed only 6% of its scheduled Question Hour time).
  • Bills passed with minimal debate:
    • Regulation of Online Gaming Bill: Cleared in one day, with 6 minutes (LS) and 23 minutes (RS) of discussion.
    • Merchant Shipping Bill 2024: 20 minutes (LS), 10 minutes (RS).
    • Operation Sindoor: 50% of LS time spent on it alone.

Institutional Concerns Raised

  • Warnings from constitutional experts:
    • P. D. T. Achary: Declining deliberation undermines the “very purpose of Parliament”. Passage of Bills without debate is a “mockery of legislative business” under Article 107. He advocates dialogue between the PM and Leader of Opposition.
  • Views from MPs:
    • Manish Tewari (Congress): Parliament became a rubber-stamp legislature. Standing Committees becoming redundant. Presiding officers’ neutrality diminishing.
    • Syed Naseer Husain (Congress): The government holds primary responsibility for enabling debate. Opposition protests when discussions are denied.
  • Government’s position: Opposition blamed for disruptions, driven by “failed leaders”.

What the Number Indicate

  • Short-term variability:
    • Exceptionally high productivity in Budget Sessions 2023 and 2024 (111% LS, 112% RS).
    • Sharp drop again in Winter Session 2024 (52% LS, 39% RS).
  • Long-term structural decline - 17th Lok Sabha (2019–2024):
    • The Lok Sabha functioned for 88% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha 73%. 
    • However, this came with the fewest sittings of any full-term Lok Sabha since 1952 due to Covid-19 (met only 33 days in 2020).
    • 11 of its 15 sessions were adjourned early, and it became the first Lok Sabha without a Deputy Speaker (absent even in the 18th LS). 
  • Historical decline in sittings:
    • 1952–1970: 121 days/year (1st LS - 135 days/year)
    • Since 2000: 68 days/year
    • 17th Lok Sabha: 55 days/year
  • Committee scrutiny weakened: Bills referred to committees - Over 60% in the 14th and 15th LS, around 20% in the 16th and 17th LS.
  • Cross-government trend:
    • Decline is not limited to one party or era.
    • Example: 15th Lok Sabha (UPA-2) performed poorly (61% LS; 66% RS). The 13th and 14th Lok Sabha performed significantly better (91% and 87%).

Deeper Causes of Institutional Erosion

  • Anti-Defection Law:
    • From stability to suppression: Intended to curb defections, the law now erodes independence of MPs. MPs function as subjects of party whip, not representatives of people.
    • It affects power of the purse (the foundational principle that no tax can be levied), impeachment of a president or a judge (when members are expected to act as jurors, weighing evidence with impartiality), and legislative autonomy.
  • Executive dominance over legislature: Parliament becoming an approval body rather than a deliberative body. Opposition’s notices, adjournment motions often dismissed; question hour and zero hour frequently disrupted; committees weakened, reducing expert scrutiny.
  • Erosion of constitutional offices’ neutrality: Presiding officers perceived as partisan. Constitutional conventions not upheld resulting in institutional imbalance.

Comparative Perspective - Westminster Model vs India

  • Historical roots:
    • Oxford Parliament of 1258: Established executive accountability to the legislature.
  • UK and Commonwealth nations:
    • PM’s Questions ensure that the head of government is held to account on a direct, weekly and public basis.
    • Strong committee oversight.
    • Mandatory testimony by executive officials.
  • India’s divergence:
    • Reversal of the Westminster model’s spirit.
    • Decline in oversight, lack of routine accountability from executives.

Challenges and Way Forward

  • Breakdown in government–Opposition communication: Dialogue mechanisms between PM, LoP, and House leaders.
  • Declining sittings and productivity: Mandatory minimum sittings (e.g., 120 days/year) to prevent rushed legislation without debate.
  • Weakening of Standing Committees: Make committee referral mandatory for all major Bills. Enhance transparency and expert consultation.
  • Absence of Deputy Speaker (Constitutional requirement under Article 93): Strengthen conventions on Deputy Speaker election.
  • Dominance of party whip due to anti-defection law: Limit whips to confidence motions and money bills. Restore legislative independence and conscience vote.
  • Partisanship of presiding officers: Clear norms for impartial conduct of Speaker and Chairperson.
  • Marginalisation of Question Hour and Zero Hour: Ensure full Question Hour and functioning of Zero Hour.
  • Institutional imbalance favouring the executive:  Institutionalise Prime Minister’s Question Hour (weekly). Require executive testimony before committees.

