Daily Editorial Analysis 5 November 2026

Anaemia Burden – Iron Alone is No Solution

Context

• The National Family Health Survey-5 (NFHS-5) found that more than half of women and approximately two-thirds of young children are anaemic.
• Double-Fortified Salt (DFS), containing iodine and iron, has been proposed as a convenient solution.
• However, convenience does not guarantee effectiveness. Excessive salt consumption, risks associated with iron accumulation and the multiple causes of anaemia raise questions about the suitability of universal fortification.

The Contradiction Between Iron Fortification and Salt Reduction

• The effectiveness of DFS depends on regular salt consumption.
• However, Indians consume approximately twice the WHO-recommended five grams of salt per day.
• Nearly one in three Indian adults suffers from hypertension, while India’s National Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) action plan aims for a 30% reduction in salt intake.
• DFS potentially contradicts these objectives because its delivery mechanism depends on continued salt consumption.
• Moreover, salt intake varies across population groups. Adult men generally consume more salt than women and children, meaning that those with greater iron requirements may receive smaller quantities.
• Thus, universal salt fortification may create an imbalance between nutritional requirements and actual iron consumption.

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Iron as a Nutrient

• Health Risks Associated with Excessive Iron
  • International studies have raised concerns about indiscriminate iron supplementation.
  • The 2006 Pemba trial in Tanzania associated iron and folic acid supplementation among children in a malaria-endemic setting with increased hospitalisations and deaths.
  • A 2015 Kenyan trial found that iron-fortified foods altered infants’ gut microbiota towards pathogenic bacteria and increased diarrhoeal infections.
  • These findings are relevant to India because several regions face malaria and inadequate sanitation.
• Haemoglobinopathies and Iron Overload
  • India has millions of beta-thalassaemia carriers, while sickle cell disease is concentrated in several tribal regions.
  • People with thalassaemia, particularly those receiving repeated blood transfusions, are vulnerable to iron overload.
  • Screening everyone before introducing fortified salt is impractical, especially considering that the Public Distribution System (PDS) reaches approximately 800 million people.
• The Problem of Cumulative Iron Exposure
  • Fortified rice is already distributed through the PDS, PM POSHAN and ICDS, while iron-folic acid tablets reach several population groups.
  • Introducing DFS could expose children and adolescents to iron through multiple government programmes simultaneously.
  • The absence of comprehensive research on cumulative iron intake makes a nationwide rollout premature.
• Iron Absorption and Dietary Limitations
  • DFS generally contains non-haem iron, whose absorption depends on dietary composition.
  • Phytates in cereals, millets and pulses, polyphenols in tea and coffee, and calcium in milk inhibit iron absorption.
  • Since fortified salt is consumed with food, much of its iron may remain unabsorbed. Furthermore, infections and inflammation increase hepcidin, a hormone that restricts iron absorption.
  • Consequently, fortification may be least effective among populations with high infection burdens.

Iron Deficiency Only in Half of Anaemia Cases

• Multiple Causes of Anaemia
  • India’s Comprehensive National Nutrition Survey (2016–18) also found that iron deficiency explained only part of anaemia among children and adolescents.
  • Other important causes include:
• Folate and vitamin B12 deficiencies, particularly among populations with limited dietary diversity.
  • Chronic inflammation, recurrent infections, malaria and hookworm.
  • Poor sanitation and inadequate hygiene.
  • Haemoglobinopathies, including thalassaemia and sickle cell disease.
  • Protein and vitamin A deficiencies.
  • Early marriage, pregnancy, adolescent undernutrition and menstrual blood loss.
  • Therefore, treating anaemia exclusively through iron fortification risks overlooking its underlying causes.

