Key Presidential References in India: From Cauvery Dispute to 2G Spectrum Case

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What’s in Today’s Article?

President Droupadi Murmu has sought the Supreme Court’s opinion—through a Presidential Reference—on whether the Court can use its Article 142 powers to set deadlines for the President and Governors to act on state Bills.
Historically, various governments have used the Presidential Reference mechanism to seek legal clarity on complex issues with political implications.
Notable examples include the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi dispute, the Cauvery water issue, election timing after the 2002 Gujarat riots, and the 2G spectrum case.

In June 1991, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal ordered Karnataka to release 205 tmcft of water to Tamil Nadu.

In defiance of the Tribunal’s order, the then Karnataka government issued the Karnataka-Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance to override the directive.

The President sought the Supreme Court’s opinion on three questions:
- Whether Karnataka’s Ordinance was constitutionally valid.
- Whether the Tribunal’s order qualified as a “report and decision” under Section 5(2) of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.
- Whether the Tribunal had the authority to grant interim relief.

The Ordinance (later an Act) was ultra vires the Constitution and beyond Karnataka’s legislative competence.
The Tribunal’s order was a valid report and decision under Section 5(2).
The Tribunal could grant interim relief, but only upon reference by the Central Government.

In 2001, the Gujarat government enacted the Gujarat Gas (Regulation of Transmission, Supply and Distribution) Act.
This led to a Presidential Reference questioning the constitutional validity of the Act, as oil and gas fall under the Union List.

Is natural gas (including LNG) a Union subject under Entry 53 of List I, giving the Union exclusive legislative power?
Do states have competence to legislate on natural gas under Entry 25 of List II (State List)?
Did Gujarat have the authority to enact this law?

The Court ruled that natural gas and LNG fall exclusively under Union jurisdiction.
States do not have legislative competence to make laws on these subjects.
Therefore, the Gujarat Act, in relation to natural gas and LNG, was ultra vires the Constitution.

After the 2002 Gujarat riots, the then state government recommended early elections.
The Assembly, though due for polls in March 2003, was dissolved in July 2002 by Governor S. S. Bhandari on the advice of the Narendra Modi Cabinet.
The last sitting of the Assembly had been held on April 3, 2002, triggering a six-month window under Article 174 to reconvene the House.

The Election Commission (EC) stated that elections could not be held before October 3, 2002, due to logistical and security constraints.

Then President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam referred three questions to the Supreme Court:
- Does Article 174 depend on the EC’s authority under Article 324 regarding election scheduling?
- Can the EC assume Article 356 (President’s Rule) will be invoked if Article 174’s timeline is breached?
- Is the EC obliged to fulfill Article 174 by utilizing all Union and State resources to conduct elections?

Article 174 applies only to existing (“live”) Assemblies, not dissolved ones.
Article 324 and 174 operate in different spheres—the former governs elections, the latter concerns Assembly sessions.
The EC’s discretion to schedule polls was upheld, and there was no constitutional requirement to hold elections within six months of the last sitting in case of premature dissolution.

Within an hour of the verdict, the EC announced elections for December 12, 2002, validating its authority to independently manage the electoral schedule even amid political pressure.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s February 2012 verdict cancelling 122 2G telecom licences, the then government led by Manmohan Singh sought clarification through a Presidential Reference.

The central question was: Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?
- The concern stemmed from the Court’s earlier observations that natural resources should be allocated through auctions.

A Constitution Bench ruled that auctions are not the only constitutionally valid method for allocating natural resources.
Auction is an economic policy, not a constitutional requirement.
The Court deferred to the Executive’s wisdom, stating it was not competent to evaluate economic methods like auctions versus other modes of allocation.

The Court refused to prescribe a single method for all sectors and situations.
Economic decisions involve complex trade-offs, and judicial overreach in such matters is not appropriate.
The judgment underscored that policy-making lies within the domain of the Executive, not the Judiciary.