Conclusion

  • The decline of parliamentary functioning in India is not a partisan or episodic problem but a structural erosion decades in the making. This has hollowed out the legislature’s constitutional role as the grand inquest of the nation.
  • Reforms are essential to revive the institutional spirit envisioned by the Constitution, without which, India risks reducing Parliament to a symbolic edifice—standing tall, but silent in its duty to hold power accountable to the people.

Source: IE | IE

Parliamentary Decline in India FAQs

Q1: What factors are responsible for the declining deliberative functioning of the Indian Parliament?

Ans: Decline stems from reduced sittings, routine disruptions, rushed legislation, weakened committee scrutiny, anti-defection constraints, etc.

Q2: How has the anti-defection law contributed to the erosion of parliamentary autonomy in India?

Ans: By binding MPs to party whips on most issues, the anti-defection law suppresses individual legislative judgment.

Q3: What is the significance of Parliamentary Standing Committees in legislative oversight?

Ans: They enhance expert scrutiny and bipartisan deliberation, but their relevance is eroding due to fewer Bills being referred.

Q4: What are the trends in parliamentary productivity over recent Lok Sabhas?

Ans: Productivity has steadily fallen with declining sittings and early adjournments, weakening accountability mechanisms like Question Hour.

Q5: What reforms are needed to restore the balance between the executive and the legislature?

Ans: Reforms include revisiting the anti-defection law, ensuring minimum sittings, mandatory committee referral, restoring neutrality of presiding officers, etc.

New Seeds Bill 2025: Mandatory Registration, Stricter Penalties & Key Farmer Concerns

Seeds Bill 2025

Seeds Bill 2025 Latest News

  • The Centre has introduced a new Seeds Bill that mandates compulsory registration of all seed varieties and imposes stricter penalties for violations. 
  • Released by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare recently, the draft legislation aims to modernise and strengthen seed regulation in India, and will replace the existing Seeds Act, 1966 once enacted.

Why India Needs a New Seeds Bill

  • The current Seeds Act regulates only notified seed varieties, and registration is not mandatory. 
  • Several categories — including green manure seeds, commercial crops, and plantation crops — fall outside its scope. 
  • Penalties are outdated and minimal, limited to six months’ imprisonment and a ₹1,000 fine.
  • These regulatory gaps have driven longstanding demand for an updated law. 
  • An earlier attempt in 2004, when a new Seeds Bill was introduced and sent to a Parliamentary committee, did not progress into legislation.

Problem of Spurious and Substandard Seeds in India

  • Complaints about low-quality and fake seeds are frequent, and the Agriculture Ministry has repeatedly highlighted the issue. 
  • Between 2022 and 2025, 43,001 seed samples were found non-standard out of nearly 6 lakh samples tested.
    • West Bengal accounted for the highest share at 62%, followed by Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh.
  • During the same period, authorities also took extensive action: 12,287 warnings, 12,915 stop-sale orders, 1,914 FIRs/cases, and 164 forfeitures, underscoring the scale of the problem.

India’s Annual Seed Requirement and Market Size

  • For 2024–25, India required 48.20 lakh tonnes of seeds, while 53.15 lakh tonnes were available, indicating adequate supply. 
  • The country’s seed market is worth around ₹40,000 crore.
  • Between May 2014 and August 2025, 3,053 new seed varieties were released, with the public sector accounting for 85% of them and the private sector contributing 15%.

Key Features of the New Seeds Bill, 2025

  • The Draft Seeds Bill, 2025 aims to overhaul India’s seed laws by replacing the Seeds Act, 1966 and Seeds Control Order, 1983
  • The government says it will improve seed quality, curb counterfeits, and protect farmers.

Mandatory Registration of Seed Varieties

  • All seed varieties (except traditional farmers’ varieties and export-only seeds) must be registered.
  • Varieties must undergo Value for Cultivation and Use (VCU) testing at multiple locations.
  • Only seeds meeting minimum germination and purity standards can be sold.