Lessons and Policy Recommendations for India

• Lessons from Peru
  • Peru achieved a double-digit reduction in child anaemia during the early 2010s through political prioritisation, individual tracking of children, iron supplementation, micronutrient powders and cash transfers.
  • However, progress reversed when COVID-19 disrupted healthcare delivery.
  • This demonstrates the importance of sustained public health services and institutional accountability.
• Lessons from Vietnam
  • Vietnam reduced anaemia among women through weekly iron-folic acid supplementation, deworming and fortified fish sauce containing NaFeEDTA, an iron compound better absorbed in phytate-rich diets.
  • Rising incomes and greater dietary diversity complemented these interventions.
  • Its experience demonstrates that fortification must be adapted to local dietary patterns and supported by broader nutritional measures.
• Policy Recommendations for India
  • India should avoid an immediate nationwide rollout of DFS and instead:
  • Conduct monitored district-level pilot programmes.
  • Measure haemoglobin, ferritin and inflammation markers.
  • Assess cumulative iron exposure across government programmes.
  • Monitor risks in malaria-endemic and haemoglobinopathy-prone regions.
  • Adopt better-absorbed iron forms and targeted fortification.
  • Strengthen diagnostics, deworming, malaria prevention and sanitation.
  • Improve affordable access to diverse and nutritious foods.

Conclusion

• India’s anaemia burden requires urgent intervention, but universal iron fortification through DFS may create health risks and conflict with salt-reduction objectives.
• The experiences of Peru and Vietnam demonstrate that successful anaemia reduction requires integrated nutrition programmes, targeted supplementation and effective healthcare delivery.
• India must adopt an evidence-based strategy that addresses nutritional deficiencies, infections, sanitation and socioeconomic inequalities.
• Ultimately, anaemia is a multidimensional public health challenge, not merely a nutritional deficiency that can be corrected through an additive in the salt bottle.

Anaemia Burden — Iron Alone is No Solution FAQs

Q1. What is Double-Fortified Salt (DFS)?

Ans. DFS is salt fortified with iodine and iron to address nutritional deficiencies.

Q2. Why is DFS considered problematic?

Ans. DFS may conflict with salt-reduction goals and create risks of excessive iron intake.

Q3. What are the major causes of anaemia besides iron deficiency?

Ans. Other causes include vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies, infections, malaria, hookworm and haemoglobinopathies.

Q4. What lessons can India learn from Peru and Vietnam?

Ans. India can learn the importance of targeted supplementation, dietary diversity and sustained healthcare delivery.

Q5. What should India prioritise to reduce anaemia?

Ans. India should prioritise better diagnostics, affordable nutritious food, deworming, sanitation and targeted iron supplementation.

Source: The Hindu

What the BRICS Carbon Market Partnership Needs

Context

• Carbon markets are important instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and financing the transition towards a low-carbon economy.
• However, differences in national regulations, accounting methodologies and verification standards have prevented the development of interconnected international markets.
• At the 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, members reiterated their commitment to the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership.
• India should prioritise developing a common regulatory rulebook rather than immediately establishing a unified trading platform.

Growing Importance of BRICS Carbon Markets

• Eight BRICS members reportedly operate voluntary carbon markets, while Brazil, China, India and Indonesia account for over one-third of registered carbon credit projects worldwide.
• Their domestic compliance systems are also developing. China has expanded its Emissions Trading System (ETS) to steel, cement and aluminium.
• India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) has notified emission-intensity targets for 490 entities across nine sectors and introduced an offset mechanism.
• Brazil established its Brazilian Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System (SBCE) in 2024, based on an absolute emissions cap.
• Despite these developments, national markets remain disconnected because of differences in regulations, accounting procedures and eligibility criteria.
• Common principles are therefore necessary to improve transparency and interoperability.