Stronger Market Controls and Traceability

  • Seed dealers must obtain a state registration certificate for selling, importing or exporting seeds.
  • Each seed container must carry a QR code generated through the central Seed Traceability Portal.

Easier Compliance for Large Companies

  • A new Central Accreditation System allows nationally accredited firms to operate across states without additional approvals — a move critics say benefits big agribusinesses.

Higher Penalties

  • Minor offences attract fines starting at ₹1 lakh.
  • Major offences, including selling spurious or unregistered seeds, carry penalties of up to ₹30 lakh and three years’ imprisonment.

Farmers’ Rights

  • Farmers may grow, save, exchange, share and sell farm-saved seeds (but not under a brand name).
  • New central and state seeds committees will oversee implementation.

Major Concerns Raised by Critics

  • No Easy Compensation for Farmers - Crop failure due to faulty seeds still requires farmers to seek compensation through courts — an expensive, time-consuming process. Critics say the Bill lacks a farmer-friendly grievance mechanism.
  • Community Seed Keepers Excluded - Collectives like FPOs, women’s seed groups, and traditional seed networks will be treated as commercial entities, subject to heavy compliance burdens. Experts warn this may open doors to biopiracy of India’s genetic resources.
  • Corporate Bias and Digital Burden - VCU trials favour uniform hybrid seeds from big companies, making it harder for indigenous, diverse, climate-resilient varieties to qualify. Mandatory digital reporting, QR tracking and online submissions are difficult for small rural seed keepers with low digital access.
  • Risk of Foreign Seed Entry - Foreign organisations may be recognised for VCU testing. Critics fear this could allow genetically modified or patented seeds into India without strong domestic evaluation. Some warn this could worsen farmer distress and lead to severe social consequences, including higher farmer suicides.

Source: IE | DTE

Seeds Bill 2025 FAQs

Q1: Why does India need a new Seeds Bill?

Ans: The old Seeds Act covers only notified varieties, excludes major crops, and has outdated penalties. Rising cases of fake seeds created urgency for stronger legislation.

Q2: How serious is the issue of substandard seeds in India?

Ans: Between 2022 and 2025, 43,001 seed samples failed quality tests. States issued thousands of warnings and FIRs, showing widespread concerns about seed quality and farmer losses.

Q3: What are the key features of the Seeds Bill 2025?

Ans: Mandatory registration, VCU testing, QR-based traceability, stricter penalties, accreditation for large firms, and explicit recognition of farmers’ rights to save and exchange seeds.

Q4: Why are farmer groups critical of the Bill?

Ans: They argue it favours big companies, burdens small seed keepers with digital compliance, excludes community seed networks, and lacks an easy compensation mechanism for crop losses.

Q5: What market context does the Bill address?

Ans: India requires over 48 lakh tonnes of seeds annually, with a ₹40,000-crore seed market and thousands of new varieties released—demanding stronger regulation and oversight.

IMF C-Grade for India’s GDP Data: What It Means and What Comes Next

IMF Rating on India’s GDP Data

IMF Rating on India’s GDP Data Latest News

  • The IMF’s 2025 annual staff report for India has once again given the country’s national accounts, including GDP data, a C-grade, indicating that the statistics have “some shortcomings” that hinder effective economic surveillance.
  • This assessment comes even as India’s GDP growth unexpectedly rose to 8.2% in July–September, the highest in six quarters and above the 7.8% recorded in April–June. 
  • The stronger-than-expected data has revived familiar questions about the reliability and interpretation of India’s GDP numbers.
  • With the IMF highlighting concerns over statistical quality and economists surprised by the sharp growth, the debate on the credibility and meaning of India’s GDP figures has resurfaced.

Why the IMF Evaluates India’s Data

  • The IMF assesses India’s economic statistics as part of its annual Article IV consultations, during which an IMF team visits the country, reviews economic developments, and prepares a detailed report. 
  • This includes a Data Adequacy Assessment to judge whether India’s data is sufficient for effective economic surveillance.

What the IMF Said in Its 2025 Assessment

  • The IMF stated that India would benefit from better quality, availability, and timeliness of macroeconomic and financial statistics to support policymaking.
  • While acknowledging India’s efforts to update GDP and CPI series, the IMF recommended:
    • Regular revisions of national accounts and price indices
    • Conducting the overdue population census on priority
    • Timely publication of combined Centre–State fiscal data
    • Improvements in coverage and consistency of key statistics
  • India responded that improvements were underway, with new GDP and CPI series expected in February 2026, and argued that this warranted higher ratings.

Ratings Given by IMF

  • Despite India’s submissions, the IMF retained the same ratings as in 2024:
    • National accounts: C grade
    • All other categories: B grade
    • Overall rating: B

What the IMF Grades Mean

  • IMF ratings run from A to D:
    • A – Data fully adequate for surveillance
    • B – Data broadly adequate, with some shortcomings
    • C – Data has shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance
    • D – Data has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance
  • India’s C rating for national accounts means the IMF sees notable issues in GDP data coverage, granularity, or methodology that limit robust analysis, even though other datasets are broadly acceptable.

IMF Ratings Before 2024: How India’s Data Was Seen

  • The IMF introduced its four-tier data adequacy rating system only in 2024. India received a B overall rating that year for the first time.
  • Before this system, India’s data was described as:
    • “Broadly adequate” from 2017 to 2023
    • “Adequate for surveillance” in 2016
    • This shows a gradual decline in confidence over time.

Why 2015 Became a Turning Point

  • India last updated its GDP base year in 2015, shifting to the 2011–12 series.
  • The new numbers surprised economists and even IMF staff, who noted:
    • Large revisions to historical data
    • Short time span of the new series
    • Major discrepancies between GDP by activity and GDP by expenditure
  • These issues complicated economic interpretation and contributed to growing concerns about data reliability.

Reasons Behind the IMF’s Gradual Downgrade

  • In 2023, IMF staff said the 2011–12 base year is outdated and should be updated urgently. This had been a repeated recommendation.
  • A persistent criticism has been India’s use of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) instead of a Producer Price Index (PPI) to deflate nominal GDP.
  • This affects the accuracy of real GDP calculations, since WPI is not fully representative of producer-level prices.

What Comes Next for India’s Official Statistics

  • New GDP Series Launch in February 2026
    • MoSPI will release the new GDP series with 2022–23 as the base year on February 27, 2026.
    • This series is expected to include methodological improvements and new data sources.
    • The first numbers released will be:
      • Q3 2025–26 GDP (Oct–Dec 2025)
      • Second advance estimate for FY 2025–26
  • Updated CPI Inflation Series
    • A revised CPI series will be introduced earlier, on February 12, 2026, based on:
      • The 2023–24 Household Consumption Expenditure Survey
      • 2024 as the new base year
    • This will replace the current CPI series based on the 2011–12 survey.
  • Other Major Statistical Updates
    • Additional updates planned under the statistical overhaul include:
      • A new Index of Industrial Production (IIP) with 2022–23 as the base year
      • Expanded and modernised datasets across sectors to align with current economic structure
  • More Frequent Balance of Payments Data
    • The Reserve Bank of India plans to publish monthly Balance of Payments (BoP) statistics, including the crucial current account balance, instead of only quarterly updates.
    • This will improve the timeliness and granularity of external sector monitoring.

Source: IE | MC

IMF Rating on India’s GDP Data FAQs

Q1: Why did the IMF give India’s GDP data a C-grade in 2025?

Ans: The IMF said India’s national accounts have shortcomings in coverage, timeliness, and methodology, which somewhat hamper economic surveillance despite improvements in other statistical areas.

Q2: What concerns did the IMF raise about India’s data quality?

Ans: IMF highlighted outdated base years, need for regular revisions, delayed census data, and gaps in Centre–State fiscal statistics, suggesting improvements for better policymaking.

Q3: How was India’s data rated before the new four-tier system?

Ans: Before 2024, IMF described India’s data as “broadly adequate,” and in 2016 even “adequate for surveillance,” showing a gradual decline in confidence over time.

Q4: What caused IMF concerns after India updated GDP series in 2015?

Ans: Large revisions, short historical series, and inconsistencies between GDP-by-activity and GDP-by-expenditure complicated analysis and raised questions about data reliability.

Q5: What major changes to India’s statistical system are coming next?

Ans: India will release a new GDP series (base 2022–23), updated CPI, revised IIP, and monthly Balance of Payments data starting February 2026 to improve statistical robustness.

Enquire Now