Divergence and a Common Framework

• Differences in Domestic Carbon Market Structures
  • China and India follow output-based emissions-intensity benchmarks, whereas Brazil is establishing an absolute emissions cap.
  • Their offset-credit eligibility rules also differ. China accepts domestic certified credits, India restricts eligibility to projects initiated after January 1, 2025, and Brazil requires accredited methodologies.
  • The legal status of carbon units varies too. Brazil regulates its market through securities authorities, whereas India facilitates carbon certificate trading through power exchanges under CERC regulations.
  • Consequently, identical emissions reductions represent different legal instruments across jurisdictions.
• Establishing Common Measurement and Verification Standards
  • The first priority should be harmonising Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems.
  • Common standards would ensure consistent measurement, independent verification and transparent reporting of emissions reductions.
  • The 2025 BRICS Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Accounting provide a foundation through comparable benchmarks and interoperable systems. These principles should be operationalised using ISO 14064 standards while preserving national regulatory autonomy.
• External Pressure from Carbon Border Measures
  • The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase in January 2026, while the United Kingdom will follow in January 2027.
  • These mechanisms impose carbon-related costs on imports of steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers and hydrogen.
  • Recognition of carbon prices paid in exporting countries requires verified evidence.
  • The UK’s recognition of India’s CCTS in August 2026 demonstrates the importance of accredited verification.
  • Exporters without reliable emissions data risk punitive default values. A common BRICS framework would strengthen collective bargaining and reduce compliance costs.

Necessary Steps to Link Domestic Carbon Projects

• Developing a Common Rulebook
  • A BRICS rulebook should prioritise three areas:
    • Common monitoring standards: Establish consistent emissions-monitoring and reporting procedures, particularly for industries exposed to carbon border adjustments.
    • Mutual recognition of verifiers: Recognise verifiers accredited by members’ national accreditation bodies.
    • Harmonised registries: Adopt compatible data fields to facilitate information exchange and prevent duplication.
  • These measures would provide exporters with a common compliance pathway and strengthen BRICS’ negotiating position.
  • Credible emissions accounting is essential to challenge unilateral carbon border measures effectively.
• Introducing a Pilot Carbon Credit Exchange
  • The second priority should be a limited pilot exchange involving domestic carbon projects.
  • Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement provides the legal basis for bilateral transfers of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, subject to corresponding adjustments.
  • Two or three BRICS members could mutually recognise selected methodologies and permit capped transfers of authorised credits within domestic offset limits.
  • The pilot would identify practical challenges, including corresponding adjustments, financial regulations, legal classification of carbon units and prevention of double counting.
  • Its objective should be institutional learning rather than maximising trading volumes.

The Way Forward: Using Existing Institutions

• The New Development Bank (NDB) could establish a shared registry data facility or purchasing mechanism for pilot carbon units, improving transparency and reducing transaction costs.
• A portion of carbon-transfer proceeds could support climate adaptation financing, giving countries with limited mitigation potential an incentive to participate.
• However, national interests diverge. China’s industrial scale could make it a dominant price-setter, sanctions may complicate settlements, and competition in steel and aluminium exports could discourage integration.
• Therefore, full integration of compliance markets is neither realistic nor desirable at present.
• Common MRV standards and limited pilot exchanges offer a practical alternative while preserving national autonomy.

Conclusion

• The BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership offers an opportunity to strengthen climate cooperation among emerging economies.
• Its success requires moving beyond general commitments towards practical institutional arrangements.
• Priorities should include common MRV standards, mutual recognition of verifiers, interoperable registries and pilot carbon exchanges.
• Supported by the New Development Bank, these measures can strengthen domestic markets and collective bargaining capacity.
• Ultimately, a common carbon market rulebook can establish BRICS as a credible force in global climate governance while advancing equitable carbon accounting, climate justice and sustainable development.

What the BRICS Carbon Market Partnership Needs FAQs

Q1. What is the main objective of the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership?

Ans. The partnership aims to strengthen cooperation among BRICS members through common carbon market standards and capacity-building.

Q2. What is the major challenge facing BRICS carbon markets?

Ans. The major challenge is the lack of common regulations, accounting methodologies and verification standards.

Q3. What is the significance of CBAM for BRICS countries?

Ans. CBAM increases compliance costs for exporters by imposing carbon-related charges on emissions-intensive imports.

Q4. How can Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement help BRICS?

Ans. Article 6.2 enables bilateral transfers of carbon credits between countries through internationally transferred mitigation outcomes.

Q5. What role can the New Development Bank play in carbon market cooperation?

Ans. The New Development Bank can establish shared registry facilities and support carbon credit transactions and climate adaptation financing.

Source: The Hindu